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Although the obsessions implicated in obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD) could theoretically involve any distressing topic, they typically gravitate 
toward a handful of specific themes (e.g., contamination, religion, sex, etc.). 
The universality of these themes across OCD patients from different time 
periods, cultures, and age-groups suggests they are manifestations of a common, 
underlying process, but little effort has been made to elucidate the identity of 
this process. One intriguing feature shared across most common obsessions is a 
heightened concern with consequences that are objectively terrible but highly 
unlikely (e.g., catching HIV from a doorknob, being sent to hell for a fleeting 
immoral thought). The ubiquity of this particular consequence suggests that 
OCD may be characterized by an underlying sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes (SIC), but this possibility has yet to be explored. The present 
dissertation sought to address this gap by examining whether OCD symptoms 
predicted higher anxious reactivity toward unlikely, highly aversive threats 
across three experimental studies. In the first study, college students with 
higher OCD symptoms exhibited greater avoidance of improbable, highly 
aversive threats, as well as greater expectancy and physiological reactivity for 
improbable threats in general. An extension of this investigation with different 
types of experimental threats (study two) showed that OCD symptoms 
predicted heightened expectancy of improbable threats involving both harmful 
and disgust-related consequences, while relations between OCD symptoms and 
avoidance of improbable, highly aversive consequences were specific to 
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harmful threats. Finally, study three showed that differences in expectancy, 
anxiety, and avoidance for improbable threats prospectively predicted changes 
in OCD symptoms over the first year of college, with indices of anxious 
reactivity to improbable threat (anxiety, startle, avoidance) emerging as 
especially predictive among participants who rated the threat as highly 
aversive. Together, these studies implicate SIC as a novel pathogenic marker of 
OCD and suggest its role in the illness may derive from a more general 
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Chapter 1: The Role of Improbable Catastrophes in OCD 
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a well-known psychiatric condition, 
defined by either obsessions, compulsions, or both (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). Obsessions are recurrent and persistent thoughts, 
urges, impulses, or ideas that a) are experienced as intrusive and unwanted, b) 
typically provoke distress or anxiety, and c) the sufferer tries to ignore, 
suppress, or neutralize with them some other thought or action. Compulsions 
are repetitive, time-consuming behaviors (e.g., handwashing) or mental acts 
(e.g., counting) that the sufferer feels they must perform in response to the 
obsession or according to rigid rules. 
Although compulsions are aimed at reducing anxiety or distress, or to 
prevent some dreaded event, they are not connected to such events in a 
realistic way, or are clearly excessive (APA, 2013). However, because 
compulsions provide temporary relief of distress, they are reinforced and thus 
become more likely to be re-enacted in the future (Taylor, 2009). The 
functional impact of these symptoms, moreover, is often debilitating: OCD is 
associated with significant social, educational, and occupational impairment 
and reduced quality of life (Huppert, Simpson, Nissensen, Liebowitz, & Foa, 
2009) and is believed to be the 10th largest source of disability in the 
developed world (Lopez & Murray, 1998). 
Characteristics of OCD 
 
Epidemiology and Demographics 
 
OCD has estimated 12-month and lifetime prevalence rates of 2.5% and 
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1.2%, respectively (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, Ressler, 2010; Kessler, Petukhova, 
Sampson, Zaslavsy, & Wittchen, 2012). Among those with OCD, 96% have 
both obsessions and compulsions, 2% have only obsessions, and 2% have only 
compulsions (Foa & Kozak, 1995). Sub-clinical OCD symptoms are even more 
common, as 25% of the population is estimated to experience least one OCD 
obsession or one OCD compulsion over a 12-month period (Stein, Forde, 
Anderson, & Walker, 1997). 
OCD is most likely to emerge in early 20s (Rasmussen and Eisen, 
1992), though its mean age-of-onset may be as late as mid 30s in some 
countries (Weissman, 1998). Other work suggests OCD’s age-of-onset is 
bimodal, peaking at approximately 11 years of age and again at around 23 
years of age (Delorme et al., 2003). These different age-of-onset classes also 
possess divergent clinical correlates (e.g., Tukël et al., 2005), indicating they 
may be distinct OCD subtypes (Chabane et al., 2005). Regardless of when it 
develops, OCD tends to be chronic (Rasmussen & Tuang, 1986), though some 
may experience a more episodic course (Skoog & Skoog, 1999), or 
progressively worsening symptoms over time (Goodwin et al., 1969). 
OCD is slightly more prevalent in females than males (Rasmussen and 
Eisen, 1992). However early-onset OCD is more common among males 
(Riddle et al. 1990; Leckman et al., 1997), who comprise approximately 70% 
of such cases (Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane, & Cheslow, 1989). OCD is 
slightly less common among black individuals, but the effect does not appear 
to be specific to OCD and may be the result of reduced service 
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utilization/delivery (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Overall, the demographic 
(e.g., gender) and clinical features (e.g., course) of OCD appear to be quite 
consistent across cultures (Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, Marques, Versiani, 2004). 
Comorbidity patterns 
 
Between 45 - 55% of individuals with OCD have a concurrent 
comorbid psychiatric condition, while approximately 78% have a lifetime 
comorbid psychiatric condition (Hofmeijer- Sevink et al., 2013; Dennys, 
Tenney, van Megen, Geus, & Westenberg, 2004). Among OCD- related 
conditions, OCD is most commonly comorbid with tic disorder (12.5%) and 
body dysmorphic disorder (8.7%); among anxiety-related conditions, OCD is 
most commonly comorbid with social anxiety disorder (14%) and generalized 
anxiety disorder (13%; Lochner et al., 2014). Additionally, 25% of OCD 
patients meet criteria for hoarding disorder, which was recently recognized as 
a separate condition (Wheaton, Timpano, Lasalle-Ricci, Murphy, 2008), and 
approximately 20% of individuals with OCD meet criteria for major 
depressive disorder (Dennys et al., 2004), though some studies estimate the 
proportion to be as high as one-third (Overbeek, Schruers, Vermette, & Griez, 
2002). A smaller but significant proportion of OCD patients also meet criteria 
for eating disorders (11.3%; Sallet et al., 2010), substance use disorder (4.3%), 
and psychotic-spectrum conditions (3.3%; Denys et al., 2004). Finally, 
approximately 25% of OCD patients meet criteria for obsessive-compulsive 
personality disorder (Coles, Pinto, Mancebo, Rasmussen, & Eisen, 2008). 
In virtually all cases, OCD develops after rather than before its 
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comorbid mental disorder  (Ruscio et al., 2010). The exceptions to this are 
separation anxiety disorder, which usually develops before OCD, and PTSD, 
which typically develops in the same year (Ruscio et al., 2010). 
Treatment 
 
Like many mental illnesses, OCD is usually addressed through a 
combination of psychological and pharmacological treatments. For 
psychological treatment, the intervention with the strongest empirical support 
is Exposure with Response Prevention Treatment (EX/RP), which involves 
exposing patients to gradually more distressing obsession-provoking scenarios 
while simultaneously preventing compulsions (National Collaborating Centre 
for Mental Health, 2006). EX/RP has consistently demonstrated large effect 
sizes when it comes to reducing OCD symptoms relative to waitlist control 
treatments (Christensen, Hadzi-Pavlovic, & Mattic, 1987) and active control 
treatments (e.g., relaxation techniques; Abramowitz, 1997). Cognitive therapy 
(CT), which involves addressing maladaptive beliefs such as the importance of 
controlling thoughts, has been found to be equally effective as EX/RP (Rosa-
Alcàzar, 2008; Olatunji, Davis, Powers, & Smits, 2013). Meta-analytic work 
also suggests that both treatments are significantly more effective in treating 
OCD in children compared to adults (Olatunji et al., 2013). 
Regarding psychiatric medication, OCD is most commonly treated with 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), which have consistently 
outperformed placebo controls in reducing OCD symptoms (Soomro, Altmna, 
Rajagopal, & Browne, 2008). There is also evidence that higher doses of SSRIs 
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are associated with greater symptom reduction, though they have also been 
shown to result in a higher treatment dropout rate (Bloch, McGuire, Landeros- 
Weisenberger, Leckman, & Pittenger, 2010). SSRIs do not appear to facilitate a 
greater reduction in OCD symptoms beyond psychological treatment, but they 
have been shown to significantly reduce depression symptoms in OCD patients 
beyond psychological treatment (O’Connor et al., 2006). 
Though SSRIs, CT, and EX/RP have been associated with large effect 
sizes in the treatment of OCD, they nonetheless remain ineffective in many 
cases. For SSRI treatment, up to 40-60% of OCD clients do not have a 
satisfactory outcome with SSRIs (Pigott & Seay, 1999; Jenike & Rauch, 
1994). For EX/RP and CT, only 40-50% of OCD clients show a significant 




Traditionally, OCD is believed to arise from disruption in the cortico-
striatal-thalamic circuit (CSTC), based on findings showing abnormal metabolic 
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate/caudal medial prefrontal 
cortex, and the caudate nucleus (Saxena, Brody, Schwartz, & Baxter, 1998). 
Additionally, this network tends to show increased activity both “at rest” and 
during symptom provocation among OCD patients, as well reduced activity 
following treatment (Graybiel & Rauch, 2000). Functionally, this circuit has 
been implicated in the formation of habits, suggesting its excessive activation 
could facilitate highly repetitive thoughts (obsessions) and actions 
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(compulsions) that the person has difficulty stopping (Graybiel, 1997). Indeed, 
stimulation of the CSTC circuit in rodents produces OCD-like habitual 
behaviors like repetitive grooming, which eventually become independent of 
stimulation and are effectively reduced using SSRIs (Ahmari et al., 2013). 
However, more recent neurobiological models of OCD implicate the amygdala 
and hippocampus as modulators the CSTC, perhaps explaining why anxiety is 
often coincident with obsessional thoughts (Milad & Rauch, 2012) 
Like most mental illnesses, OCD tends to be quite heritable. Twin 
studies estimate OCD’s heritability to be between 27-47% for adult cases and 
45-65% for child cases (Pauls, 2008), with potentially higher heritability rates 
for obsessions relative to compulsions (Jonnal, Gardner, Prescott, & Kendler, 
2000). The heritability of OCD has also been demonstrated in family studies, 
where its prevalence is approximately 12% among relatives of OCD probands 
(Pauls, Alsobrook, Goodman, Rasmussen, & Leckman, 1995). There is also 
strong evidence that OCD involves at least one major susceptibility locus for 
both adult-onset and child-onset cases, which has higher penetrance in females 
(Grados, Walkup, & Walford, 2003). Genetic association studies have also 
found links between OCD and genes commonly implicated in many mental 
illnesses such as the serotonin transport genes (5-HTTLPR), serotonin receptor 
genes (5HT1-D beta; 5HT2A), and the low-activity allele of the catechol-
methyltransferase heterozygous genotype (COMT; Nestadt, Grados, & 
Samuels, 2010). Notably, OCD does not appear to be any more heritable than 





Although technically a unitary construct, OCD is known to exhibit 
several distinct symptom presentations (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Common 
obsessions include: Concerns with contacting germs, dirt, or disease 
(contamination); fears of bringing about a disaster for failing to check 
something thoroughly or completely (pathological doubting); concerns with 
properly following religious or moral rules (scrupulosity); concerns with acting 
on some hidden aggressive impulse (aggressive OCD); concerns with 
possessing and/or acting upon a secret sexual desire that is discrepant from 
one’s perceived sexual identity (sexual OCD); an immoderate focus on one’s 
bodily functions or appearance, including their potential malfunctions and 
abnormalities (somatic OCD); and an excessive preoccupation with order, 
symmetry, exactness, and organization, particularly regarding one’s 
possessions or environment (symmetry). Not surprisingly, some of the most 
common compulsions are those that are thematically linked to common 
obsessions, for instance: repeated handwashing or cleaning (washing/cleaning) 
for contamination obsessions; repeatedly checking measures necessary for 
preventing disaster (checking) for pathological doubting; and repeatedly lining 
up, straightening, or organizing personal objects (ordering) for symmetry 
obsessions. However, there are other common compulsions that are not 
explicitly tied to particular obsessions, including repeating certain trivial 




Research on specific OCD presentations has typically focused on 
elucidating their differences (McKay et al., 2004). First, there is fairly 
compelling evidence that certain presentations co-occur with each other more 
commonly, suggesting etiological divergence. For  instance, in a meta-
analysis of 21 factor analytic studies of OCD symptom presentations (N = 
5124 OCD patients), Bloch, Landeros-Weisenberger, Rosario, Pittenger, & 
Leckman (2008) found a four-factor solution explained 79% of the variance 
in OCD symptom heterogeneity: A symmetry factor composed of symmetry 
obsessions and repeating, ordering, and counting compulsions; a forbidden 
thoughts factor, composed of aggressive, sexual, religious, and somatic 
obsessions and checking compulsions; a cleaning factor, composed of 
contamination obsessions and cleaning/washing compulsions; and a hoarding 
factor, composed of hoarding obsessions and hoarding compulsions. 
Further support for the heterogeneous nature of OCD comes from 
studies showing that its symptom dimensions exhibit divergent clinical 
correlates. For instance, hoarding consistently demonstrates a poorer response 
to psychological and pharmacological treatments (Mataix-Cols, Marks, Greist, 
Kobak, & Baer 2002; Abramowitz, Franklin, Schwartz, & Furr, 2003; Stein, 
Andersen & Overo, 2007), as do sexual obsessions and religious obsessions in 
some studies (Mataix-Cols et al. 2002; Alonso, Menchon, & Pifarre, 2001; 
Shetti, Reddy, Kandavel, 2005; though see Mataix-Cols, Rauch, Manzo, 
Jenike, & Baer, 1999; Stein, Andersen, & Overo, 2007). OCD symptom 
dimensions may also involve different psychiatric comorbidities (Hasler et al., 
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2005). For instance, the forbidden thoughts factor has been broadly associated 
with higher risk of anxiety and mood pathology (e.g., generalized anxiety 
disorder, depression, panic disorder, social phobia) as well as alcohol abuse; 
the symmetry/ordering factor has been associated with elevated risk of 
agoraphobia specifically; and the cleaning factor has been associated with 
elevated risk of eating disorders (Hasler et al., 2005). Additionally, the 
symmetry/ordering and hoarding symptoms are consistently more prevalent 
among those with comorbid obsessive compulsive personality disorder (e.g. 
Coles et al., 2008; Lochner et al., 2011). Finally, there is also compelling 
evidence from a large sample of OCD patients (N = 955) that the symmetry 
dimension is associated with an earlier age of onset than the other dimensions 
and that individuals with higher levels of the forbidden thoughts factor are 
more likely to evidence a waxing-waning symptom course (Kichuk et al., 
2013). 
In addition to exhibiting divergent clinical correlates, there is also 
evidence that OCD symptom presentations possess distinct neurobiological 
profiles. Much of the early evidence for this assertion came from 
neuropsychological studies. For instance, individuals with primary 
aggressive/checking symptoms have shown worse performance on trail-making 
tests (Hashimoto et al., 2011), while those with primary checking symptoms 
have shown worse performance on tests of episodic memory and response 
inhibition compared to those with primary washing symptoms (Omori et al., 
2007). More recently, the symmetry/ordering dimension has been linked to 
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poorer verbal fluency, checking/doubting to poorer cognitive flexibility, and 
contamination to poorer visuospatial construction (Kashyap, Kumar, Kandavel, 
& Reddy, 2017). These divergent neuropsychological abilities are consistent 
with OCD symptom presentations showing different neurobiological activation 
patterns, such as in studies comparing patients with primary checking 
symptoms to those with primary washing symptoms (e.g., Murayama et al., 
2013; Mataix-Cols et al., 2004). 
Etiological theories 
 
Although the exact causes of OCD remain unknown, several 
contemporary theories have outlined a detailed account of the disorder’s 
origin. The most widespread of these theories are ‘cognitive-appraisal models’ 
(CAMs), which propose that intrusive thoughts are a normal part of conscious 
experience, and only take on an anxiety-provoking or distressing nature in 
OCD because their meaning is catastrophically misinterpreted. For instance, 
while an unaffected individual might appraise an intrusive thought about 
harming their infant as preposterous and unworthy of further consideration, an 
individual with OCD might interpret this same thought as evidence that they 
are capable of such an act, thereby provoking significant anxiety and 
motivation to neutralize its possibility. In support, virtually all people report 
experiencing an OCD-like intrusive thought on at least an occasional basis 
(e.g., Belloch, Morillo, Lucero, Cabedo, Carrió, 2004), suggesting that it is the 
reaction to intrusive thoughts rather than the experience of intrusive thoughts 
that is cause of obsessions. 
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The first well-articulated CAM was proposed by Salkovskis (1996), 
who argued that intrusive thoughts take on an obsessive quality when the 
person interprets their associated consequence as one for which they would be 
personally responsible. Salkovkis suggested that this responsibility appraisal 
arises from more global beliefs about the nature and meaning of thoughts (e.g., 
thoughts of harm are morally equivalent to harmful actions, failing to prevent 
harm is the same as causing it, etc.; Salkovskis, 1985), which in turn are 
acquired through experiences that engender a stricter code of conduct and 
responsibility (e.g., growing up in an extremely religious household; 
Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). Theorists later built upon 
Salkovskis’s model by proposing other pathological beliefs that could produce 
similar distress-evoking misappraisals of intrusive thoughts. The most 
comprehensive such theory was developed by the Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 2003), who proposed that intrusions 
could also translate into obsessions via beliefs about the over- importance of 
thoughts (e.g., belief that a thought has ethical or moral ramifications, or can 
increase the probability of the corresponding event/behavior), the need to 
control thoughts (i.e., belief that compete control over one’s thoughts is 
necessary and possible), overestimation of threat (i.e., belief that negative 
events are especially likely and would be especially awful), perfectionism (i.e., 
belief that mistakes and imperfection are intolerable), and intolerance of 
uncertainty (i.e., belief that it is necessary and possible to be certain that 
negative outcomes will not occur). 
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Since the development of CAMs, other competing models of OCD 
pathology have risen to prominence. One such theory was proposed by 
Szechtman and Woody (2004), who contended that OCD is caused by an 
abnormality in the so-called “Security Motivation System” (SMS): An evolved 
threat system designed to detect subtle or hidden indications of danger. 
Specifically, the authors propose that OCD persons are unable to generate the 
“feeling of knowing”, which under normal circumstances serves as a satiety 
signal to shut down the SMS. In this way, the SMS theory breaks from CAMs 
in considering OCD as a pathology stopping (i.e., failure to put a closure on 
experience) rather than starting (i.e., an anxiety-provoking misappraisal of an 
intrusive thought that triggers compulsive behavior). The SMS also affords 
affective responses (i.e., subjective feelings of risk) a more central position in 
the development of OCD compared to cognitive responses (i.e., beliefs about 
the nature of intrusive thoughts), which breaks from the cognitive-focused 
claims of CAM. 
Another contemporary OCD theory is the Inference-Based Approach 
(IBA) model (O’Connor et al., 2005). The key tenet of the IBA model is that 
those with OCD are overly reliant on possibility-based information (e.g., “my 
hands might be dirty”) relative to sensory information (i.e., “I see no dirt on 
my hands”). This tendency in turn causes remote possibilities to be treated as 
actual probabilities, which when paired with a distrust of the senses allows 
such possibilities to take on an obsessional quality. Thus, unlike belief-
appraisal models, the IBA model proposes that OCD symptoms are the result 
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of a distinct reasoning error (i.e., overweighting possibility-based information 
relative to sensory information) rather than one of several beliefs about the 
nature of intrusive thoughts. Moreover, the IBA model provides several 
distinct reasoning devices that could result in possibility-based information to 
be overweighed, thereby allowing some mechanistic flexibility in how IBA 
could lead to the development of different OCD concerns. For instance, OCD 
patients could come to doubt the veracity of sensory information through 
errors like over-categorization (e.g., ‘this table is dirty because the other table 
was dirty), over-comparing events (e.g., ‘my friend’s garage door sprang open 
so mine could as well’), utilizing out-of-context facts (e.g., ‘I could be infected 
because it’s a fact that microbes exist’), or creating imaginary narratives (e.g., 
‘I saw the red stain and I imagined it was blood, and that the blood was 
dripping on me, and so I could be contaminated’; O’Connor, Ecker, Lahoud, 
& Roberts 2012). 
Finally, a more recent model of OCD pathology proposed by Gillan and 
colleagues suggests that OCD is the result of excessive habit formation (Gillan 
et al., 2014; Gillan & Robbins, 2014; Gillan & Shakarian, 2015). More 
specifically, this model holds that compulsions, which are manifestations of 
excessive habit formation, actually develop prior to obsessions, which are more 
or less post-hoc justifications for what the patient perceives as odd and 
senseless behavior. In this way, the so-called ‘habit-hypothesis’ breaks 
significantly from all earlier etiological models by placing compulsions, rather 
than obsessions, as the primary driver of OCD pathology. Although the habit-
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hypothesis has yet to be critically evaluated, its claims are remarkably 
congruent with neurobiological models of OCD, which emphasize 
abnormalities in neural areas mediating habit formation (Graybiel, 1997). 
Moreover, these researchers report that at least some OCD patients use the sort 
reverse inference to justify their habitual actions that the model considers to be 
the origin of obsessions. For instance, participants retrospectively reported that 
their avoidance of a particular stimulus must have been because they feared it 
(Gillan et al., 2014). 
OCD Symptom Selectivity 
 
While research has clarified a great deal about the characteristics, 
treatment, and etiology of OCD, one feature of the illness that has gone largely 
unexplained is its remarkable selectivity for certain presentations. As early as 
the 1930s, clinicians noted that certain obsessional themes arose with 
remarkable frequency, such as those involving sex, contamination, and religion 
(Lewis, 1936). This sentiment was echoed more recently by prominent OCD 
epidemiologists Rasmussen and Eisen (1992), who in describing a decade’s 
worth of research cataloguing specific OCD subtypes stated the following 
about the disorder’s selective nature: 
 
 
“Inevitably, the beginning clinician is struck by the diversity of the 
clinical presentations of OCD. This initial impression, however, is soon 
replaced by the realization that the number and types of obsession and 
compulsions are remarkably limited and stereotypic. The basic types 
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and frequencies of OC symptoms have been found to be consistent 
across cultures and time. Why these particular symptom patterns 
develop remains unknown” (p. 748). 
 
 
The notion that OCD shows strong selectivity for certain presentations 
could have important etiological consequences. Specifically, high selectivity 
arguably suggests that certain presentations share (or perhaps trigger) some 
fundamental characteristic that other, unexpressed (or rarely expressed) 
presentations do not. As a relevant example, Seligman’s highly influential 
theory of preparedness (1971) leveraged the fact that certain phobias were 
selectively expressed more than others to identify an important latent similarity 
shared between them: That common phobias were by and large all “events 
related to survival of the human species through the long course of evolution” 
(p. 312). Although significant criticisms and revisions have been made to 
Seligman’s theory (see Öhman & Mineka, 2001 for a review), it nonetheless 
fostered critical etiological insights into specific phobias, such as the fact that 
they are mediated by more primitive, subcortical brain areas (Etkin & Wagner, 
2007), are observable in young children with no previous phobic contact 
(Matasaka, Hayakawa, & Kawai, 2010), and are particularly responsive to 
behavioral treatment (Ost, 1989). 
Curiously, none of the modern etiological theories of OCD have 
attempted to account for the disorder’s selective nature. CAMs contend to 
certain maladaptive beliefs could give rise to certain obsessive themes; 
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however, they make no attempt to explain why these rather broad belief 
structures (e.g., importance of controlling thoughts) would result in very 
specific kinds of obsessional content. A similar issue exists with the IBA 
model, which fails to explain why an over-reliance on possibility-based 
information would result only in a concern with certain possibilities. 
Szechtman and Woody’s (2004) theory makes some attempt to explain 
selectivity by proposing that the Security Motivation System, which fails to 
properly terminate in OCD, primes humans toward species-specific behaviors 
aimed at ensuring survival in our evolutionary past, (e.g., checking, cleaning 
and hoarding). However, it still unclear why such a broad motivation for 
preservation would manifest in only certain behaviors, as well as why many 
common OCD behaviors with no evolutionary relevance (e.g., checking if one 
hit a pedestrian with their car, obsessively testing whether one is gay) would 
arise in the disorder. Finally, the issue of selectivity is not circumvented by 
placing compulsions as the driver of OCD, as in Gillan’s habit hypothesis. 
Specifically, if obsessions are merely post-hoc justification for otherwise 
senseless habitual actions, why do the same justifications arise over and over 
again in different OCD patients? 
There are two possible reasons for why OCD researchers have generally 
eschewed the topic of symptom selectivity. First, there is no straightforward 
method of assessing the selectivity  of mental illnesses: DSM-based definitions 
often vary markedly in their phenomenological restrictions, making any 
judgment of a disorder’s selectivity highly subjective. For instance, the fact that 
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social anxiety disorder typically involves a small number of specific 
presentations (e.g., concerns with public speaking, eating in public, meeting 
strangers, and confronting authorities) does not imply that the illness is 
selective for these presentations since it is definitionally restricted to socially-
based fears. Second, OCD is becoming increasingly conceptualized as a 
markedly heterogeneous condition (e.g., Lochner & Stein, 2003), due in large 
part to a wealth of evidence demonstrating that its major subtypes are 
associated with divergent clinical and biological correlates (see previous 
section). As such, the notion that disparate OCD subtypes share some unifying 
feature(s), as implied by the disorder’s selective nature, has become 
increasingly de-emphasized and more empirically dubious over time, perhaps 
reducing enthusiasm for endeavors aimed at characterizing and explaining this 
phenomenon. 
Despite these barriers, I maintain that there is strong evidence for the 
notion that a) OCD  is highly selective for certain obsessional themes, and b) 
that the OCD subtypes associated with these themes share a common 
etiological underpinning. In the following two sections, I will review evidence 
for both these claims. 
Evidence for selectivity of obsessional themes 
 
As alluded to above, judgment of a disorder’s selectivity for particular 
presentations involves both a conceptual evaluation of its definitional 
constraints and an empirical evaluation of its presentational frequencies. More 
specifically, evidence for selectivity is most compelling if a disorder is broadly 
 
18 
defined but narrowly instantiated, implying that it could involve many 
presentations but in reality only takes on a few. 
In regard to the conceptual component of selectivity, it is noteworthy that 
OCD obsessions are defined quite broadly. Specifically, obsession may 
theoretically involve any thought, urge, or impulse so long as they are 
recurrent, persistent, and, at some point, experienced as intrusive or unwanted. 
Further, even though the sufferer must make some attempt to neutralize the 
thoughts, images, urges, or ideas, there are no constraints on what these 
neutralization attempts must involve (APA, 2013). Of note, this degree of 
definitional breadth is fairly unique among affective disorders. As pointed out 
by Brown, Zinbarg, and Barlow (1993), OCD and generalized anxiety disorder 
are the only anxiety-related illnesses where an excessively triggered cognitive 
process (i.e., obsessions and worry) constitutes a core definitional criterion of 
the disorder. Moreover, the definition of obsessions has changed very little over 
time (see APA, 1952, p. 33), allowing evidence for selectivity from different 
decades to be evaluated similarly. 
Regarding the empirical component of selectivity, studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated that OCD gravitates toward a handful of specific 
obsessional themes. Early on, Dowson (1977) found that fears of 
contamination, doubts concerning past events, and thoughts of violence, 
destruction, death, or injury were each present in approximately one-third or 
more of the study’s 41 OCD patients, which was remarkably similar to studies 
from different continents that used different methodologies (e.g., Akhtar, Wig, 
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Varma, Perhad, & Verma, 1975). Later, Rasmussen and Eisen (1992) found 
even more compelling results for obsessional selectivity using a larger (N = 
560) sample, where obsessional themes involving contamination, pathological 
doubting, sex, aggression, somatic concerns, and symmetry were each present 
in at least a quarter of OCD patients. In another large sample of OCD patients 
(N = 425), Foa and Kozak (1995) showed that OCD’s symptom selectivity is 
even higher when considering only primary obsessions (i.e., the three 
obsessions the patient finds the most distressing or impairing). Specifically, 
only 1% of this study’s sample identified a primary obsession that was not 
captured by eight distinct categories (Contamination, Fear of harming oneself 
or others, symmetry, somatic, religious, sexual, hoarding, and unacceptable 
urges), suggesting that clinically significant obsessional content is exceedingly 
rare outside of OCD’s major categories. 
Since these earlier studies, the development and proliferation of the 
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Symptom Checklist (Y-BOCS-SC; 
Goodman et al., 1989) has afforded a wealth of data on the frequency of 
specific OCD symptom presentations. Recently, I quantitatively reviewed this 
data by aggregating and comparing the frequency of specific OCD 
presentations assessed with the Y-BOCS for 9306 OCD patients across 51 
studies (Hunt, 2020). Overall, results from this review were remarkably 
similar to earlier epidemiological studies, demonstrating that at least one fifth 
of OCD patients reported obsessions involving sexual (20.1%), somatic 
(28.6%), religious (29.0%), symmetry-related (40.2%), aggressive (58.3%) or 
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contamination-related (59.5%) themes. Importantly, patients assessed with the 
Y- BOCS-SC are given definitions for obsessions and compulsions (along 
with a couple of examples of each) and then asked to enumerate any 
experiences or behaviors they feel fit those definitions (Goodman et al., 1989). 
As such, patients typically disclose their symptoms without knowledge that 
certain presentations are more or less common, thereby increasing confidence 
that their specific reporting pattern is not just an attempt to fit the instrument’s 
particular categorization structure. Moreover, because the Y-BOCS-SC 
includes a miscellaneous symptom category, raters should also not be 
compelled to shoehorn a patient’s reported concerns into an ill-fitting 
category. In support, the proportion of symptom in principal relative to 
miscellaneous categories is similar across self-report and clinician-
administered versions of the Y-BOCS-SC (Marques et al., 2010). Thus, the 
high prevalence associated with the instrument’s principal categories does 
appear to reflect a rater-related biases for more readily placing symptoms into 
more commonly recognized categories. 
While the principal categories of the Y-BOCS-SC capture fairly 
specific content, studies reporting frequencies at the item level suggest that 
OCD is perhaps even more selective for particular presentations than this 
category-level data suggests. For instance, Pinto et al. (2008) found that 73% 
of individuals reporting contamination obsessions had concerns with germs or 
diseases and 40% of those with sexual obsessions had fears of being gay; 
similar high item-level frequencies were reported in a separate study of 
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pediatric OCD (Storch et al., 2010). There is also a great deal of anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that OCD has a high affinity for certain highly specific 
presentations. For instance, contamination OCD is commonly linked with a 
fear of contracting HIV (e.g., Veale, 2007; Hauser, Eldar, & Dolan, 2016), 
which has also been assessed as a variable of interest in experimental OCD 
studies (Riskind & Maddux, 1994), and is commonly mentioned in case studies 
(e.g., Bruce & Stevens, 1992). Similarly, fears of having accidentally hit 
someone with one’s car are prevalent enough within aggressive OCD to have 
been garnered the label ‘hit-and-run-OCD’ (Hyman & Pedrick, 2010), as are 
fears of murdering one’s newborn among recent mothers (i.e., ‘post-partum 
OCD; Zambaldi et al., 2009). The same can be said for sexual OCD, where 
fears of becoming gay (homosexual OCD, or ‘HOCD’; Williams, 2008) or 
becoming a pedophile (P-OCD; Bruce, Ching, & Williams, 2017) are 
apparently common enough to warrant their own clinical literatures. 
Evidence for etiological uniformity across OCD subtypes 
 
The surfeit of research demonstrating that OCD presentations possess 
divergent clinical and biological correlates has left little doubt that the illness is 
not wholly unitary. Thus, if there are conserved etiological processes across 
OCD’s major presentations, they likely exist in addition to, rather than instead 
of, presentation-specific determinants. Indeed, this is the position favored by 
leading theorists (e.g., Taylor, 2005; Mataix-Cols, 2006), who contend that 
OCD symptoms are most likely arranged in a hierarchical bifactor model, 
where specific presentations possess both lower-order factors, reflective of 
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etiological diversity, and share a single common factor, reflective of etiological 
uniformity. 
Direct support for this hierarchical bifactor model of OCD was recently 
obtained by Olatunji, Ebesutani, and Abramowitz (2017). Using the recently 
developed Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et 
al., 2010), these researchers found that a hierarchical bifactor model (general 
OCD factor + four specific factors) was a far better fit than an unidimensional 
model (general OCD factor only) or a correlated traits models (four specific 
factors only) in a heterogeneous sample of OCD patients (n = 246), other 
psychological disorders (n = 158), and other unselected adults (n = 888). 
Interestingly, these researchers also found that specific symptom dimensions 
(contamination, responsibility for harm, unacceptable thoughts, 
symmetry/ordering) were no longer reliable measures of OCD when levels of 
the general OCD factor were controlled for. This suggests that the stability of 
specific OCD symptom dimensions is largely attributable to stability in the 
general factor underlying all of them. 
The findings by Olatunji et al. (2017) are further supported by evidence 
of biological commonalities across common OCD symptom presentations. For 
instance, Taylor, King, & Asmundson (2010) found that variance in four of the 
five symptom subscales of the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa 
et al., 2001)—washing, checking, ordering, obsessing—were more attributable 
to a shared genetic factor than to unique genetic factors. These same findings 
were later replicated by Iervolino, Rijsdijk, & Cherkas (2011). Similarly, 
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Katerberg et al. (2010) found that both a five-factor solution and a one-factor 
solution emerged as possible solutions to symptom structure data in a large 
sample of OCD patients, with heritability analyses showing that the single 
factor was at least as heritable as the most of the of the specific factors. 
Neurobiologically, there also appears to also be a consensus that OCD 
dimensions are mediated by distinct, but partially overlapping neural areas 
(Mataix-Cols et al., 2004; Van Den Huevel et al., 2008), indicating that such 
presentations share some degree of neurobiological uniformity in addition to 
neurobiological divergence. 
Etiological uniformity of OCD’s major symptom presentations is also 
implied from the invariance of these presentations across different demographic 
variables. Specifically, groups of people that are likely to have highly divergent 
experiences (e.g., children vs. adults; persons from different cultures) generally 
develop the same types of obsessions, suggesting that these symptoms share 
some important universal quality. To illustrate such invariance, Table 1 lists the 
percentage of total obsessions symptoms from each Y-BOCS-SC symptom 
category for OCD patients of different ages (i.e., children vs. adults; Table 1A) 
and from different cultural regions (i.e., United States/Europe, South Africa, 
Middle East, Asia, South America), using data derived from the quantitative 
review of Y-BOCS-SC studies described earlier (Hunt, 2020). While the 
symptom proportions of most categories showed statistically significant 
differences between ages and cultural regions, virtually all differences were 
below the threshold considered indicative  of a small effect (Odds Ratio = 1.68), 
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and none were close to the threshold considered indicative of a medium-sized 
effect (Odds Ratio = 3.47; Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010). This suggests that 
while age and culture have some influence on the manifestation of OCD 
obsessions, such content is more strongly determined by more universal factors 
that are shared across these demographic  subgroups. Interestingly, there is 
evidence suggesting that the cultural universality of OCD may apply to intrusive 
thoughts more generally. Specifically, Radmosky et al. (2014) found the 
unaffected university from six continents generally endorsed the same specific 
categories of intrusive thoughts, mirroring results from this clinical data. 
 





Note. % symptoms refer to the proportion of total obsessions in the total 
sample that were subsumed by a particular Y-BOCS-SC obsession 
category. Data is taken from Y-BOCS-SC studies of OCD patients of 
children and adults from different cultural regions. Y-BOCS-SC = Yale-
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Symptom Checklist. 
 
Explanations of Selectivity in OCD 
 
Having reviewed evidence for the notions that a) OCD is highly 
selective toward particular presentations, and that b) such presentations share a 
common etiological process, I will  now briefly turn to what is, to my 
knowledge, the only two proposals regarding the origin of such selectivity. 
The first proposal, which was reviewed earlier, is that OCD 
presentations derive from an inflated sense of personal responsibility for harm 
or damage occurring (Salkovskis, 1985). For instance, compulsive checkers 
often fear not just they will accidentally allow a burglary, flood, or fire to 
occur in their home, but that it will be their fault, and that others might get hurt 
because of it. The same is also often true of contamination-related obsessions, 
which involve fears of accidentally passing along diseases to others as a result 
of carelessness. Similarly, individuals with OCD often regard the untoward 
thoughts associated with sexual or aggressive themes as their responsibility, 
which is central to what makes them aversive to those with the disorder. In 
support of this theory, inflated responsibility has been repeatedly linked to 
levels of OCD symptomology in both correlational studies (Rhéaume, 
Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995; Wilson & Chambless, 1999; 
Salkovskis et al., 2000) and experimental studies (Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar, 
& Przeworski, 2001). Further, Salkovskis et al. (2000) found that heightened 
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responsibility continued to predict levels of OCD symptoms even after levels 
of anxiety and depression were controlled for. 
Although there is little doubt that inflated responsibility plays an 
important role in OCD, there a few reasons why this process is an insufficient 
explanation for selectivity. First, there are  many common OCD symptom that 
do not appear to involve inflated responsibility. Notable examples include 
some types sexual obsessions (e.g., fear of becoming gay), somatic obsessions 
(e.g., not being able to stop paying attention to one’s blinks/breathing), and 
symmetry/ordering more generally. Further, it is unclear why an inflated sense 
of responsibility would result in those with OCD only feeling responsible for 
certain, specific situations, such as harming others or failing to properly secure 
one’s dwelling. Additionally, other empirical studies indicate that the link 
between OCD symptoms and inflated responsibility is less robust than 
previously thought. 
For instance, there are several studies showing that beliefs about inflated 
responsibility did not significantly predict OCD symptoms from either the Y-
BOCS or the OCI-R when levels of other obsessive beliefs (i.e., overestimation 
of threat, perfectionism, importance of controlling thoughts; Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognition Working Group, 2003) were controlled for (Tolin et al., 
2003; Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Myers & Wells, 2005). 
Further, Tolin, Worhunsky, ad Maltby (2006) found that while individuals with 
OCD report elevated levels of perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, threat 
overestimation, and importance of controlling thoughts relative to clinically 
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anxious controls, they were not elevated on beliefs about inflated 
responsibility. Thus, although there have been links between OCD and inflated 
responsibility for harm, other candidate beliefs appear to be more central and 
specific to OCD pathology. 
A more recently proposed commonality across OCD’s major subtypes 
is a heightened fear of death (Menzies, Menzies, & Iverarch, 2015). For 
instance, compulsive washers are often driven by a desire to prevent chronic or 
fatal diseases (e.g., HIV) or to reduce exposure to toxins, poisons, or heavy 
metals capable of causing grave bodily harm; compulsive checkers typically 
report prevention of fire, home invasion, and death of oneself or loved ones as 
the reason behind their behavior; and persons engaging in atypical compulsions 
(blinking, tapping, counting to magical numbers) often enact such behavior to 
prevent harm or death to a loved one (Menzies et al., 2015). As was the case for 
inflated responsibility, levels of death anxiety, as measured by the Collett-
Lester Fear of Death Scale (CLFD; Collett & Lester, 1969), were strongly 
associated with levels of OCD severity (Menzies & Dar-Nimrod, 2017). 
Further, this same study showed that priming thoughts of death (but not a 
different aversive consequence) increased washing behavior (amount of soap 
used, amount of time spent washing) for clinical OCD participants with 
primary washing symptoms (Menzies & Dar-Nimrod, 2017). 
Though this research suggests that fears of death may contribute to 
OCD-related fears, this commonality also falls short of explaining 
presentational selectivity for largely the same reasons as inflated responsibility. 
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First, many common OCD presentations do not involve a fear of death, 
including the same ones that were not relevant to inflated responsibility (i.e., 
fears of becoming gay or becoming a pedophile, fears of never being able to 
stop paying attention to certain bodily functions) as well as other common 
manifestations (fearing for the safety of one’s dwelling in pathological 
doubting). Along similar lines, while some OCD clients fear physical 
contamination, which could lead to death, others fear mental contamination 
(Coughtrey, Shafran, Knibbs, & Rachman, 2012)—which instead involves a 
concern with taking on the characteristics of an untoward or disliked 
individual. In addition, fear of death does not appear specific to OCD. For 
instance, in the study by Menzies & Dar-Nimrod (2017), death anxiety was 
also strongly correlated with the number of anxiety diagnoses. Indeed, this 
same group proposed that fear of death may be a transdiagnostic construct 
underlying many anxiety-related illnesses like somatoform disorders, panic 
disorder, specific phobia, and separation anxiety disorder. Thus, it is unclear 
how death-related fears would contribute to the development of commonly 
observed OCD symptom presentations as opposed to other forms of anxiety-
related illnesses. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the vast majority of OCD cases appear to involve a 
handful of specific obsessional themes, which may be even more 
circumscribed than data at the category-level imply. This data is quite 
suggestive of selectivity because OCD obsessions are defined quite broadly, 
with little to not phenomenological constraints in regards to particular topics, 
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concerns, or topics that they must contain. The fact OCD obsessions gravitate 
toward particular content areas arguably implies these themes share a common 
etiological underpinning, which is supported by recent factor analytic work 
favoring the existence of a common underlying dimension, genetic 
neurobiological data demonstrating the existence of conserved biological 
markers, and epidemiological research showing the developmental and 
cultural universality of obsessional content. Only two theories have attempted 
to account for the selective nature of OCD, and both are arguably insufficient. 
Thus, despite its etiological significance, OCD symptom selectivity remains a 
poorly understood phenomenon. In the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt 
to fill this gap by outlining evidence for a novel, etiologically-relevant 
commonality across OCD’s major obsessional subtypes. 
Improbable Catastrophes in OCD 
 
One way to identify commonalities across major obsessional themes is 
to consider their feared consequences (Foa & Kozak, 1995). Most OCD 
patients can identify a feared consequence associated with their obsessions 
(Starcevic et al., 2011) and prevention of such events is often identified as the 
primary reason for compulsive avoidance (Foa, Abramoitz, Franklin, & 
Kozak, 1999; Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak, & Foa, 2001). Perhaps the most 
straightforward way to categorize these feared consequences, moreover, is on 
the basis of their probabilities (i.e., how likely the consequence is to occur) 
and potential severities (i.e., how bad the consequence would be were it to 
occur). These two variables form the basis for the calculation of expected 
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value (i.e., value = probability x severity), which is central to models of human 
choice (Simon, 1955) and to theories of pathological behavior in anxiety 
disorders (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) and OCD specifically 
(Salkovskis, 1996). 
Considering common OCD-relevant consequences on the basis of their 
costs and probabilities allows an intriguing pattern to emerge: Many, if not 
most prototypical consequences across the major OCD subtypes involve a 
specific combination of extremely high costs and extremely low probabilities. 
In the following sections, I will illustrate the relevance of this characteristic to 
OCD by reviewing how feared consequences associated with each major 
presentation (contamination, pathological doubting, scrupulosity, aggressive, 
sexual, and somatic) exhibit both the high-severity and low-probability 
components of this commonality. 
Contamination 
 
The high severity associated with the consequences of contamination-
related OCD were previously summarized by Rachman (2003), who stated that 
clinically significant contamination concerns usually involve a belief that “the 
infectious/polluted/dangerous substances will cause serious harm to the 
person’s physical and/or mental health” (p. 1229). The severity of 
contamination-related consequences is also apparent from items listed on the 
Y-BOCS-SC, which reference contaminants with the potential of causing great 
bodily harm (e.g., AIDS: Fishman & Walsh, 1994). In addition, other 
individuals with contamination OCD report fears of unknowingly spreading 
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the harmful contaminant to others as a result of not being careful (see Y- 
BOCS-SC, contamination item 7)— a consequence likely associated with 
severe and debilitating guilt. Somewhat less severe but nonetheless 
catastrophic consequences are arguably present in so-called ‘mental 
contamination’. For instance, Coughtrey, Shafran, Lee, and Rachman, (2013) 
describe a patient with contamination OCD who was afraid that having ‘bad 
thoughts’ would result in her morphing into people she felt were undesirable 
(alcoholics, obese individuals), which would in turn lead to abandonment by 
her loved ones. 
Consequences commonly associated with contamination are also 
extremely unlikely in their particular contexts. Deadly infectious diseases are 
rarely contracted in modern society, and unknowingly passing these diseases 
on to others is even rarer. Additionally, patients often believe that these 
infectious diseases will transfer through mediums that medical science has 
deemed impossible, such as catching HIV from a doorknob. On top of this, it 
bears reminding that individuals with contamination fears continue to worry 
about contact with these contaminants despite extensive washing and cleaning 
rituals that make the chance of them occurring even more unlikely. Finally, 
mental contamination clearly defies causal laws of the physical universe by 
assuming that untoward characteristics can be contracted between people in the 
same way that diseases are spread. 
Notably, a small but significant subset of persons with contamination 
OCD report a desire to wash or clean solely to avoid/prevent the feeling of 
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contamination. Although this feeling is no doubt distressing, it does not arise 
to the level of severity of other contamination- related consequences. 
Moreover, the probability of this consequence occurring is almost certain: 
OCD individuals invariably experience a feeling of contamination when in 
contact with a potential contaminant. Accordingly, this consequence does not 
fit the mold of improbable catastrophes as well as other contamination-related 
outcomes, as it appears to represent a less severe and more probable 
consequence. However, some authors have described cases of contamination 
OCD in which this feared consequence involves never feeling clean again 
(Abramowitz, 2006). The outcome in these cases is clearly both very severe 
and very unlikely, especially considering that the person has experienced 
countless instances where the unclean  feeling eventually subsided. 
Pathological doubting 
 
Generally, pathological doubting involves concerns that something 
disastrous will happen because the individual has failed to check something 
thoroughly or completely, even while realizing that the possibility is extremely 
remote (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Thus, perhaps more than any other 
symptom presentation, pathological doubting is conceptualized in a way that 
directly incorporates the notion of improbable catastrophes. The relevance of 
SIC to pathological doubting is further underscored when considering the 
subtype’s specific presentations, which typically involve fears of having not 
turned off/secured measures related to household safety or security, such as 
water taps, locks, windows, stove tops, and others (Goodman et al., 1989; Foa 
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et al., 2002). Moreover, the consequences associated with having failed to turn 
off/secure these measures—burglary, fire, and flooding—are obviously quite 
severe, and may also be considered improbable on the basis that a) the person 
has likely already checked that these things were secured, b) sufferer is unlikely 
to be the kind of person that leaves these measures unsecured, and 
c) the events themselves have quite low base rates even in cases when these 
security measures  were not taken. 
The low-probability and high-severity features of improbable 
catastrophes also apply readily to less prototypical forms of pathological 
doubting. For instance, consider ‘hit-and-run’ OCD: the fear that one has 
accidentally run over a pedestrian with their vehicle. The cost of accidentally 
hitting and (perhaps) killing a pedestrian is obviously quite severe, but the 
event also has a very low base rate. Moreover, fear of this outcome often 
persists among pathological  doubters even after they have repeatedly checked 
the spot where the accident supposedly occurred or thoroughly surveyed the 
nightly news for reported incidents of hit-and-runs (Hyman & Pedrick, 2009). 
Other, more idiosyncratic examples of pathological doubting also 
demonstrate this pattern. For instance, Hyman and Pedrick (2009) describe a 
case of a woman who constantly returned to check whether her car was locked 
and the parking brake was off in order to ensure that a child would not climb 
in and get hurt. Again, while the cost of this outcome is objectively quite 
severe, it also requires a chain of causal events whose combined probability 
is clearly very low (i.e., car is actually unlocked, an unsupervised child would 
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need to pass her car, the child would need to climb in, and the child would 
need to get hurt once inside the car). 
Scrupulosity 
 
The feared consequences associated with scrupulosity (religious OCD) 
are typically those that would occur as a result of being a sinful or immoral 
person. As one might expect, these particular consequences shift based on 
one’s particular religious doctrine. For instance, scrupulous Christians are often 
concerned about offending God, going to hell, and devil worship while 
scrupulous Jews are often concerned with behavioral requirements or laws 
surrounding ritual purity, Sabbath observance, or dietary laws (Siev, Baer, & 
Minichiello, 2011). 
Contrastingly, scrupulous Muslims may be concerned with having stated 
prayers correctly while Hindus may be overly concerned with cleanliness or 
purity (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). Although scrupulous obsessions may 
vary markedly across religious doctrines, most forms of scrupulosity appear to 
be undergirded by a fear of divine punishment or retribution, consistent with 
viewing their particular deity as overly punitive (Grayson, 2014). Indeed, Siev 
et al. (2011)  found that levels of scrupulosity were positively correlated with a 
negative (punitive) concept of God, but uncorrelated with a positive concept of 
God. Further, fears related to retribution by god emerged as one of two unique 
factors on a self-report inventory assessing the frequency of common 
scrupulosity complaints known as the Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity (PIOS; 
Abramowitz, Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, & Cahill, 2002). Notably, this instrument 
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was developed in a sample who identified as Jewish, Cathoilic, Protestant—
reinforcing the notion that this fear of god underlies scrupulosity independent 
of the patient’s particular religious doctrine. 
Since the god of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam is usually regarded as 
omnipotent, the consequences this deity could exact may obviously be quite 
severe. The most common and obvious example of this sort of divine 
retribution is being sent to hell—which is described in Christianity as a 
consequence more severe than any other. Others however, may fear divine 
retribution by god in the current world, such as the invocation of severe 
punishment on themselves or a loved one (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). 
The likelihoods of scrupulosity’s consequences are somewhat more 
difficult to define given that, in many cases, they are unknowable. For instance, 
the probability going to hell cannot be evaluated since it is conceived as 
occurring after death. Still, the committed sins associated with scrupulosity are 
virtually always pardonable, not central to the religion, or not even considered 
wrong (Siev et al., 2011; Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). Moreover, scrupulous 
fears often persist despite reassurance from religious officials that the acts in 
question are indeed benign and not offensive to god. For instance, Abramowitz 
(2006) describes the case of a Jewish man with OCD who repeatedly called his 
rabbi to ensure that he had not violated the fasting laws of Yom Kippur by 
accidentally swallowing his saliva. Thus, even when considered in a purely 
religious context, the supposed sins of scrupulosity have a very low likelihood 
of truly being sins. Combined with the low probability of such sins (if actually 
 
36 
wrong) evoking divine punishment, it is clear that the consequences commonly 
seen in scrupulosity are indeed very improbable. 
Aggressive OCD 
 
In contrast to pathological doubting, where the individual is afraid of 
accidentally causing harm or damage, the common thread across aggressive 
obsessions is that the individual is afraid of committing purposeful aggressive 
or untoward acts toward themselves or others (Moulding, Aardema, & 
O’Connor, 2014). Perhaps the most common fear in this category is of 
snapping and harming one’s loved ones. For instance, fears of harming 
newborns are particularly common among recent mothers with OCD (Zambaldi 
et al., 2014), though these obsessions may also relate to other family members 
(Aardema & O’Connor, 2007). Aggressive obsessions about perpetrating 
sexual or physical violence against strangers are also commonly reported, 
particularly those aimed at vulnerable members of society like older adults and 
children (Abramowitz, 2006; Moudling et al., 2014). In addition, aggressive 
obsession also often involve fears of suddenly doing serious harm to oneself; 
for instance, 18.2% of patients in one sample reported aggressive obsessions 
about potentially harming themselves—about half the prevalence of obsessions 
about harming others (Pinto et al., 2008). Such estimates do not clarify the 
specific means of self-harm, but anecdotal evidence suggests it is often a fear 
of committing suicide. For instance, Abramowitz (2006) cites a case of an 




The severity of the consequences across these examples is apparent: To 
kill oneself or one’s loved ones are among some of the worst consequences 
imaginable. Further, even if the acts  are committed against a stranger, the legal 
and social consequences associated with such acts would be severe, not to 
mention the overwhelming guilt they would likely bring. For some though, 
much of the distress associated with aggressive obsessions arises from 
interpreting their thoughts as evidence that they are a monstrous or terrible 
person. Indeed, these beliefs are often serious and severe enough for the 
individual to request being locked away both as a precaution and a punishment 
(Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). 
The improbable nature of aggressive obsessions is apparent from the 
fact that those who develop them almost always lack a violent history 
(Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Indeed, researchers believe aggressive obsessions 
arise in individuals for whom they are the most ego- dystonic—that is, most 
objectionable to one’s sense of self (Lee & Known, 2003). This anecdotal 
observation is also supported in a study by Aardema (2013), who found that 
levels of ego-dystonicity uniquely predicted repugnant obsessions (i.e., 
aggressive and sexual ones) but not levels of other symptom presentations. The 
same can also be said for individuals who simply fear they are an evil or 
monstrous person: The probability that someone is such a person because they 
had a fleeting thought of violence is extremely low, especially given that the 
thought does not elicit pleasure but rather guilt, distress, or anxiety. 
Of note, there are less common examples of aggressive obsessions that 
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are somewhat less severe. Suddenly yelling aggressive obscenities or insults is 
cited as a particularly common consequence (see Y-BOCS-SC aggressive 
obsessions item #4), particularly in situations where such statements would be 
shameful, such as church (Hyman & Pedrick, 2009). The consequences 
(embarrassment, social approbation) associated with these actions are 
obviously less severe than murder, suicide, or being a monster. Like other 
aggressive obsessions, however, these actions are very ego-dystonic to the 
individual—underscoring the fact that despite their less severe nature they may 
still be considered extremely improbable. 
Sexual OCD 
 
Within the category of sexual obsessions, at least half of individuals 
report fears of becoming homosexual and about a third report fears of being 
attracted to a family member (Pinto et al., 2008). Another commonly cited 
example involves a fear that one is sexually attracted to children (i.e., POCD; 
e.g., O’Neil, Cather, Fishel, & Kafka, 2005; Bruce et al., 2018). 
The improbable nature of the consequences associated with sexual 
obsessions may be understood in a similar fashion as aggressive obsessions: 
The obsessions are experienced as extremely ego-dystonic and repugnant to 
the individual (Williams, 2008; Moulding et al., 2014; Bruce et al., 2018), 
rendering the likelihood that one actually possesses this feared attraction quite 
remote (Gordon, 2002). Consequently, the probability that one both possesses 
this secret attraction and will act on is even lower. Moreover, sexual 
obsessions usually persist after the individual performs extensive tests proving 
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they do not possess this secret attraction. For instance, individuals with 
homosexual OCD may repeatedly watch homosexual pornography to check 
that they are not aroused by members of the same sex, but will continue to 
doubt their sexuality even after these activities fail to induce arousal 
(Williams, 2008). 
The high severity of some consequences associated with sexual OCD 
are obvious. For instance, pedophiles are regarded as monsters in modern 
society, so the possibility that one possesses this attraction is clearly 
catastrophic. The possibility of acting on these desires is even worse, as it 
would result in severe social approbation and legal consequences. In contrast, 
fears of being secretly homosexual appear comparatively less severe: 
Homosexuality is not illegal and is becoming gradually more accepted and 
supported by society in the modern era (Glick, Cleary, & Golden, 2015). Still, 
because sexual obsessions are perceived as extremely ego-dystonic, those who 
develop HOCD may be particularly repulsed by the idea of themselves 
becoming homosexual, even if they do not have moral issues with 
homosexuality in general. Additionally, while gradually becoming 
homosexuality may be comparatively less severe, suddenly becoming 
homosexual could be extremely costly. Specifically, this sudden shift in one’s 
sexual identity would be a huge life-altering disruption for those with families 
or in long-term committed relationships, as their changed orientation could lead 
to the loss of their partner or possibly the loss of their children. Along similar 
lines, individuals from more conservative families may associate 
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homosexuality with familial rejection—another quite severe cost. Importantly, 
all these potential consequences readily apply to incestuous sexual obsessions 
as well. Thus, while research on OCD presentations is not granular enough to 
verify the high severity of many sexual- based obsessions, there is still clear 
reason to suspect that for some individuals, sexual obsessions involve 
subjectively severe consequences. 
Somatic OCD  
Somatic OCD involves an obsessive preoccupation with one’s body or 
bodily functions. Most commonly, somatic OCD crystallizes around the fear of 
having some terrible disorder, disease, or condition (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; 
Fallon, Qureshi, Laje, & Klein, 2000). For instance, Fallon et al. (2000) 
described cases of OCD patients with fears of having contracted mad cow 
disease and cases of OCD patients with more generalized somatic fears about 
common deadly afflictions like heart disease or cancer. However, somatic OCD 
may also involve other types of body-related obsessions, such as fears of being 
the unable to stop paying attention to normal bodily processes like blinking, 
breathing, or swallowing. In these cases, the person may become worried that 
they are performing this process oddly or incorrectly, may never be able to stop 
focusing on it, and may go insane as a result (e.g., Hyman & Pedrick, 2009). 
Finally, somatic OCD may also include obsessions related to abnormalities in 
one’s physical appearance, for instance, obsessively wondering if one breast is 
larger than the other (Abramowitz, 2006). Indeed, in the sample reported by 
Pinto et al. (2008) obsessive concern with a body part or appearance was about 
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half as common (15.5%) as concerns with illness or disease (28.7%). 
Regarding severity, the diseases typically feared by those with somatic 
OCD are typically serious or life-threatening (cancer, heart disease, dementia). 
Similarly, the prospect of losing one’s sanity as the result of never being able to 
ignore a bodily process is also an objectively catastrophic outcome. Obsessive 
concerns with appearance, on the other hand, appear to involve less severe 
consequences. While this outcome may involve feelings of inadequacy, social 
rejection, and difficulty finding a romantic partner, they arguably do not rise to 
the severity level of other consequences in somatic OCD. Like homosexual 
concerns however, it could be the case that concerns with appearance are still 
subjectively catastrophic to the individual. Although research on somatic OCD 
is too sparse to verify these claims, research on a disorder with closely 
intertwined phenomenology to appearance-related OCD—body dysmorphic 
disorder (BDD)— offers some important guidance. For instance, in Phillips’ 
(2005) book “The Broken Mirror”, she describes cases of BDD patients for 
whom slight or even non-existent abnormalities led to them to perceive 
themselves as monsters who should not even be seen in public, and who 
considered themselves as “one of the ugliest people in the whole world” (p. 7). 
Indeed, Phillips (2005) reports that one patient actually stated that she would 
“be happy to have cancer, because it wouldn’t isolate me the way this [her 
BDD obsessions about appearance] does” (p. 4). Accordingly, those with 
appearance-related somatic obsessions may indeed perceive the consequences 
of such abnormalities as very severe, even if they are not as objectively terrible 
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as other consequences commonly associated with this presentation.  
Regarding the probability of these consequences, it is clear that they are 
all quite remote. The diseases feared by those with somatic OCD are typically 
very rare for their age or history (e.g., cancer in a young person) and they 
continue to be concerned with these maladies despite repeated assurance from 
medical professionals. Never being able to remove focus from a bodily 
process, and thereby going insane, arguably has an even lower probability. 
Although this consequence is imaginable, instances of this actually occurring 
are exceedingly rare, if they occur at all. Finally, the notion the one is indeed 
the ugliest or most monstrous person in the world is clearly very improbable, 
especially considering that the one’s friends, family members, and clinicians 
constantly offer constant reassurance of intact appearance (Phillips, 2005). 
Symmetry and exactness 
 
The consequences associated with symmetry/exactness obsessions are 
typically divided into two distinct categories: Those accompanied with magical 
thinking and those that are not (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; Goodman et al., 
1989). Symmetry/exactness obsessions accompanied by magical thinking may 
involve fastidious attempts to line up, straighten, or count objects in a certain 
way in an attempt to prevent the occurrence of some disastrous event that 
would otherwise be uncontrollable (e.g., death of a family member). Thus, 
these consequences obviously fit the mold of an improbable catastrophe: The 
feared event is clearly disastrous and the ‘magical’ connection between the 




In contrast, the link between improbable catastrophes and 
symmetry/exactness-related consequences without magical thinking is more 
tenuous. Specifically, individuals with these obsessions are driven to 
straighten/reorder objects primarily in response to a nagging feeling of 
‘incompleteness’ or ‘just-not-right experience’ (NJRE) that occurs when 
objects are in a state of disorganization or misalignment (Coles, Frost, 
Heimberg, Rhéaume, 2003; Summerfeldt, 2004). The empirical link between 
symmetry/exactness and incompleteness/NJREs is also very robust: 
Symmetry/ordering has been found to be exclusively predicted by levels of 
incompleteness in both clinical samples (Ecker & Gönner, 2008) and 
nonclinical samples (Pietrefesa & Coles, 2008; Summerfeldt, Gilbert, & 
Reynolds, 2015). Such feelings are arguably much more probable (i.e., they 
will absolutely certainly occur/continue to occur if the objects are 
straightened/reordered) and much less severe (i.e., not actual catastrophic 
event is feared) than other common OCD concerns, and thus do not cohere 
very well to the features of improbable catastrophes. Moreover, symmetry 
obsessions without magical thinking have been shown to be more prevalent 
(31.8%) than those with magical thinking (20.8%) in the sample reported by 
Pinto et al. (2008), meaning the number of OCD patients exhibiting these 
symmetry/exactness obsessions is far from trivial. 
Hoarding 
 
Although hoarding is now considered a separate disorder from OCD, I 
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will still consider it here given that it is recognized as an OCD symptom on 
some clinical assessment tools (Y- BOCS-SC, OCI-R). Individuals with 
hoarding disorder (HD) are characterized by both a) excessive acquisition of 
items and b) difficulty throwing away possessions, resulting in severely 
cluttered personal spaces (Frost & Hartl, 1996). Typically, the items individuals 
with HD collect and save have little to no use or value (Maier, 2004). 
Moreover, the major reason hoarders report wanting to save these items is the 
belief that they may serve a purpose in the future. For instance, in an early study 
of 108 hoarders by Frost and Gross (1993), the most common reason for saving 
items was that they could potentially be used at some later date (mean 
prevalence rating of 4.8 on a 5-point scale). 
The maladaptive nature of HD comes from the fact that the items are 
indeed useless and continue to be useless, even after being saved for years. 
Thus, the notion that a discarded (useless) item could serve some important 
use in the future is clearly a very low probability event. Of course, the 
severity of this consequence is also very low: If the person’s fear was 
proved correct (i.e., they encountered a situation in which the discarded item 
would have been useful) the situation could be easily rectified since the item is, 
by definition, common and easily obtainable. Accordingly, hoarding is linked 
with OCD in being characterized by improbable fears but appears to break 
from the illness by involving more benign consequences. 
Summary of Improbable catastrophes across OCD presentations 
 
A summary of the probabilities and costs associated with feared 
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consequences across the major OCD subtypes are shown below in Table 1.2. 
Overall, it appears that most feared consequences associated with OCD may be 
considered both improbable and catastrophic. Given that these consequences 
could theoretically involve any cost x probability combination, the 
preponderance of OCD-relevant consequences fitting this pattern suggests the 
disorder involves a more general sensitivity to improbable catastrophes or SIC.  
Importantly, this commonality appears across presentations associated 
with different symptom dimensions (e.g., contamination, taboo thoughts; Bloch 
et  al., 2008), suggesting that it may constitute a more general etiological 
process  that exists alongside dimension-specific determinants (Olatunji et al., 
2017; Taylor, 2005). 
The major exceptions to the improbable catastrophe rule were outcomes 
where the feared consequence was a subjectively distressful feeling rather than 
a specific external event. This included the feeling of dirtiness or pollution in 
contamination OCD and the feeling of incompleteness or just-not-rightness in 
symmetry/exactness OCD. However, the feeling-related consequences of 
contamination OCD may still cohere to the pattern of SIC if the individual 
fears the improbable, catastrophic consequence of never feeling clean again. 
Thus, obsessions with symmetry/exactness stand as perhaps the one major 
exception to the improbable catastrophe rule among the common OCD 
presentations. 
Notably, the improbable dimension of SIC appeared to be a more 
consistent feature of OCD-relevant consequences compared to the  
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Table 1.2. Probability and cost estimates of feared consequences across major 





catastrophic one. For instance, even though consequences like becoming gay, being ugly, 
and yelling obscenities involved less objectively severe outcomes, they would still be 
considered highly improbable. This suggests that a heightened concern for low 
probabilities events may be a more abiding feature of OCD pathology compared to a 
concern with catastrophic outcomes. 
 
Improbable Catastrophes in Other Anxiety-related Conditions 
 
While demonstrating the universality of SIC across the major OCD 
subtypes is a crucial step for establishing its relevance to the disorder, so too is 
demonstrating that this characteristic exhibits specificity for OCD. In other 
words, if SIC truly contributes to the development or maintenance of OCD, but 
not other forms of anxiety pathology, the fears prominently associated  with 
other anxiety-related conditions should not involve improbable catastrophe 
nearly as often as those commonly associated with OCD. In this section, I will 
review the relevance of improbable, catastrophic concerns in other anxiety-
related conditions in an effort to evaluate the specificity of SIC to OCD. 
Panic disorder 
 
Unlike fears in OCD, feared consequence associated with panic 
disorder is listed directly in the diagnostic criteria: Worry about having a panic 
attack, which persists for at least a month (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Regarding severity, panic attacks are known to be extremely aversive, 
with anxiety so severe in some cases that the sufferer reportedly feels as if they 
are dying (McNally, 1994). At the same time, panic attacks are brief, peaking 
within 10-15 minutes by definition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
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Thus, while the experience of a panic attack is severe, its temporary nature 
arguably renders it less objectively severe compared to many of the common 
concerns associated with OCD, which often involve permanent and harmful 
damage (e.g., chronic disease, loss of family member, loss of home, death). 
More importantly though, panic attacks are quite probable for those with panic 
disorder. For instance, Reed & Wittchen (1998) found that 41% of individuals 
with panic disorder experienced 5 or more panic attacks per month. Thus, 
panic attacks are clearly not improbable catastrophes in the same way as the 
concerns typically associated with OCD. 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
 
Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) exhibit a heightened 
concern with social encounters or performance situations in which the 
individual will be subjected to scrutiny and may act in a way that is 
humiliating or embarrassing (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Common social fears for SAD include public speaking (most common), 
writing in front of others, eating in front of others, and a generalized type that 
pertains to many social situations (Ramshaw, Chavira, & Stein, 2010). 
Some consequences associated with SAD may be improbable and at 
least moderately severe. For instance, some SAD patients fear that failure in 
social situations will result in a loss of status and worth and social rejection 
(Clark & Wells, 1995), which is both fairly severe and quite unlikely to arise 
from a social misstep. Of course, the severity of these consequences still do not 
arise to the level of many associated with OCD (e.g., hell, death, murder of 
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children, AIDS, etc.). Moreover, most individuals with SAD are merely 
concerned with being criticized or with doing something embarrassing, which 
are clearly less severe and more probable relative to most OCD-relevant fears. 
For instance, mistakes occur quite frequently during public presentations and 
do not typically involve any direct consequences. Thus, socially-relevant fears 
in SAD do not typically involve improbable catastrophes, illustrating that the 
disorder is likely not characterized by an underlying sensitivity to such 
circumstances. 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
 
The cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is 
persistent and uncontrollable worry (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
which may involve a broad- range of categories like work-related conflicts, 
family issues, finances, social concerns, physical health, family member health, 
or even the general state of the world (Becker, Goodwin, Hölting, Hoyer, & 
Margraf, 2003). 
Data on specific feared consequences within these categories is sparse, 
but studies comparing worries of GAD individuals to unaffected individuals are 
quite illuminating. For one, Craske, Rapee, Jackel, and Barlow (1989) found 
few differences between GAD individuals and unaffected individuals on most 
content worry areas. Moreover, the probability of the worry occurring was the 
same across these groups, indicating GAD individuals do not fear 
consequences that are less probable than unaffected individuals. However, 
Craske et al. (1989) did find that a miscellaneous worry category was more 
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frequently endorsed by GAD patients. 
Because this category included a mix of probable, benign worries (e.g., 
accidentally dropping a plate) and improbable, catastrophic worries (e.g., 
nuclear war), it was difficult to determine which types of worries were 
driving this increase in prevalence. 
Fortunately, Roemer, Molina, and Borkovec (1997) conduced a follow-
up study in which they compared the reported frequency of worries within this 
miscellaneous category between GAD individuals and healthy controls. In this 
study, GAD individuals reported a much higher prevalence of worries within a 
category called daily hassles, which included concerns of minor or routine 
issues (e.g., forgetting to pay a bill). Thus, a distinguishing feature of GAD 
appears to be, if anything, a propensity to worry about consequences that are 
both less severe and more probable—the exact opposite pattern of OCD. This 
is also consistent with the clinical language in the DSM used to differentiate 
GAD and OCD, which states that OCD obsessions cannot simply be worries 
about everyday activities in contrast to those in GAD. 
Specific Phobia 
 
Similar to the feared consequences in OCD, the outcomes associated 
with Specific phobia (SP) tend to gravitate toward a handful of specific content 
areas. Indeed, SP is distinguished by five specific subtypes that reflect the most 
common types of fears: Animal type (e.g. snakes, spiders), natural 
environment type (e.g., heights, storms, deep water), situational type (e.g., 
enclosed places, flying on airplanes), blood-injury-injection type (needles, 
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blood), and an ‘other’ category type (e.g., suffocation; Wolpe & Lang, 1974). 
In terms of probability and severity, there is clear heterogeneity across 
the common fears  in SP. Bites or encounters with snakes or spiders, while not 
common, are still much more probable than prototypical OCD fears, and are 
also quite less severe. Similarly, the major fears associated with blood-injury-
injection phobia are fainting (Page, 1994) and pain (e.g., De Jongh et al., 
1998), both of which are also less severe and more probable than what would 
be considered improbable catastrophes. In contrast, fears subsumed by the 
natural environment type (e.g., fear of falling from a high height, being struck 
by lightning, drowning in deep water), the situational type (e.g., being in a 
plane crash) and the ‘other type’ (e.g., being suffocated) are often on par with 
OCD-relevant fears in terms of both their low probabilities and high severities. 
Interestingly, subtypes with more relevance to improbable catastrophes are also 
more likely to driven a desire to prevent harm: 84% of those with natural 
environment phobias report catastrophes/harm as their feared consequence, 
whereas the number is 54% for situational, 25% for animal, and 10% for 
blood-injection-injury (Lipsitz, Barlow, Mannuzza, Hoffman, & Fyer, 2002). 
Although some fears in SP fit improbable catastrophes fairly well, the 
pattern is arguably still less consistent than it is in OCD. Specifically, while 
improbable catastrophes are observed across virtually all the major subtypes of 
OCD, the outcome is only relevant for around half the major categories of SP. 
Moreover, SP has a common thread that accounts for its constellation of fears 
more readily than improbable catastrophes: They all relate to threats relevant 
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to survival in our evolutionary past (Seligman, 1971). These evolutionary 
threats will obviously be quite severe because they were selected to respond to 
life-threatening dangers, and they may also be less probable because the 
environments that drove their selection is markedly different from the one we 
live in today. For instance, excessive fears of snakes are less adaptive today 
because encounters with snakes are less common and because known antidotes 
to their venoms exist. Thus, the fact that SP-related fears sometimes involve 
improbable catastrophes may be an artefact of them being evolutionarily-salient 
fears, rather than reflecting a sensitivity to improbable catastrophes per se. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that a sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes is an area of partial etiological overlap between SP and OCD. In 
support, in a large Korean sample (N = 6152), the co-occurrence between OCD 
and specific SP subtypes was by far the greatest (and the only to be significant) 
for natural environment subtype (Park et al., 2013)—which is also the subtype 
whose content is most consistent with improbable catastrophes.. 
Separation Anxiety Disorder 
 
Perhaps more than any other anxiety-related illness, separation anxiety 
disorder involves a feared consequence that arises to the level of an improbable 
catastrophe. Specifically, separation anxiety disorder is defined by fears of 
being separated from one’s household or primary caregiver, including 
concerns that harm will befall one’s caregivers or self during the separation 
(APA, 2013). Losing a parent is one of the most severe things that can happen 
to a child, and is also (fortunately) highly improbable. Thus, the central fear in 
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separation anxiety disorder is phenomenologically consistent with 
consequences common to OCD. 
Although permanent caregiver separation is both improbable and 
catastrophic, one aspect that differentiates this fear from OCD-relevant 
concerns is its normative and adaptive nature. Specifically, most children go 
through some period of excessive attachment to their caregiver, which is both 
evolutionarily advantageous and helpful for developing a sense of safety and 
security (Weinfeld, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 2008). Thus, separation 
anxiety may be more  accurately conceived as a failure to resolve a 
developmentally-appropriate fear rather than a sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes. This point is further demonstrated by the fact that most cases of 
separation anxiety disorder are circumscribed to caregiver-separation and not 
generalized to other, improbable catastrophic outcomes (Costello, Egger, & 
Angold, 2005). 
Despite the differences, it cannot be ruled out that SIC might manifest 
as caregiver separation fears early in life and other, OCD-relevant concerns 
later on. In support, anywhere from 20% to 33% of OCD patients report a 
history of separation anxiety (Ruscio et al., 2010; Lewinsohn, Zinbarg, Seeley, 
Lewinsohn, & Sack, 1997) and there is evidence that rates are even higher 
rates in early-onset cases of OCD (Mroczkowski et al. 2011). Clinicians have 
also noted that harm-related obsessions in OCD and are difficult to distinguish 
from separation anxiety in children (Mroczkowski et al. 2011), again 
underscoring the face-valid relevance of separation anxiety to OCD-relevant 
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improbable catastrophes. However, the notion that separation anxiety 
represents an early indicator of SIC is merely speculative as there is no direct 
evidence capable of supporting the assertion at the current time. 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) centers around the distress, 
avoidance, and re-experiencing of past harmful events (APA, 2013). The 
traumatic events that produce these debilitating reactions are usually quite 
severe, including rape, serious car accidents, robbery, or dangerous military 
conflicts. Thus, anxious apprehension about these events re-occurring clearly 
matches the high-cost dimension of an improbable catastrophe. 
However, the fact the individual actually experienced these severe 
events indicates that they are clearly more probable than those associated with 
OCD. Specifically, while consequences feared in OCD are often borderline 
impossible (e.g., getting HIV from a doorknob, snapping and killing a family 
member in the absence of violent history/intentions) or unknowable (being sent 
to hell for a trivial immoral thought) the precipitating events in PTSD are, 
unfortunately, relatively common. For instance, in a sample of N = 2953 U.S. 
adults, Kilpatrick et al. (2013) found that 90% of the population had 
experienced a PTSD trauma at some point in their lives, and that participants 
on average had experienced three traumatic events. Moreover, many 
individuals with PTSD are not necessarily afraid of the traumatic event re- 
occurring, but rather the memories or feelings associated with the event (APA, 
2013). Accordingly, anxious apprehension about improbable catastrophes does 
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not appear to be a definable feature of PTSD, which typically involve concerns 
with more probable events or events that occurred in the past. 
Summary of improbable catastrophes in other anxiety-related conditions. 
The phenomenology of most anxiety-related conditions indicates that a 
heightened concern with improbable catastrophes is not a generalized 
feature of anxiety pathology. Specifically, most anxiety-related conditions 
involve fears that are neither improbable nor catastrophic (panic attacks in 
panic disorder, criticism/social mistakes in SAD, worries about daily 
hassles in GAD), while those with concerns better approximating 
improbable catastrophes are more parsimoniously explained by other 
shared features (e.g., evolutionary-salient threats in SP) or are completely 
confined to one category of threat (e.g., fear of being separated from 
caregivers in separation anxiety disorder). Thus, OCD-relevant 
consequences appear to fit the improbable catastrophe pattern far better 
than other anxiety-related conditions, suggesting the sensitivity to these 
events is a fairly specific feature of the disorder. Nonetheless, there is 
some evidence that disorders involving fears with more relatedness to 
improbable catastrophes are often comorbid with OCD (e.g., fear of 
environmental threats like drowning in SP), suggesting SIC may partially 
cuts across other categories of anxiety-related disorders. 
Explanations for the Sensitivity to Improbable Catastrophes in OCD 
 
Given that SIC appears to be a fairly sensitive and specific feature of 
OCD, the next logical question is why this link exists. In other words, why are 
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those with OCD sensitive to improbable catastrophes as opposed to other 
types of outcomes? 
A useful starting point for answering this question is with the tendency 
to overestimate  threat (OET), which is widely viewed as a core cognitive bias 
in OCD (OCCWG, 2003) that is commonly elevated among those with the 
disorder (e.g., Meyers, Fisher, & Wells 2008). Accordingly, those with OCD 
could be sensitive to improbable catastrophes as a result of overestimating 
their probabilities, their costs, or both. Nonetheless, while OET is clearly 
relevant to OCD, there are two reasons why this construct is insufficient for 
explaining the purported links between SIC and OCD on its own. 
First, OET is not specific to OCD: Clinicians have long observed 
OET to be a general feature of anxiety-related condition rather than a 
specific feature of OCD (Beck, 1976). Similarly, when controlling for 
levels of trait anxiety, OET (as measured by the Obsessive Beliefs 
Questionnaire [OBQ]; Myers et al., 2008) is elevated equally across OCD 
participants and those with other anxiety disorders (Tolin et al., 2006), 
suggesting it cannot explain why a sensitivity to improbable catastrophes 
arises in OCD specifically. Second, because OET pertains to a generally 
disposition to overestimate the probability and severity of threat (OCCWG, 
2003), it cannot explain why OCD individuals tend to only overestimate the 
risk/harm associated with improbable catastrophes. If OET were the driving 
force behind OCD symptoms, the disorder should have feared 
consequences involving a wide range of probability and cost combinations, 
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which the phenomenological evidence reviewed earlier suggests is clearly 
not the case. 
Given the issues with using OET to explain SIC, it appears that 
whatever threat-based distortion is contributing to this process needs to be 
both focally tailored to improbable catastrophes and relatively specific to 
OCD. In other words, the most likely candidates for explaining SIC will be 
OCD-specific traits/processes that could result in those with OCD 
overestimating either a) the likelihood of improbable threats, or b) the cost of 
catastrophic ones. In the proceeding sections, I will review how several OCD-
relevant psychological processes within each threat-distortion category satisfy 
these criteria. 
Overestimation of Improbable Threat Likelihood in OCD  
OCD has been linked to elevations in a number of psychological 
constructs that would theoretically lead to overestimating the likelihood of 
improbable threat. The links between these constructs and OCD have typically 
been validated in separate studies using different measures, making it difficult 
to determine just how distinctive these constructs are from each other. For the 
sake of clarity however, I will review each of them separately using names 
and definitions they have been designated in their respective literatures. 
Doubt. In the context of OCD, doubt is typically referred to as to a lack 
of subjective certainty about one’s perceptions and internal states (Lazarov, 
Dar, Liberman, & Oded, 2012). As such, heightened doubt should result not in 
global overestimations of threat probability, but rather a more specific 
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difficulty with appraising highly improbable events as certain not to occur. 
Because of this, doubt arguably provides a compellingly parsimonious 
explanation for how those with OCD could (at least slightly) overestimate the 
likelihood of improbable events specifically. 
Although clinicians have long acknowledged the role of excessive 
doubt in OCD (Gerrios, 1989; James, James, Burkhardt, Bowers, & 
Skrupskelis, 1890; Janet & Raymond, 1903), even referring to it as “the 
doubting disease” (Ciarrocchi, 1995; Ceflau, 2010), this link was not formally 
evaluated until relatively recently. Specifically, Samuels et al. (2017) had 
clinicians rate the doubt severity (0 = “none”, 5 = “extreme and debilitating”) 
of 1132 OCD patients based on their responses to a single doubt-specific 
question: “After you complete an activity, do you doubt whether you 
completed it correctly?’. The mean number of OCD symptoms increased with 
the degree of doubt for each of the major OCD symptom dimensions 
(checking, contamination, symmetry/ordering, hoarding), and OCD-related 
impairment was uniquely predicted by doubt as well. Notably, the likelihood 
of GAD and the number of anxiety- related personality diagnoses (e.g., 
avoidant personality disorder) also increased with levels of doubt. However, 
every one of these participants also had an OCD diagnosis, so it is unclear 
whether elevated doubt would also be present in participants who had GAD or 
an anxiety-related PD but not also OCD. 
Another common method for assessing doubt in OCD is through 
examining whether OCD patents exhibit reduced confidence in their cognitive 
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abilities. The most consistent effects within this domain have been found for 
memory (e.g., Constans, Foa, Franklin, & Matthews, 1995), particularly in 
OCD-relevant situations involving potential mistakes (e.g., Cougle, 
Salkovskis, & Wahl, 2007) and particularly for participants with primary 
checking symptoms (Macdonald, Antony, Macleod, & Richter, 1997). This 
reduction in memory confidence is typically greater compared to that of 
anxious control participants (Tolin et al., 2001), though this difference may 
partly be the result of utilizing OCD-relevant content in the experimental 
manipulation (Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003). 
Importantly, OCD participants typically report reduced confidence in memory 
despite demonstrating intact abilities during both recognition and recall tasks 
(Hermans et al., 2003; Macdonald et al., 1997). 
A similar pattern of results has also been found for other cognitive 
domains. For instance, individuals with OCD may show intact or superior 
performance on a test of general knowledge compared to healthy and anxious 
controls, but reduced confidence in the correctness of their answers (Dar, Rish, 
Hermesh, Taub, & Fux, 2000). Similarly, OCD participants may exhibit less 
confidence in the ability to maintain attention relative to both healthy anxious 
control participants, with levels of mistrust specifically predicting levels of 
checking symptoms (Hermans et al., 2008). 
Indecisiveness. In addition to manifesting as reduced confidence in 
one’s cognitive faculties, doubt in OCD is also believed to manifest as 
indecisiveness, which some researchers propose is actually indistinguishable 
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from doubt (Nestadt et al., 2016). One of the first studies to systematically 
establish this indecisive tendency in OCD was conducted by Fear and Healy 
(1997). Specifically, these researchers tasked participants with deciding 
whether a ball was being drawn from two different urns: one with a 85:15 
mixture of red to black balls (Jar A) and another with a 85:15 mixture of black 
to red balls (Jar B). The authors found that OCD participants required 
significantly more draws to decide upon which jar they were drawing from (3.4 
draws) compared to healthy control participants (2.6 draws), participants with 
delusional disorders (1.5 draws), and participants with mixed obsessive and 
delusional features (2.7 draws). In a second, subsequent condition, balls were 
repeatedly selected from Jar A by the researcher and participants rated the 
chance that the balls were coming from Jar A after each draw. Here, OCD 
participants required significantly more draws to reach certainty (7) compared 
to the delusional disorder group (3.1), the healthy control group, (3.4), and the 
mixed group (4.8). Importantly, these authors also provided a Bayesian 
estimate of the ‘true’ conditional probability that the observed set of balls were 
actually coming from Jar A. By draw three, the probability that the balls were 
coming from Jar A already had a Bayesian probability of 99%, suggesting that 
OCD participants were less able to treat the extremely improbable possibility 
that the balls were coming from Jar B as a certainty. These results were later 
replicated in a subsequent study, which showed that OCD participants also 
require more draws to a make a decision in this task compared to those with 
GAD (Pélissier & O’Connor, 2002). 
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In another study of doubt-related indecisiveness, Foa et al. (2003) had 
participants chose between two options in three scenarios: An OCD-relevant 
scenario (choosing a brand of gas stove), a low-risk scenario (choosing a brand 
of car wax), and a high-risk scenario (choosing a treatment for seriously ill 
relative). Participants were initially presented with a piece of information 
outlining the pros and cons of both options (e.g., a consumer report indicating 
what percentage of customers chose car wax A over car wax B), and could 
request up to seven additional pieces of information (presented in a similar 
format) before choosing an option. Compared to a non-anxious control group, 
OCD participants required significantly more pieces of information to make a 
choice in the low risk and OCD-relevant scenarios but not in the high- risk 
scenario. These results were driven by the fact that that OCD participants and 
healthy controls both requested more pieces of information in the high-risk 
scenario. This same pattern was observed for reaction time: OCD participants 
took longer to decide whether to request more  information in the low risk and 
OCD-relevant scenarios but not in the high-risk scenarios. This suggests that 
doubt-related elevations in OCD are apparent in low-risk situations with low 
severity (i.e., the low-risk scenario) and high severity (i.e., the OCD-relevant 
scenario), but not in objectively risky situations involving both higher 
probability and higher costs (i.e., the high-risk scenario). 
Finally, researchers have also examined indecisiveness among OCD 
participants in the domain of perceptual decisions. Specifically, Banca et al. 
(2015) used a random dot probe experiment to assess differences in decision-
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making processes between OCD participants and healthy controls. The dots 
moved under across the screen at varying levels of coherence, which the 
authors broke down into three levels of uncertainty: high (2.5% - 5% of dots 
moving in a coherent direction), medium (15% - 25% of dots moving in a 
coherent direction), and low (45% - 70% of dots moving in a coherent 
direction). One of the major findings was that OCD participants (relative to 
controls) had slower drift rates— a computationally derived parameter 
reflecting the speed of evidence accumulation during the decision process—
specifically in conditions of low and medium uncertainty. In other words, OCD 
participants had a significantly more difficult time committing to choices when 
correct options were more obvious. This finding mirrors those of the studies 
described above and is consistent with doubt differentiating OCD individuals 
from unaffected person specifically in situations where the probability of 
making the incorrect choice is low. Interestingly, these researchers found that by 
yoking increased decision times to a cost (i.e., choices made after a certain 
amount of time would be penalized) OCD participants were able to make 
choices in low uncertainty conditions with less evidence, indicating their 
indecisiveness can be attenuated using incentives. 
Inferential confusion. A related but distinct construct from doubt is a 
reasoning error known as inferential confusion (Emmelkamp & Aardema, 
1999; Aardema, O’Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand, Todorv, 2005), which 
refers to the tendency to confuse an imagined possibility with an actual 
probability. According to the authors, inferential confusion arises in OCD as a 
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result of engaging in inductive as opposed to deductive reasoning when judging 
a state of affairs. For instance, while unaffected individuals may start with 
evidence and reason toward a conclusion (e.g., “I forgot to lock the door 
yesterday and was in a rush today [evidence], so maybe I forgot to lock the 
door today as well [conclusion]” individuals with OCD may begin with the 
conclusion and then search for evidence to disprove it (i.e.., “I forgot to lock 
the door today [conclusion], how can I be sure that I didn’t? [evidence]”). 
Because sensory evidence is incapable of disproving an abstract conclusion, the 
original doubting inference will persist produce anxiety and ultimately motivate 
maladaptive behavior (e.g., going back to check if the door is locked). In this 
way, inferential confusion is particularly relevant for explaining how those with 
OCD could be anxious about possibilities that are remote but cannot be 
technically disproven, thereby providing an additional mechanism by which 
risk for these low-probability scenarios could be slightly overestimated. 
Links between inferential confusion and OCD have been found in both 
correlational and experimental studies. Correlational studies have focused on 
assessing relations between OCD symptoms and scores on the Inferential 
Confusion Questionnaire (ICQ; Aardema et al., 2005), which was designed to 
measure the two tendencies deemed central to the construct: Inverse inference 
(e.g., “I often know a problem exists even thought I don’t have actual proof”) 
and distrust of the senses (e.g., “I am sometimes more convinced by what 
might be there than by what I actually see”). In a non-clinical sample, the 
authors found that the predecessor of the ICQ was positively correlated with 
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most forms of OCD as measured by the Padua Inventory, even while 
controlling for depressive symptoms (Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999). 
Aardema et al. (2005) later replicated these results in a clinical sample, 
showing that a) individuals with OCD exhibited greater scores on the ICQ 
than anxiety disordered and healthy control participants, b) the ICQ positively 
predicted most OCD symptoms on the Padua Inventory except for 
‘dressing/grooming symptoms and ‘impulses about harm’, and c) the ICQ 
continued to uniquely predict levels of OCD symptoms even after controlling 
for all other belief domains from the OBQ-44 (e.g., importance of controlling 
thoughts, overestimation of  threat, perfectionism, etc.). Interestingly, ICQ 
scores among those with delusional disorders and OCD did not significantly 
differ in this study, indicating inferential confusion may be an area of overlap 
between the two types of conditions. 
In a follow-up study, Aardema, Radomsky, O’Connor, and Julien 
(2008) attempted to further characterize relations between inferential confusion 
and other common OCD beliefs by determining the factor structure of a 
combined questionnaire consisting of the OBQ-44 and ICQ. Interestingly, 14 of 
the 15 items from the ICQ loaded on a factor consisting mostly of items from 
the threat overestimation subscale of the OBQ-44. Moreover, after controlling 
for general anxiety and distress, the combined inferential confusion/threat 
overestimation factor was the only belief domain to significantly predict two 
separate indices of OCD symptoms and the only domain to predict every 
individual OCD symptom subscale. These same findings were also replicate by 
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the authors in three additional studies (e.g., Wu, Aardema, & O’Connor, 2009; 
Aardema et al., 2010); Polman, O’Connor, & Huisman, 2011). Thus, there is 
clear conceptual and empirical overlap between the tendency to engage in 
inferential confusion and the tendency to overestimate threat, which also 
appears to be a fairly central and specific feature of OCD pathology compared 
to other belief domains. 
This same group has also tested the relevance of inferential confusion to 
OCD via experimental studies. Specifically, Aardema, O’Connor, Pélissier, 
and Lavoie (2009) assessed the degree to which estimates regarding the 
probability of a hypothetical state of affairs— whether one had hit a pedestrian 
with their car after hearing a scream and feeling a bump in the road— are 
affected by both reality-based information (e.g., “you see a pothole in your 
rearview mirror”) and possibility-based information (e.g., “The pothole may 
have not been deep enough to cause the bump”). Results show that while the 
presentation of reality-based information produced similar decreases in event 
likelihood estimates across OCD participants and unaffected individuals, 
presentation of possibility-based information resulted in inflated estimates of 
event probability for OCD participants. Of note, this difference did not translate 
to a non-OCD- relevant situation (determining if there was a bus strike). These 
results were later replicated in a follow-up study using two new hypothetical 
scenarios (judging the cleanliness of a $20 bill, judging whether a gas stove had 
been left on), in which similar albeit weaker effects for a non- OCD-relevant 




Other researchers have since contended that possibility-based effects for 
OCD participants can be more parsimoniously explained as a ‘better safe-than-
sorry strategy’. More specifically, presentation of information consistent with 
threat is predicted to result in those with anxiety disorders (including OCD) 
being less sure of their safety compared to healthy controls, regardless of 
whether such information is presented as a possibility or a sensory reality 
(Gangemi, Mancini, & Dar, 2015). Indeed, these researchers found that when 
the possibility- based information is framed as evidence supporting safety (e.g., 
“you don’t see a pothole in the rearview mirror, but it may not be easily 
viewable from your mirror”) the findings were reversed: reality-based (danger-
congruent) information led to greater levels of doubt among OCD participants 
relative to controls. Thus, it could be the case that inferential confusion is only 
triggered (or becomes problematic) in the context of potential threats and is not 
a more global reasoning error that OCD individuals evidence in all situations. 
Magical Ideation. Magical ideation (MI), referred to as the tendency to 
hold beliefs that defy culturally-accepted laws of causality, has also been 
proposed to be central cognitive feature of OCD (Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, 
Neary, and Brigidi, 2001). Inherent to the definition of MI is the tendency to 
feel at elevated risk for extremely improbable events, as improbable events 
would necessarily be ones that defy laws of causality. Thus, MI is another trait 
that could potentially help explain why those with OCD overestimate the 
likelihood of improbable events. 
 
67 
Links between MI and OCD have traditionally been examined using the 
Magical Ideation Scale (MIS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), which assesses the 
presence/absence of beliefs about a number of magical influences (e.g., thought 
transmission, spiritual influences, psychic energy). Using this scale, Einstein 
and Menzies found that OCD symptoms were significantly predicted by MIS 
scores in both a clinical sample (Einstein & Menzies, 2004a) and a non-clinical 
undergraduate sample (Einstein & Menzies, 2004b). In a subsequent study, 
these same researchers found that MIS scores were elevated in both OCD 
checkers and OCD washers relative to individuals with panic disorder and 
healthy controls (Einstein & Menzies, 2006), which was later replicated in a 
non-western Turkish sample (Yorulmaz, Onozu, & Gültepe, 2011). Notably, 
while a separate group replicated the finding that MIS scores were elevated in 
OCD participants relative to healthy controls, they failed to find significant 
differences in MI between OCD participants and those with GAD (West & 
Willner, 2011). 
Levels of magical ideation do not appear to be evenly distributed across 
OCD symptom presentations. In the study by Einstein and Menzies (2006) for 
instance, compulsive washers showed higher MI compared to compulsive 
checkers. In a larger and more comprehensive study (N = 395 OCD patients) 
however, Tolin et al. (2001) found a somewhat different pattern: Participants 
with primary aggressive obsessions (which lumped ‘pure aggressive’ and 
‘pathological doubting’ obsessions together) and religious obsessions reported 
significantly greater MI compared to those with primary contamination 
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obsessions, symmetry/ordering obsessions, and somatic obsessions. A similar 
pattern of findings was also obtained by Lee & Telch (2005), who found that 
schizotypal traits (which include magical thinking) predicted levels of 
autogenous obsessions, which includes reactions to internally generated 
repugnant thoughts (i.e., as in aggressive OCD, religious OCD, sexual OCD) 
but not reactive obsessions, which include distressing reactions to external 
stimuli (i.e., as in contamination, pathological doubting, symmetry/ordering). 
Thus, while results are mixed, magical ideation appears to be more specific to 
those with aggressive and religious obsessions, and perhaps sexual obsessions 
as well. 
Thought-action fusion. A related but somewhat more specific construct 
relative to magical ideation is thought-action fusion (TAF), which reflects the 
belief that one’s thoughts can influence the external world. TAF is typically 
measured with the Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran, Thoradson, 
& Rachman, 1996), which usually breaks into two distinct components: moral 
TAF, defined as the belief that thinking about an action is morally equivalent to 
performing it, and likelihood TAF, defined as the belief that thinking about a 
possibility increases the likelihood that it will occur. Thus, likelihood TAF (but 
not moral TAF) reflects a specific belief mechanism by which individuals 
could come to overestimate the likelihood of magical, improbable events. 
In the initial TAFS study, OCD participants exhibited greater levels of 
moral TAF and likelihood TAF relative to healthy undergraduates (Shafran et 
al., 1996). Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary, & Brigidi (2001) followed up on 
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these results using a larger undergraduate sample (N = 424) and a more fine-
grained measure of TAF, which assessed participants’ perception of whether 
their thoughts could increase a) the likelihood of causing positive events (e.g., 
friend/relative having a relaxing vacation), b) the likelihood of negative events 
(e.g., friend/relative being in a car accident), and c) the likelihood of preventing 
negative events (e.g., friend/relative avoiding a car accident). While participants 
reporting high OCD symptoms evidenced similar moral TAF compared to 
participants reporting low OCD symptoms, the high OCD group evidenced 
higher likelihood TAF for negative events, positive events, and negative event 
prevention. Thus, this study suggested that links between OCD and TAF were 
more circumscribed to the likelihood-based manifestation. 
Although there is a general consensus that TAF is relevant to OCD, it 
also does not appear specific to the illness. For instance, Abramowitz, 
Whitesie, Lyna, & Kalsy (2003) found that while OCD participants exhibited 
greater likelihood TAF (but not moral TAF) relative to participants with 
depression and social phobia, they were not significantly elevated relative to 
participants with GAD or PD. Moreover, when controlling for levels of trait 
anxiety and depression, differences between OCD participants and the 
depressed and social phobic groups were no longer significant. Similar results 
were also gleaned in a number of other studies, which again showed that while 
OCD participants reported greater TAF than healthy controls, they were not 
different from those with other anxiety disorders (O’Leary, Rucklidge, & 
Blampied, 2009; Rasin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001; Shirinzadeh, 
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Nateghian, & Goudarzi, 2010). Indeed, in one study, individuals with GAD 
exhibited higher TAF compared to those with OCD (Thompson-Hollands, 
Farchione, & Barlow, 2013). 
Notably, it is unclear whether differences between those with OCD and 
other anxiety disorders differed according to the type of TAF. This point is 
especially relevant for the finding that those with GAD showed greater TAF 
than those with OCD. Specifically GAD patients often hold beliefs about the 
importance and positive effect of worries, and thus may believe that worries 
can decrease (rather than increase) the chance of a negative outcome. 
Additionally, most studies comparing OCD participants to anxiety control 
groups utilized participants with GAD, so this explanation applies readily to 
these findings as well. In lieu of more detailed TAF comparisons however, 
extant evidence remains equivocal as to whether likelihood-based TAF is 
specific to OCD. 
Sympathetic magic. Another belief that may result in an overestimation 
of improbable threat likelihood is sympathetic magic (Nemeroff & Rozin, 
1994). Sympathetic magic refers to implausible beliefs about how contagions 
are transmitted, such as the idea that contaminants transfer to novel mediums 
permanently and absolutely (e.g., “Even if I was hungry, I would not drink a 
bowl of my favorite soup if it had been stirred by a used but thoroughly washed 
flyswatter”; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). Thus, the construct may be 
particularly relevant for explaining how those with contamination OCD 
overestimate improbable threats. 
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To my knowledge, sympathetic magic has only been examined in 
relation to OCD in two studies. In the first study, Woody & Tolin (2002) found 
that OCD participants exhibited higher scores on the Sympathetic Magic 
subscale of the Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994) relative to healthy controls but 
not anxious controls. The authors proposed that null difference between the 
OCD and anxiety group in this study were due to the content of sympathetic 
magic scale being too general relative to the concerns expressed by those with 
contamination OCD. 
In the second study, the same authors tested this explanation by 
comparing OCD patients with contamination obsessions to anxious- and non-
anxious control participants on an experimental paradigm with greater 
relevance to contamination-specific beliefs in sympathetic magic (Tolin 
Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2004). In this paradigm, participants selected an object 
they felt was contaminated (e.g., piece of rotting food, a toilet, etc.) and then 
touched a clean pencil to it. Subsequently, the researchers thoroughly rubbed 
this ‘contaminated’ pencil to a second pencil, and then a third, a fourth, a fifth 
etc. up to 11 pencils to create a ‘chain of contagion’. The authors repeated this 
same procedure in a control condition, where pencils were instead rubbed onto 
a neutral object (i.e., a piece of candy). Following each point of contact, 
participants rated how contaminated they believed the pencil was on a 0 – 100 
scale (0% = “not at all contaminated”, 100 = “completely contaminated”). 
While all groups showed a steep drop off in perceived contamination for 
pencils whose initial contact began with candy, the contamination manipulation 
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produced the expected group differences: Both control groups perceived 
pencils farther down the chain of contagion as gradually less contaminated, 
while OCD participants continued to rate pencils far removed from the original 
contaminant as markedly contaminated. 
For instance, while both anxious and healthy control participants gave a 
rating of zero contamination by pencil #7, OCD participants continued to give 
a mean contamination rating of 50% by the last pencil (pencil #12). While it is 
unclear whether these differences are attributable to greater sympathetic magic 
beliefs per se, they did successfully illustrate how those with contamination 
OCD could overestimate the likelihood of improbable contamination-related 
events (e.g., contracting HIV from a doorknob). 
Personal vulnerability. Finally, a more recent line of inquiry has 
suggested that individuals with OCD are also distinguished by a heightened 
sense of personal vulnerability for low base-rate events. Specifically, several 
studies have shown that OCD participants judge the likelihood of improbable 
negative events (e.g., suffering from a life-threatening infection or 
unintentionally killing/severely injuring another person) greater than healthy 
controls, but only when such events are framed as occurring to themselves 
(Moritz & Jelineck, 2009; Moritz & Pohl, 2009; Niemeyer, Moritz, & 
Pietrowsky, 2013; Zetsche, Rief, & Exner, 2015). Thus, these studies perhaps 
most directly demonstrate that those with OCD overestimate their risk for 
experiencing highly unlikely threats. 
Nonetheless, an issue with these studies is that their samples were 
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composed exclusively of OCD patients with washing- and checking-concerns, 
which matched the types of index events used in the study (i.e., contracting a 
harmful disease; hitting someone with your car). Thus, it is difficult to tell from 
this evidence alone if perceived vulnerability is generalizable to all improbable 
threats or specific to the consequences most relevant to these OCD subtypes. 
Moreover, evidence for the specificity of increased personal vulnerability in 
OCD is mixed, as those with OCD show increased levels of the variable 
relative to other anxiety groups in some  studies (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 2009) 
but not others (e.g., Zetsche et al., 2015). 
Summary of improbable threat overestimation. Overall, the studies 
reviewed in the preceding section illustrate that there are a variety of traits and 
mechanisms that could theoretically result in individuals with OCD 
overestimating the likelihood of improbable events. The fact that these 
proclivities would lead to overestimating improbable events specifically is 
implied by both the face-valid conceptualizations of the traits and the nature of 
the experimental conditions that produced differences between OCD 
participants and controls. For instance, traits like thought-action fusion, 
magical ideation, and sympathetic magic are clearly relevant to improbable 
events specifically, as they refer to beliefs in phenomena that are not deemed 
possible in the physical world. Similarly, differences between OCD 
participants and healthy controls in indecisiveness tend to emerge most 
robustly in circumstances where the correct choice is obvious, implying that 
OCD participants continue to question the right decision even when the 
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probability of making the wrong choice is exceedingly low. 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to assess the distinctiveness of 
OCD-relevant processes linked to the overestimations of improbable event 
likelihoods. For some traits, the conceptual overlap is clear: TAF and 
sympathetic magic, for instance, could be considered more specific types of 
magical ideation. Similarly, indecisiveness could arise from doubting one’s 
memory, attention, or knowledge. In line with these notions, Nestadt et al. 
(2016) suggested that these more specific processes are really just secondary 
manifestations of doubt, perhaps even idiosyncratic post-hoc justifications by 
OCD patients for why they tend to doubt their safety for certain negative 
events. Indeed, many of the traits/processes that result in overestimating 
improbable event likelihoods are linked to specific OCD presentations: Doubt 
in one’s cognitive abilities (memory, attention, perception) has been most 
robustly linked to checking-related concerns; sympathetic magic is clearly 
most relevant to contamination OCD; and magical ideation/thought-action 
fusion is elevated most commonly among those with aggressive, religious, and 
perhaps sexual OCD. Thus, it is possible that each of these distinct 
traits/processes are really just a presentation-specific manifestations of the 
tendency to overestimate the likelihood of improbable events. 
Importantly, while several distinct traits/processes may result in 
improbable threat likelihoods being overestimated in OCD, evidence also 
suggests that such overestimations are typically quite slight. For instance, 
compared to healthy controls, OCD participants rate their personal 
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vulnerability for catastrophic OCD-relevant consequences as only slightly 
greater (Moritz & Jelinek, 2009), doubt the veracity of their 
perceptions/cognitive faculties only slightly more (Hermans et al., 2008), and 
judge likelihood of extremely improbable experimental outcomes as only 
slightly more uncertain (Fear & Vealy, 1996). Similarly, although OCD 
participants are often elevated on the TAFS and MIS, they do not report beliefs 
in the bizarre phenomena indexed by these scales as anything more than a 
possibility (e.g., Shafran et al., 1996). The notion that those with OCD only 
slightly overestimate the likelihood of improbable outcomes is also very 
consistent with the fact that most OCD patients possess intact insight into the 
senseless of their concerns (e.g., Marazzti et al., 2002; Kishore, Samar, Reddy, 
Chandrasekhar, & Thennarasu, 2004), and rarely appraise their feared 
consequences as very likely (Foa and Kozak, 1995; Tolin et al., 2001). 
Finally, most of the reviewed processes and traits showed at least some 
evidence of specificity to OCD (e.g., they were elevated among OCD 
participants relative to anxious controls). There were some notable exceptions 
like elevated TAF in GAD, though this particular elevation could be due to a 
failure to consider the heterogeneity underlying measures of TAF. Regardless, 
the fact these constructs were most robustly linked to OCD suggests that 
overestimations of improbable threat likelihood are more relevant to OCD 
compared to other anxiety disorders. 
Overestimation of catastrophic event costs in OCD 
 
Although the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of improbable 
 
76 
events appear to play an important role in OCD, clinicians have suggested that 
overestimations of threat severity are also relevant to the illness. For instance, 
Van Oppen and Arntz (1994) and Salkovskis (1999) both noted that OCD 
patients may come to accurately appraise a feared consequence as very unlikely 
after therapy but still continue to obsess about it if they overestimate its 
potential severity. However, there is little evidence to suggest that any cost-
related distortions associated with OCD would result in elevated perceptions of 
danger to catastrophic outcomes specifically. Thus, it does not seem plausible 
that cost-related distortions are capable of producing an OCD- relevant concern 
with improbable catastrophes on their own. Nonetheless, there are several well- 
known OCD-relevant traits capable of producing more general cost-related 
overestimations that warrant consideration given their potential for augmenting 
the perceived aversiveness of the catastrophic outcomes associated with SIC. 
Inflated responsibility for harm. As reviewed earlier, inflated 
responsibility (IR) refers to a heightened belief about one’s responsibility for 
harm or danger occurring to oneself or others. As such, IR could theoretically 
increase the aversiveness of a potential outcome (e.g., having one’s house 
burglarized) by adding additional responsibility-related costs (e.g., feelings of 
guilt, fears of blame) to the more direct costs of the outcome (e.g., the loss of 
possessions). Indeed, experimental manipulations of IR has been shown to 
specifically produce elevations in perceived threat severity as opposed to 
increases in perceived threat probability. For instance, Menzies, Harris, 
Cumming, & Einstein (2000) found that undergraduates with OCD rated the 
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severity (but not likelihood) of hypothetical washing- and checking-related 
situations greater than healthy controls, but only in scenarios where the 
participant would have been responsible for the aversive outcome. 
Much of the early research on IR validated its role in OCD. For 
instance, several studies demonstrated that pathological beliefs about 
responsibility for harm were higher among OCD participants relative to 
healthy and anxious controls (Salkovskis, et al., 2000; Cougle, Lee, 
Salkovskis, 2007). In another study, levels IR were found to significantly 
predict OCD symptoms controlling for other OCD-relevant traits (e.g., 
Rhéaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995). The relevance of IR 
to OCD is also underscored by the decision of the OCCWG to list the 
construct as one of the core beliefs associated with OCD (OCCWG, 2003) and 
by its centrality to early etiological conceptualizations of the illness 
(Salkovskis, 1996). 
The relevance of IR to OCD is further demonstrated by the ability of 
experimental responsibility manipulations to elicit increases in OCD-like 
symptoms. In such experiment, participants were presented a low-
responsibility scenario (e.g., “You see a piece of string on the ground”), an 
OCD-relevant responsibility scenario (e.g., “You see some nails on a road”), 
and a high-responsibility scenario (e.g., “You see a person sitting alone in a 
diner is choking”). Similar to results from a similar study with this design (i.e., 
Foa et al., 2001), significant differences emerged on low-responsibility and 
OC-relevant scenario but not on high-responsibility scenarios: OCD 
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participants (relative to healthy and anxious controls) reported greater distress 
at leaving these situations unrectified, a greater desire to rectify them, and 
greater responsibility if a consequence were to occur as a result of not rectifying 
them (Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar, & Przeworski, 2001). In a replication and 
extension of this experiment, Foa, Sacks, Tolin, Prezworski, & Amir (2002) 
found the same pattern of results for OCD participants with primary checking 
symptoms but not for OCD participants with different primary symptoms. 
Another type of experimental responsibility manipulation was 
conducted by Arntz, Voncken, & Goosen (2007). These researchers had 
participants sort pills of 11 different color combinations into appropriate jars 
in a low responsibility condition, where participants thought they were 
helping with a study of visual color perception, and a high responsibility 
condition, where participants thought they were validating a pill-sorting 
scheme to aid with medication dispensation in 3rd-world country that had 
previously been rejected because of too many participant errors. Participants 
were coded by raters for ‘compulsive-like’ checking behaviors such as re-
checking that pills had been correctly sorted or pausing to inspect the pill’s 
color. 
Results showed that, relative to both anxious and healthy controls, OCD 
participants exhibited more checking behaviors in the high-responsibility, but 
not low-responsibility condition. As such, this study extended the results of 
previous IR experiments by demonstrating that increases in perceived 
responsibility could also induce greater compulsive behaviors (i.e., checking) 
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among OCD participants in the laboratory. 
Although both correlational and experimental work leaves little doubt 
that IR is relevant to OCD, other studies have implicated this construct as a 
more general marker of anxiety pathology. For instance, in a study by Tolin et 
al. (2006), IR was the only OCD-relevant belief that was not elevated among 
OCD participants relative to anxious controls, even when trait anxiety and 
depression were controlled for. More recently, Pozza & Dèttore (2014) 
conducted a meta-analysis demonstrating that relations between OCD 
symptoms and IR were strong, (r = .42), but not stronger relative to its 
relations with other anxiety symptoms. As such, it appears that while IR is 
relevant to OCD, the construct may also produce cost-based overestimations 
among those with other forms of anxiety pathology. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty. In the context of OCD, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty (IU) is defined as the belief that uncertainty, newness, and change 
are intolerable because they are potentially dangerous. Thus, IU is another trait 
that could theoretically augment the perceived severity of an aversive 
consequence by supplementing an event’s direct consequences with additional 
uncertainty-related discomfort. 
Although early research implicated IU as a sensitive and specific 
feature of OCD (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998), latter research suggests the 
trait is actually elevated across many forms of anxiety pathology. Specifically, 
Tolin et al. (2003) found that, although IU was significantly elevated OCD 
patients relative to anxious controls initially, the difference disappeared when 
 
80 
levels of trait anxiety and depression were controlled for. Other studies have 
since yielded similar results (e.g., Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012; Boswell, 
Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013). Indeed, a recent meta-
analysis found that when a more general, non-OCD-specific definition of IU 
is used (Buhr & Dugas, 2009), the construct is actually more related to 
symptoms of GAD than to symptoms of OCD (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). 
In addition to the fact that IU may not be specific to OCD, the trait also 
does not appear relevant to all OCD presentations. For instance, Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi, and Foa (2003) found that IU was elevated among OCD 
checkers but not OCD patients without checking. Similar results were obtained 
by Julien, O’Connor, Aardema, and Todorov (2006) who found that a combined 
IU/perfectionism scale uniquely predicted symptoms related to checking and 
precision but not other types of OCD symptoms. Thus, although IU may result 
in cost-related overestimations for some OCD patients, its effects may not be 
generalizable to all OCD subtypes or specific to the disorder as a whole. 
Perfectionism. A final OCD-relevant trait that may augment the cost of 
aversive consequences is perfectionism, defined as the tendency to set high 
standards and employ critical self-evaluations (Frost & Marten, 1990). As such, 
perfectionism may render consequences more subjectively aversive by causing 
the individual to perceive unfortunate events as evidence of personal failings, 
which may open them up to criticism by others (McFall & Wollersheim, 1979). 
Indeed, researchers have specifically conceptualized perfectionism as a 




Links between perfectionism and OCD have been well-studied. In one 
of the first studies of this topic, Rhéaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, and 
Ladocuer (1995) found that levels of perfectionism as measured by the 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Frost et al., 1990) was a unique 
predictor of OCD symptoms in a non-clinical student samples, even when 
beliefs pertaining to inflated responsibility were controlled for. This result was 
later replicated and extended to show that perfectionism uniquely predicted 
OCD symptoms controlling for both inflated responsibility and beliefs about 
perceived danger (Rhéaume, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 2000). Similar findings 
were also obtained in a separate group utilizing a different perfectionism scale, 
which also showed that OCD symptoms were uniquely related to ‘maladaptive 
perfectionism’ (i.e., constant dissatisfaction at failing to meet one’s personal 
standards) but not ‘adaptive perfectionism’ (i.e., constant motivation to grow 
and improve; Rice & Pence, 2006). 
Clinical studies of OCD and perfectionism have since demonstrated that 
the relationship between these variables is more nuanced than was implied in 
previous non-clinical studies. In the first of these studies, Frost and Steketee 
(1997) found that OCD patients were only elevated on two perfectionism 
domains relative to healthy controls: Concern Over Mistakes (e.g., “If I fail at 
work/school, I am a failure as a person”) and Doubt (e.g., “I usually have 
doubts about the simple everyday things I do”). Further, these same researchers 
found differences between OCD patients and anxious controls on the doubt 
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subscale, but not the Concern Over Mistakes subscale. Importantly, the Concern 
Over Mistakes subscale arguably better taps the tendency to overestimate the 
cost of negative events, whereas the Doubt subscale appears to more tap the 
tendency to overestimate the probability of negative events. Thus, this study 
suggested that the perfectionistic tendencies toward overestimating threat-
related costs are not specific to OCD. More conclusive evidence for this 
assertion came from a recent meta-analysis examining the role of perfectionism 
in anxiety disorders, OCD, anorexia, and depression (Limburg, Watson, 
Hagger, & Egan, 2017). In this study, doubt was once again the perfectionistic 
domain that was most strongly related to OCD symptoms, while associations 
involving ‘concern over mistakes’ were more or less equivalently associated 
with OCD symptoms (r = .37) and other anxiety symptoms (r = .34) and even 
more strongly associate with depression symptoms (r = .45). 
Finally, like other cost-related distortions, there is some evidence that 
perfectionism has distinct relationships with different OCD symptoms. In one 
study, Martinelli et al. (2014) found that doubt about performing actions was a 
significant predictor of checking symptoms, while the perfectionistic domain 
of organization (e.g., “Organization is very important to me”) specifically 
predicted ordering symptoms. Similar results were found by Wheaton et al. 
(2010), who found that perfectionism as measured by the OBQ-44 specifically 
predicted symmetry obsessions. Likewise, Tolin, Brady, and Hannah (2008) 
found that perfectionism from the OBQ predicted scores on the Obsessing, 
Hoarding, and Ordering scales of the OCI-R. In sum, perfectionism 
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appears to be another cost-related distortion that is both not specific to OCD 
and not pervasive across all OCD symptoms domains. 
Characteristics of improbable catastrophes as evidence for particular 
threat-based distortions 
To complement the empirical evidence used to elucidate the origin of 
SIC, I would like to  briefly turn to how the theoretical properties of 
improbable catastrophes also help clarify the nature of this sensitivity. To 
illustrate, consider the decision to prevent a prototypical OCD- relevant 
improbable catastrophe—re-checking the stove to prevent a fire—through 
the lens of an expected value calculation (i.e. value = likelihood x cost), 
where checking has an objective cost of -1 and a probability of 1, and losing 
one’s house to a fire (given that one checked) has an objective cost of -
100,000 and an objective probability of .000001, making checking the 
favored option (i.e., [Checking: -1 x 1 = -1] <  [Not Checking: -100,000 x 
.000001 = 0.1]). Next, consider what degree of probability- and cost-based 
overestimations would be necessary to make checking the favored option. 
For checking to become the favored option purely through a probability-
based distortion, just a slight overestimation is necessary (e.g., p = .0001 
rather than p = .000001; -1 > - 10[-100,000 x .0001]). This minor distortion 
is consistent with most OCD patients possessing intact insight into the 
senselessness of fears (Foa & Kozak, 1995; Marazziti et al., 2002; Kishore 
et al., 2004), as well as with experimental evidence suggesting that 
likelihood estimates of catastrophic outcomes among those with OCD are 
 
84 
only slightly higher than healthy controls (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 2009). 
In contrast, for checking to become the favored through a purely cost-
based distortion, an excessive overestimate is required (e.g., c = 10,000,000 
rather 100,000; -1 > - 10[-10,000,000 x .000001]). Given that this consequence 
is objectively terrible, it is hard to envision what additional costs the person 
could imagine for the idea of not checking to be considered 100 times 
more aversive. The issue with explaining SIC using only a cost-based 
distortion is further compounded by the fact that many OCD-relevant fears are 
so improbable that they may be considered to have an objective probability of 
zero (e.g., catching HIV from a doorknob; catching undesirable qualities from 
another person). As such, no degree of cost-based overestimation would be 
sufficient to elicit compulsive behavior in the absence of a probability- based 
distortion. In this way, probability-based distortions offer a more likely 
pathway for the development of SIC, as such overestimations are theoretically 
more capable of eliciting compulsive avoidance of improbable catastrophes 
among those with OCD. 
Still, even though cost-based distortions seem incapable of explaining 
the development of SIC on their own, they could still exacerbate OCD 
symptoms by rendering the perceived consequences of a feared outcome more 
severe. For instance, Oppen and Arntz (1994) suggest that cost-related 
distortions like inflated responsibility may continue to drive compulsive 
behavior among OCD patients after EX/RP has significantly reduced one’s 
probability-based overappraisals of danger. The influence of cost-related 
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distortions may be especially relevant for less objectively severe consequences 
(e.g., yelling profanities in church), which arguably leave far more room for the 
individual to conceive additional consequences (e.g., total dismissal by church 
community) that may result in those outcomes being perceived as subjectively 
catastrophic. Importantly, the notion that traits linked to cost-based distortions 
are symptom exacerbating factors is consistent with empirical data showing 
these overestimations are relevant to OCD while not being central or specific 
markers of the disorder. 
Conclusions: The Present Dissertation 
 
Overall, evidence from past literature—whether it be 
phenomenological, lab-based, or correlational—suggests that OCD may 
involve an underlying sensitivity toward improbable catastrophes (SIC). 
Similar types of evidence suggest that SIC is fairly specific to OCD and is 
likely driven primarily by a tendency to overestimate improbable event 
likelihoods rather than a tendency to overestimate catastrophic event costs. 
However, no studies to date have attempted to experimentally validate these 
claims. In this dissertation, I will attempt to address this important gap by 
testing how OCD symptoms predict responding to threats parametrically 
varying in probability and perceived aversiveness. 
In the first study, I will test the hypothesis that OCD symptoms predict 
anxious reactivity (subjective anxiety ratings, fear-potentiated startle responses, 
behavioral avoidance choices) to improbable, highly aversive threats, as well as 
heightened likelihood estimates to improbable threats in general. In the second 
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study, I will test whether these results are invariant across harmful and disgust-
related threats, given the relevance of both types of consequences to common 
OCD presentations. In the final study, I will test whether heightened likelihood 
estimates for improbable threat, and heightened anxious reactivity to 
improbable, highly aversive threat, can longitudinally predicts future levels of 
OCD symptoms during a stressful transition (i.e., 1st year of college), thereby 
clarifying whether SIC constitutes a risk factor or correlate of OCD. Across 
these studies, I will assess the specificity of SIC by testing whether predicted 
effects with OCD symptoms are shared with more general anxiety-related traits 
(i.e., trait anxiety) and symptoms (i.e., GAD and SAD symptoms). Together, 
these studies should help clarify whether SIC is a sensitive and specific feature 
of OCD which arises from a more general tendency to overestimate the 










Chapter 2: Methods Overview 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the overarching 
methodological features of the dissertation. In particular, I will describe and 
justify my decision to a) assess OCD symptoms using the Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa et al., 2002), b evaluate responses to 
improbable catastrophes with an adapted version of the Pavlovian and 
Instrumental Generalization Paradigm (Van Meurs, Wiggert, Wicker, & 
Lissek, 2014) and, c) test relations between these variables in nonclinical 
samples of college students. 
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised 
 
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al. 2002) 
is an 18-item OCD self-report scale based on the original 42-item Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998). The 
OCI-R uses a 5-point Likert scale to assess how distressed or bothered 
individuals have been by 18 common obsessive-compulsive symptoms over the 
past month. In addition to a total score, the OCI-R yields subscales scores for 
six types of specific OCD symptoms: Washing (e.g., I sometimes have to 
wash/clean myself because I feel contaminated), Checking (e.g., “I repeatedly 
check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off”), Ordering 
(e.g., “I get upset if objects are not arranged properly”), Neutralizing (e.g., “I 
feel I have to repeat certain numbers”), Obsessing (e.g., “I frequently get nasty 
thoughts and have difficulty getting rid of them”), and Hoarding (e.g., “I have 
saved up so many things that they get in the way”). 
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In general, the OCI-R has been shown to possess excellent 
psychometric properties. In the validation study by Foa et al. (2002), the OCI-R 
showed excellent internal consistency across participants with OCD, social 
phobia, and PTSD, and no diagnosis, and all subscales had internal 
consistencies that were either good or excellent. Test-retest reliability for the 
full scale was good for both OCD patients and healthy controls, good-to-
excellent for OCD participants for the subscales, and adequate-to-good for 
healthy controls for the subscales. The full scale also showed strong 
convergent/divergent validity as demonstrated by stronger relations with other 
OCD symptom scales compared to ratings of depression. Regarding means and 
cut-off scores, Foa et al. (2002) found that OCD patients had a mean score of 28 
compared to approximately 18.82 in a sample of university students, and that a 
score of full-scale score of 21 was best at discriminating the two groups 
(sensitivity = 65.6%; specificity = 63.9%). Of note, university students were 
not screened for the presence of OCD, so it is possible that the specificity is 
actually higher than this value indicates. Scores on each OCI-R subscale were 
also elevated in  OCD patients relative to university students with the exception 
of Ordering, which was equivalent across the two groups, and Hoarding, which 
was actually higher in university students. 
Abramowitz and Deacon (2006) conducted a follow-up validation study 
of the OCI-R, finding again that the instrument demonstrated excellent 
psychometric properties. Additionally, these authors found that OCD 
participants clustered into a particular symptom category on the Y- BOCS 
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showed theoretically-consistent elevations on the same OCI-R subscale (e.g., 
those in the symmetry cluster showed higher scores on the Ordering subscale of 
the OCI-R). This suggests that the OCI-R subscales are indeed a valid way to 
differentiate individuals on the basis of their OCD symptoms. The Neutralizing 
subscale emerged as the sole exception in these analyses, as it was elevated 
equally across several distinct OCD symptom groups. 
In summary, the OCI-R appears to be a well-validated and 
psychometrically sound instrument with which to assess OCD symptoms in a 
convenient format. The subscales seem to possess less desirable but 
nonetheless valid properties compared to the overall scale. The largest 
concerns lie with the reliability and validity of the Neutralizing scale. There 
may also be concerns with the Hoarding subscale, which appears to poorly 
discriminate individuals with OCD given that it was actually higher in a 
putatively healthy sample of university students. Finally, the relatively poor 
sensitivity-specificity of the total score suggests that results with the 
continuous scale should not be over-interpreted as a way of determining the 
presence/absence of an OCD diagnosis. 
The Pavlovian and Instrumental Generalization Paradigm 
 
The Pavlovian and instrumental Generalization (PIG) paradigm is a fear 
learning and decision-making task developed by Van Meurs, Wicker, Wiggert, 
and Lissek (2014). In this experiment, both the fear-learning and decision-
making components of the task take place within a virtual farmer computer 
game during which the participant is a farmer tasked with traveling between a 
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shed and garden to successfully harvest crops (see Figure 2.1 below). During 
the journey to the garden, participants may receive electric shock depending on 
a) the road taken to reach the garden, and b) the shape presented in the center 
of the screen. One road (the short road) is contingently associated with shock 
but ensures a successful harvest (i.e., 100% of a win), while another road (the 
long road) is never associated with shock but only leads to a successful harvest 
25% of the time. Even when traveling the short road, electric shock only occurs 
when specific shape known as the conditioned danger cue (CS+) is presented, 
which is counterbalanced so as to be the largest ring for half of participants and 






Figure 2.1. Picture of the virtual farmer computer paradigm displaying the 
short and long roads connecting the tool shed to the garden. Also pictured 
are the conditioned stimuli presented in the center of the screen during the 
task.. The diameters of rings from smallest to largest are .8”, .96”, 1.12”, 
1.28”, 1.44”, 1.60”, 1.76”, 1.92” (size increases were established in 20% 
increments). Width and height are .8” for the small triangle, and 1.92” for 
the large triangle; in the present dissertation, these triangles sizes were 
averaged to form one medium- sized triangle that served as the triangular 
safety cue. CS- = conditioned safety cue; GS = generalization stimulus; 
CS+= conditioned danger cue; ∆CS-= triangular conditioned safety cue; 
GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimulus classes 1-3. 
 
The PIG paradigm consists of two types of trials: Pavlovian and 
instrumental trials. On Pavlovian trials, participants are automatically sent 
down a short road to plant their crops, during which startle-blink 
electromyography (EMG) is recorded and participants report subject ratings of 
perceived risk by responding to the question, “Level of risk?”, on a 3-point 
scale (1 = “no risk”, 2 = “some risk”, 3 = “high risk”). The startle reflex is 
evoked by startle probes administered 2.5 or 3.5 s post-trial onset (18-22 s 
inter-probe interval [IPI]) while startle-blink electromyography (EMG) is 
recorded. On instrumental trials, participants can choose to harvest their crops 
by taking either the short road or the long road described above during a 5s 
deliberation period; failure to choose a road within the 5s interval results in the 
farmer being automatically sent down the short path. Importantly, decisions to 
choose the long road in the absence of the CS+ may be considered maladaptive 
as task performance is unnecessarily compromised in the absence of genuine 
danger (i.e., shock will not actually occur). Throughout the experiment, the 
CS+ (but no other shape) is paired with a brief electric shock to the left wrist on 
50% of Pavlovian trials and 100% of instrumental trials where the short road is 
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taken. Travel down both the short and long roads on instrumental trials are 8 s 
in duration. 
The PIG paradigm consists of three phases: Preacquisition, Acquisition, 
and Generalization. Since fear generalization is not of interest to the current 
studies, the generalization phase will heretofore be referred to as the ‘Test 
Phase’. All trials during Preacquisiton and Acquistion are Pavlovian trials 
involving three different stimuli: A large ring, a small ring, and a triangle. 
During the Test Phase, participants experience alternating Pavlovian trials 
(identical structure to the first two phases) and instrumental trials, which 
involve both the three stimuli from the first two phases and a number of new 
stimuli, which are ring sizes forming  three classes of generalization stimuli 
(GSs: GS1, GS2, GS3). Together, such stimuli form a continuum of perceptual 
similarity to CS+, going from CS+ to GS3, to GS2, to GS1, to CS-, to ∆CS- (see 
Figure 2.1 above). 
To ensure an even distribution of trial types, both Pavlovian and 
instrumental trials are arranged in blocks, within which stimuli are presented in 
quasi-random order such that no more than two stimuli of the same class occur 
consecutively. Preacquisition consists of two blocks, each containing two ∆CS- 
, two CS-, and two CS+; Acquisition consists of four blocks, each containing 
two ∆CS-, two CS-, and two CS+; Test consists of six blocks, each containing 
two ∆CS-, two CS-, two GS1, two GS2, two GS3, and two CS+. 
Past studies of PIG 
All three extant studies of the PIG paradigm (van Meurs et al., 2014; 
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Hunt, Cooper, Hartnell, & Lissek, 2017; Hunt, Cooper, Hartnell, & Lissek, 
2019) indicate that participants display levels of conditioned fear and 
avoidance in a manner consistent with the presented stimulus. Specifically, 
results from each study show a continuous decline in startle EMG, online risk 
ratings, and avoidance choices as stimuli become more dissimilar from the 
CS+. Moreover, while the correlation between fear and avoidance measures on 
the PIG is significant, these measures are far from redundant. Indeed, two of 
the three studies on the PIG paradigm have been dedicated to identifying 
personality factors that can explain the large amount of variance in avoidance 
that is left unaccounted by fear-related measures (Hunt et al., 2017; Hunt et al., 
2019). 
Relevance of PIG for current studies 
Although the PIG paradigm was developed as a measure of 
generalized fear and avoidance, it also possesses a number of properties that 
make it a desirable experiment for assessing threat responses to improbable 
catastrophes. The first desirable property of the PIG is the way the task 
manipulates threat probability. Specifically, even though the CS+ is the only 
shape that is ever associated with shock, the perceptual similarity between it 
and other shapes provides a continuum on which safety from electric shock 
becomes gradually more certain. 
Participants are tasked with estimating these probabilities themselves 
based on their past experiences with the shapes and are never given explicit 
information about how likely a shape is to result in shock. Accordingly, threat 
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during the PIG paradigm is encountered under conditions of ambiguity, where 
threat probability values are unknown, as opposed to risk, where threat 
probabilities are provided. This distinction is important for both empirical and 
ecological reasons: OCD patients consistently display suboptimal decision-
making under conditions of ambiguity but not risk (Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, 
Markowitsch, & Brand, 2010; Zhang et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015) and real-
world OCD-related consequences must be estimated in the absence of explicit 
probability information, as their base rates are often unknown (e.g., contracting 
HIV from public surface) or unknowable (e.g., going to hell for an immoral 
thought). 
Another important property of the PIG’s threat probability 
manipulation is the empirically-derived shape of its stimulus gradient. 
Specifically, participants appear to make a fairly clear distinction between the 
three shapes with the least similarity to CS+ (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and the three 
shapes with the most similarity to CS+ (GS2, GS3, CS+): All shapes in the 
former group are rated significantly lower than shapes in the latter group, but 
are not rated as significantly different from each other (Hunt et al., 2017; Hunt 
et al., 2019). Moreover, the average risk rating for the group of shapes less 
resembling conditioned danger (i.e., ∆CS- CS-, GS1) is close to zero, and when 
transformed from the three-point risk rating scale to a percentage comes but to 
an average threat probability rating of 5% (see Figure 2.2.A below). Thus, half 
the stimuli used in the Test phase may be considered an experimental analogue 




The second important property of the PIG paradigm is the nature of its 
experimental threat. Namely, the intrinsically aversive nature of electric shock 
allows it to produce fairly high levels of anxiety across participants, especially 
given that it is calibrated to a standardized level meant to be “highly 
uncomfortable, but not painful” (van Meurs et al., 2014). To illustrate, the self-
reported shock aversion ratings from Hunt et al. (2017) are shown below in 
Figure 2.2.B. These ratings reflect how averse participants were to the 
consequences of electric shock, which was assessed retrospectively with the 
question, “How important is it to you to not get shocked?” using a 10-point 
scale (0 = “none”, 10 = “extremely”). As shown in this figure, the ratings are 
more or less evenly distributed; however, the modal rating is still a 10/10. 
Thus, participants vary  significantly in how aversive they find electric shock 
during the paradigm, but many find it maximally aversive. This aspect of 
electric shock is critical for ensuring the severity of the experimental threat is 
high enough to be considered a lab-based catastrophe for many participants 




Figure 2.2. Response differences in terms of threat probability ratings (A) and 
threat aversion ratings (B) from a past study of the PIG paradigm (Hunt et al., 
2017). Risk ratings were converted from a 0 – 2 scale to a 0 – 100 scale to 
facilitate interpretations in terms of threat probability. All stimuli with data 
points outlined in red were rated significantly higher than stimuli with data 
points not outlined red. Threat aversion ratings were elicited with the question 
“How important was it to avoid getting shocked?”. PIG = Pavlovian 
Instrumental Generalization. ∆CS- = Triangular safety cue; CS- = circular 
safety cue; GS1-3 = Generalization stimulus 1 – 3; CS+ = Danger cue. N = 109. 
 
 
In addition to producing high and variable levels of perceived threat 
severity, electric shock is desirable for the fact that it bears little to no direct 
relevance to OCD. Accordingly, any relations that are found between levels of 
OCD symptomology and threat responding in the PIG paradigm can be more 
readily attributed to the features of the experimental threat (i.e., its probability 
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and severity) as opposed to its particular modality (i.e., the fact that it involves 
electric shock). Critically, many past experimental studies that assessed 
relations between OCD and threat responses utilized threats commonly 
implicated in OCD (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 2009; Hermans et al., 2008), which 
made it difficult to conclude whether any response elevations to improbable 
catastrophes in these studies resulted from a more generalized sensitivity to 
such outcomes. The use of electric shock in the current studies should help 
circumvent this circularity and allow relations between OCD symptoms and 




In summary, the PIG paradigm possesses a number of desirable 
properties that render it a useful tool for testing participants’ general sensitivity 
to improbable, highly aversive outcomes. These strengths include the 
ambiguous nature of its threat, its lack of specific relevance to OCD, its ability 
to elicit varying levels of perceived threat severity and probability, and the 
large number of situations in which threats would (theoretically) be perceived 
as both improbable and highly aversive. 
OCD Symptoms in College Students 
 
Although college students are a relatively cheap and convenient 
sample, there are understandably concerns about whether findings from this 
population generalize to other groups (Gordan, Slade, & Schmitt, 1987). Such 
concerns are arguably more relevant for mental disorders, where the group of 
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interest is not the population at large, but rather a relatively specific subset of 
individuals with the condition of interest. Thus, it is important to consider the 
potential limitations of evaluating OCD-relevant correlates in a university 
sample. 
To assess the relevance of analogue studies in OCD, Abramowitz et al. 
(2013) outlines three conditions that must be met for findings of non-clinical 
samples to be generalizable: 1) The symptoms should be prevalent in the 
analogue population of interest, 2) the condition should be dimensional rather 
than categorical in nature, and 3) the disorder’s symptoms should possess 
similar empirical features across clinical and nonclinical samples. I will next 
discuss how each of these conditions are met when it comes to generalizing 
findings with OCD symptoms in college students to individuals with clinical 
manifestations of the illness. 
Regarding the first condition, researchers have long known that OCD 
symptoms are present among individuals without clinical levels of the illness. 
Rachman and de Silva (1978), for instance, showed that between 80-90% of 
people experience OCD-like intrusions at some point in their lives, a finding 
that has since been replicated numerous times (e.g., Freeston, Loaouceur, 
Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1991; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Belloch et al., 2004). 
The non- clinical samples used to obtain these findings typically involve large 
proportions of college students; however, there is also direct evidence 
showing that OCD symptoms are prevalent specifically in college students. 
For instance, scores on the OCI-R from Foa et al. (2002) were actually higher 
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among college students compared to those from the anxious control group in 
the sample from Abramowitz and Deacon (2006). Similarly high elevations on 
the OCI-R have since been found in other college samples (Hajcak, Huppert, 
Simons, & Foa, 2004; Sulkowski, Mariaskin, & Storch, 2011). Importanlty, 
there is also evidence supporting the idea that these elevations actually reflect 
clinical OCD. For instance, when Sternberger and Burns (1991) conducted a 
structured clinical OCD assessment with the top 3% of scorers on the Padua 
Inventory, 65% of participants met criteria for OCD. 
Regarding the second condition, several studies have employed 
taxometric analyses (Waller & Meehl, 1998) to test whether OCD symptoms 
form distinct clusters or ‘taxa’, suggestive of categories, or are more 
continuous, suggestive of a dimension. In the first of these studies, Haslam, 
Williams, Kyrios, McKay, & Taylor (2005), examined the taxometric structure 
of the Padua Inventory, finding that two of its three symptom subscales 
(cleaning, checking) favored dimensionality, while the third (obsessional) 
exhibited more distinct high vs. low taxa. Of more direct relevance to the 
current studies was an investigation by Olatunji, Williams, Haslam, 
Abramowitz, and Tolin (2007), who subjected the OCI-R to taxometric 
analyses. These researchers found strong evidence of dimensionality for all six 
OCI-R subscales except hoarding, which showed evidence of high vs. low taxa. 
Other evidence for dimensionality comes from studies of college 
students showing linear relationships between OCD symptoms and indices of 
distress and functional impairment. For instance, Ching, Williams and Siev 
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(2017) found significant associations between violent obsessions and suicidal 
thoughts, while Mrdjenovich and Bischof (2003) found that higher MOCI 
scores were associated with lower grades despite individuals being enrolled in 
fewer courses. Additionally, Abramowitz et al. (2010) noted that across a 
meta-analysis of 51 studies comparing clinical OCD vs. non-clinical samples 
on the OCI-R, the standard deviation across both groups was largely similar. 
This also implies that OCD is dimensional, as it appears that the range of OCD-
related impairment is similar across clinical and non-clinical populations alike. 
Finally, in regard to the third condition, there is good evidence that 
OCD symptoms possess similar features in clinical and nonclinical samples. 
Intrusive thoughts tend to involve similar content as OCD obsessions 
(Radomsky et al., 2014; Julien, O’Connor, and Aardema, 2009), and often 
trigger covert rituals/compulsions such as mental checking, focused distraction, 
reassurance seeking, and thought replacement, which appear functionally 
equivalent to OCD compulsions (Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, & Blais, 
1995; Berman, Abramowitz, Pardue, & Wheaton, 2010). Regarding symptom 
structure, OCD symptoms also tend to form similar factor- analytic dimensions 
across clinical and nonclinical college samples. For the OCI-R, Hajcak et al. 
(2004) replicated the same 6-factor structure in a college sample that was found 
by Foa et al. (2002) and Abramowitz and Deacon (2006) in clinical samples. 
Similar structural invariance across college and clinical samples has been 
demonstrated for other OCD assessment tools (e.g., Watson & Wu, 2005; 
Sanavio, 1988). More recently, Abramowitz et al. (2010) found that OCD 
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symptoms conformed to the familiar 4-factor solution among a sample of 
healthy control participants, while the hierarchical bifactor model of Olatunji et 
al. (2017) was in a non-clinical group composed largely of college students. 
Evidence for the empirical similarity across clinical and nonclinical 
college samples has also been demonstrated for other OCD-relevant domains. 
For one, obsessive beliefs (e.g., importance of controlling thoughts) form the 
same factor structure in both groups (OCCWG, 2005). Of note, the authors of 
this study also found that college-age participants scored significantly higher 
on all subscales of the OBQ-44 compared to a sample of community controls, 
building upon findings from Foa et al. (2002) in demonstrating that both OCD 
symptoms and beliefs elevated in college students. Experimental studies also 
support the notion that OCD patients and college participants are sensitive to 
the same symptom-producing mechanisms. For instance, the finding that 
OCD patients exhibit reduced memory confidence with repeated checking 
(e.g. Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007) has been shown to occur similarly in 
samples of college students subjected to the same experimental manipulation 
(e.g., Dek, Van den  Hout, Giele, & Engelhard, 2010; Van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003). 
In summary, the dimensional nature of OCD implies that results 
obtained using non- clinical samples can potentially be extrapolated to 
understand the illness in clinical contexts. Moreover, OCD symptoms in 
college students are more common compared to other non-clinical groups (e.g., 
community participants) and possesses many of the same features observed in 
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clinical samples (e.g., factor-analytic, structure, thematic content), making this 
population an especially apt analogue for understanding clinical OCD. 
Conclusions 
 
Although the current investigations would ideally test clinical samples 
assessed with a more comprehensive instrument (e.g., the Y-BOCS) and a 
more well-validated paradigm, it is clear that the OCI-R, the PIG paradigm, 
and college-age participants have a number of advantages when it comes to 
assessing links between OCD and SIC. Thus, these methods should help 
provide a strong initial test for the hypothesis that OCD symptoms will confer 
increased sensitivity to improbable, catastrophic threats.  
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Chapter 3: Experimental Evaluation of a Sensitivity to Improbable 
Catastrophes in OCD (Study 1) 
The purpose of this first study was to perform an initial experimental 
test of whether OCD symptoms confer increased sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes. Although this sensitivity is implied by the preponderance of 
OCD-relevant feared consequences involving improbable catastrophes, no 
studies to my knowledge have experimentally tested this observation by 
evaluating how persons with differing OCD symptoms respond to threats of 
varying probability and aversiveness. Additionally, the few past that found 
higher responding to improbable catastrophes in OCD utilized outcomes with 
known relevance to the disorder (e.g., hitting and killing a pedestrian: Aardema 
et al., 2008; contracting a life-threatening illness: Moritz & Jelinek et al., 
2009), which only verifies the notion that consequences that elicit OCD 
symptoms in the real world may also do so in the laboratory. Thus, the use of a 
non-OCD- relevant threat in the current study (i.e., electric shock) should help 
clarify whether OCD actually involves a more generalized sensitivity to all 
scenarios bearing improbable, catastrophic features, regardless of the particular 
consequence such scenarios entail. 
An additional purpose of this initial study was to test the relative 
contributions of probability-based and cost-based overestimations to the 
genesis of SIC. As reviewed in chapter 1, phenomenological, empirical, and 
theoretical evidence suggests that the purported sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes more likely arises from an overestimation of these events’ 
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probabilities than from an overestimation of their costs. Phenomenologically, 
improbable consequences are more common in OCD than catastrophic ones, 
suggesting a sensitivity to improbable events is a more abiding feature of the 
illness. This proposition is further buttressed by empirical data showing that 
traits conferring overestimations in improbable threat likelihood are more 
consistently and specifically linked to OCD compared those implicated in 
cost-related overestimations. The primacy of probability-based distortions for 
SIC is also suggested by the nature of improbable catastrophes themselves, 
which could theoretically trigger fear and avoidance given only a small 
probability-based overestimation while requiring an excessive cost- related 
overestimation to yield the same result. 
In the present study, I used an adapted version of the PIG paradigm 
(van Meurs et al., 2014) to test how participants with varying OCD symptoms 
would respond to threats with differing degrees of probability and 
aversiveness. Given the theory that OCD confers a specific sensitivity to 
improbable, catastrophic outcomes, I hypothesized that OCD symptoms would 
predict threat reactivity (expectancy ratings, subjective anxiety ratings, startle 
responses, avoidance choices) most strongly when the probability of the threat 
was low but subjective aversion to it was high. Additionally, I hypothesized 
that OCD symptoms would predict greater expectancy of improbable threat 
independent of levels of perceived aversiveness, consistent with 
overestimations of threat probability being a more central contributor to SIC. 
Overall, this first study should provide a strong initial test of whether OCD 
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involves a heightened sensitivity toward improbable catastrophes and whether 
this sensitivity results from a more general tendency to overestimate the 




A total of 100 University of Minnesota students were recruited and 
tested. Inclusion criteria applied at screening included: 1) being at least 18 
years old; 2) normal hearing and vision; 3) English speaking; 4) no current 
use of medications altering central nervous system function, including alcohol 
or illegal drugs up to 24 hours before the experiment; 5) no caffeine or 
nicotine intake for two hours prior to testing, and 6) not having participated in 
a previous conditioning experiment in our laboratory. All participants 
provided written informed consent after receiving a complete description of 
the study. 
Of the 100 tested participants, six were dropped due to validity 
concerns, as they provided invalid responses to validity items embedded in self-
report questionnaires; five were excluded for failing to acquire the CS+/US 
contingency (as indicated by CS+ versus CS- probability rating difference 
scores less than or equal to zero); and 5 were missing task data necessary for 
the main analyses. Finally, 8 participants were excluded either because they 
were startle non-responders, or because of technical problems with EMG 
equipment resulted in their startle data not being collected. This left a final 
sample of N = 78 participants (68% female), with a mean age of 19.75 (SD = 
1.44). Average Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa, et al., 
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2002) total score was 19.42 (SD = 12.97). Furthermore, a large portion of OCI-
R scores in the tested sample fell within the clinical range, with 41% of scores 
at or above the recommended clinical cut-off of 21 thought to indicate a likely 
presence of OCD, and 24% at or exceeding the mean among those diagnosed 




OCD symptoms were assessed using the Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory-Revised (Foa et al., 2002; see Chapter 2, Section 2.1for more details). 
Additionally, data on the Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) was also collected to 
control for broad trait anxiety in testing effects with OCI-R. 
Physiological Apparatus 
 
Stimulation and recording were controlled by a commercial system 
(Contact Precision Instruments). Startle-blink EMG was recorded with 
two 6-mm tin cup electrodes filled with a standard electrolyte gel 
(SignaGel, www.biomedical.com[CG04]) placed under the right eye. 
More specifically, one EMG electrode was placed below the lower eyelid 
in line with the pupil in forward gaze, and the second electrode was placed 
approximately 2 cm lateral to the first. Additionally, a 9-mm disk electrode 
was placed on the anterior forearm and served as a ground. Impedance 
levels for EMG electrodes was maintained below 20 Kilohms. The EMG 
signal was sampled at 1000 Hz and amplifier band width was set to 30- 
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500 Hz. Startle was probed by a 50-ms duration, 102 dB(A) burst of 




An overview of the Pavlovian and Instrumental Generalization (PIG) 
paradigm can be found in chapter two. Here, I will only describe changes made 
in the adapted version of the PIG used in this particular study. First, self-
reported risk ratings (i.e. “level of risk?”; 1 = “no risk”, 2 = “some risk”, 3 = 
“high risk”) were replaced with separate ratings of subjective anxiety (anxiety 
ratings) and threat probability (threat expectancy ratings). This was done to 
ensure that participants’ ratings of perceive threat probability were not 
conflated with their levels of perceived anxiety, as well as vice versa, as these 
outcomes served separate and equally important purposes in the current study. 
Anxiety ratings were elicited with the question, “Anxiety level?” (0 = “no 
anxiety”, 10 = “extreme anxiety”) and threat expectancy ratings with the 
question “Chance of shock?” (0 = 0% chance of shock, 10 = 100% chance of 
shock). These questions appeared for 3s on every Pavlovian trial at either 4s or 
9s post-trial onset with a counterbalanced order such that each question 
appeared first on 50% of trials. To accommodate the increased time necessary 
for answering these questions, shock during CS+ Pavlovian trials was not 
delivered until 16 s post-trial onset. To ensure that this gap did not result in 
insufficient levels of anxious 
reactivity being experienced at beginning of trials when fear-potentiated startle 
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was measured, a ‘dummy’ CS+ Pavlovian trial occurred once every 12 trials, 
during which no data was collected and shock was delivered at 4s post-trial 
onset. 
Second, because varying levels of perceived threat aversion were 
necessary to test the questions in this investigation, this adapted version also 
varied the number of shocks accompanying CS+ during the Test phase, pairing 
it with one shock (low intensity), two shocks (moderate intensity), or three 
shocks (high intensity). Multiple shocks were delivered as separate, consecutive 
pulses spaced 1s apart, and shock across all conditions continued to occur on 
50% of  Pavlovian trials and 100% of instrumental trials when the short road 
was chosen. The number of shocks possible changed every 12 trials during the 
Test Phase, and the order of shock intensity blocks was counterbalanced so that 
for half of participants the number of shocks possible across the six blocks was: 
1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, while for the other half it was reversed (i.e., 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3). 
The number of shocks participants were at risk for was shown in large font at 
the top of the screen for the duration of the block and each shock level had a 
distinct color (1 shock = blue, 2 shocks= orange, 3 shocks = red) to help ensure 
participant remained aware of the current shock condition. Threat aversion for 
each shock condition was measured as the level of motivation to avoid shocks 
(i.e., “How important was it to avoid receiving shock?”) and was assessed 
halfway through Test phase and again at the end of the Test Phase. 
Finally, to accommodate the increased time afforded by three (vs. one) 
shock conditions, two changes were made to keep the experiment a reasonable 
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length. First, acquisition involved only six presentations of each stimulus type 
(i.e., 2 ∆CS-, 2 CS-, 2 CS+), rather than eight in the original version. Second, 
each shock condition during the Test phase only contained four presentations 
of each stimulus type (i.e., 4∆CS-, 4 CS-, 4 GS1, 4 GS2, 4 GS3, 4 CS+ for each 
shock level) rather than six as in the original version. All other aspects of the 
experiment were conserved from the original version described in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2. 
Procedure  
This study was approved by the University of Minnesota IRB. 
Following informed consent, standardized questionnaires were filled out and 
EMG and shock electrodes were attached. Next, a shock-workup procedure 
was completed during which participants received several single shocks, the 
levels of which were adjusted so as to be rated as moderately or very painful 
but not extremely painful. Once the necessary level for a single shock had 
been established, participants were then given three consecutive shocks 
(spaced 1s apart as in the actual experiment) and asked whether they were 
still willing to receive three shocks at that level during the study. If 
participants said they were not willing to proceed, the level of shock was 
lowered until participants rated experience of three-shocks as at least 
moderately painful but still tolerable enough to complete the study. 
Prior to the Acquisition phase, participants were told they might 
learn to predict shock by attending to the shapes in the center of the 
screen, but were not informed of the CS+/shock contingency. Next, 
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headphones were placed and a habituation sequence consisting of nine 
startle probes (IPI=18-25 s) was run while the background image of the 
two roads, the shed, and the garden was displayed. The Acquisition phase 
was followed by a 10-min break during which time participants filled out a 
series of questionnaires regarding what they had learned in the experiment. 
Prior to the start of the Test phase, participants were given additional 
instructions concerning the avoidance portion of the task. Specifically, 
participants were told that what they learned during Acquisition about the 
relation between shapes and shocks still applied. Participants were also 
informed that they would now be able to choose the road traveled by the 
farmer on some trials, and the costs and benefits associated with each road 
were explained. Finally, participants were also told that the number of 
shocks they would be at risk for receiving would change throughout the 
next portion of the experiment, and that this number would always be 
indicated at the top of the screen. Participants then practiced using the 
button box to send the farmer down the long and short road. Next, five 
habituation startle probes were delivered (IPI=18-25 s) and the Test phase 
was run. Another 10-min break was provided halfway through the Test 
phase (i.e., after the first three 12-trial blocks), during which participants 
filled out another set of questionnaires, including separate questions for 
each level of shock asking participants to rate their threat aversion (i.e., 
“How important was it to not receive shock”) and desire to win the game 
(i.e., “How important was it to win the game”) on 10-point scales where 0 
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= “none” and 10 = “extreme”. Participants completed this same set of 
questions upon completion of the Test phase. 
Data Analysis 
 
Data processing. Startle EMG was rectified and then smoothed (20 
ms moving window average). The onset latency window for the blink 
reflex was 20-100 ms and the peak magnitude was determined within a 
window of time extending from the response onset to 120 ms. 
Additionally, the average baseline EMG level for the 50 ms immediately 
preceding delivery of the startle stimulus was subtracted from the peak 
magnitude. EMG magnitudes across all phases of the study were 
standardized together using within subject T-score conversions 
([([EMGsingle trial - EMGmean]/SD)*10]+50) to normalize data and reduce 
between participants’ variability unrelated to psychological processes. 
Threat expectancy ratings, anxiety ratings, and avoidance choices were 
linearly transformed to be on scales with values ranging from 0 and 100 
and self-reported threat aversion and desire- to-win ratings were averaged 
for each level of shock (i.e., average of the two ratings collected midway 
and at the end of the Test Phase). 
Data from the Test Phase were transformed to long format where each 
line represented a participant’s average level of responding (threat expectancy, 
anxiety ratings, fear-potentiated startle, avoidance choices) to a particular 
stimulus (∆CS- , CS-, GS1. GS2, GS3, CS+) within a specific shock-level 
condition (1, 2, or 3 shocks possible). Participants’ ratings of threat aversion 
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and desire-to-win were treated as 3-level variables wherein average ratings for 
each shock condition were used for all trials within that condition. 
Manipulation checks. To verify that no differences in threat responses 
between stimuli existed prior to acquisition, each response type (threat 
expectancy, anxiety ratings, startle EMG) was separately averaged for each 
stimulus type during Preacquisition and analyzed with separate 3-level 
(Stimulus type: ∆CS-, CS-, CS+) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(rANOVA). Similarly, to assess the acquisition of conditioned fear, separate 3-
level (Stimulus type: ∆CS-, CS-, CS+) rANOVAs were assessed for each 
response type (threat expectancy, anxiety ratings, startle EMG) from the 
Acquisition Phase. 
To test the effectiveness of the probability manipulation during the 
Test phase, a one-way rANOVA tested whether threat expectancy ratings 
differed as a function of stimulus type. Further, paired-samples t-tests 
were conducted to verify that the three stimuli with the least resemblance 
to CS+ (∆CS-, CS-, GS1; hereafter referred to as the improbable threat 
cluster) were a) rated as less likely to result in shock compared to the 
stimuli that most resembled CS+ (i.e., GS2, GS3, CS+; hereafter referred 
to as the more probable threat cluster) and b) not rated as significantly 
different from each other. Similarly, to test whether the manipulation of 
threat intensity (i.e., number of shocks) elicited additional within- subject 
variability in shock aversion, an additional 3-level (1-shock, 2-shock, 3-
shock) one- way rANOVA (along with paired-samples t-tests) was 
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conducted to verify that threat aversion ratings increased as a function of 
shock intensity. 
Main analyses. For the main analyses, separate linear mixed 
effects models (LMMs) were built to predict each response collected 
during the Test phase: threat expectancy ratings, anxiety ratings, fear-
potentiated startle responses, and avoidance choices. LMMs offer several 
advantages for assessing individual differences in responding within 
generalization paradigms, including the treatment of stimuli as a 
continuous dimension, allowing for dependency among predictors, and 
relaxing assumptions regarding the presence of equivalent variance 
between stimuli (Vanbrabant et al., 2015). Predictors in each LMM 
included: 1) the participant-specific intercept (random effect); 2) the main 
effects of stimulus type, threat aversion ratings, and total OCI-R score, 3) 
each of the three two-way interactions between these variables; and 4) the 
three-way interaction. All models were fit with maximum likelihood 
procedures, with chi square goodness-of-fit statistics comparing models 
with: a) just random effects, to b) models with random effects and main 
effects, to c) models with main effects and each two-way interaction, to d) 
those with main effects, two-way interactions, and the three-way 
interaction. 
To limit the number of significance tests, higher order models for 
each dependent variable were not tested if the preceding lower order 
model failed to provide a significance increase in model fit. I also provide 
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the t, p and Cohen’s d values as a measure of effect size (d = t(2/n)1/2; 
Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996) for individual predictors within 
the model they were the highest order term. Degrees of freedom for the t-
values of individual predictors were calculated using Satterthwaite’s 
formula (Satterthwaite, 1941)—a common correction applied to t-tests of 
individual predictors in LMMs. 
Interactive effects of OC symptoms, stimulus type, and threat 
aversion. Of central importance to this study was whether the 2- and 3-
way interactions involving OCD symptoms within LMMs predicted 
greater threat responding. Two-way interactions including OCI-R (OCI-R 
x Stimulus type, OCI-R x Threat-aversion) tested the extent to which the 
relations between OCI-R and threat responding depended independently 
on the probability and aversiveness of potential threats, while the 3-way 
interaction (Stimulus type x Threat-aversion x OCI-R) tested the primary 
hypothesis that links between OCI-R and threat responding would depend 
synergistically on the threat probability and aversion. It was predicted that 
these 3-way interactions would be in the negative direction, such that 
higher OCD symptoms would better predict greater threat responding 
when stimuli less resembled danger and threat aversion ratings were 
higher. 
Significant two-way interactions involving stimulus type were 
followed up with simple slopes (beta weights plus 95% confidence 
intervals) of the effect of OCI-R on threat responding at each level of 
 
115 
stimulus type. Significant interactions involving threat aversion were 
followed up with simple slopes of the effect of OCI-R at low (-1SD below 
the mean) and high (+1SD above the mean) levels of threat aversion. 
Significant 3-way interactions were followed up with tests of whether two-
way threat aversion x OCI-R interactions predicted greater responding 
toward stimuli within the improbable and more probable threat clusters 
separately, along with simple slopes of these interactions. It was predicted 
that there would be significant, positive interaction between OCI-R and 
threat aversion ratings within the improbable threat cluster only, such that 
higher OCI-R scores would predict greater threat responding specifically 
when threats were improbable and perceived as more aversive. 
Testing the specificity of OC symptoms and aversive motivation. 
To ensure significant effects with OCD symptoms were not driven by a 
more anxious dispositions in general, significant effects were re-analyzed 
using standardized residuals extracted from a model in which STAI-T 
(trait anxiety) was used to predict OCI-R. Since these residuals reflect 
levels of OCI-R after portioning out variance that is shared with STAI-T, 
they may be used to test the unique contribution of OCI-R in tested 
models beyond the effect of broad trait anxiety. 
Also, to test whether results were specific to aversive motivation, 
significant models involving threat aversion ratings were re-run replacing 
these ratings with desire-to-win ratings, which have been used to test the 
effects of appetitive motivation on PIG task performance in previous 
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investigations (Hunt et al., 2019). 
Exploratory analyses. Finally, to examine which specific kind of 
OCD symptoms contributed to significant effects, I reran the same 
analytic plan above replacing OCI-R scores with each symptom subscale: 
Washing, Checking, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding, and Neutralizing. 
Since no explicit hypotheses were made regarding which subscales would 
demonstrate the predicted effects most strongly, analyses at the subscale 






Prior to conditioning, no differences across stimuli (∆CS- , CS-, 
CS+) were detected in terms of threat expectancy ratings (p = .12), anxiety 
ratings (p = .69), or startle (p = .64). 
Acquisition 
During Acquisition, main effects of stimulus type were found for threat 
expectancy, F(3, 74) = 159.95, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .68, anxiety ratings, F(3, 74) = 
24.59, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .24, and startle, F(3, 74) = 3.16, p = .045, 𝜂$ = .04. 
Individual comparisons for threat expectancy ratings indicated that participants 
rated the CS+ (M = 69.99, SD = 19.55) as significantly more likely to result in 
shock relative to both the CS- (M = 28.72, SD = 22.42; p < .001) and the ∆CS- 
(M = 27.24, SD = 19.26; p < .001), which did not differ from each other (p = 





of the CS+ (M = 48.37, SD = 21.72) compared to both the CS- (M = 36.70, SD 
= 22.39; p < .001) and the ∆CS- (M = 36.60, SD = 22.48; p < .001), which were 
again not significantly different from each other (p = .95). Participants also had 
significantly greater startle to the CS+ (M = 51.48, SD = 5.40) relative to the 
∆CS-  (M = 50.03, SD = 5.53; p = .023) but not the CS- (M = 51.13, SD = 5.53; 




Threat probability. Threat expectancy ratings were found to differ 
significantly as a function of stimulus type, F(5, 72) = 294.92, p < .001, 𝜂$ 
= .79, which was driven by a continuous decline in threat appraisal (see 
Figure 3.1.A below) as stimuli became more dissimilar from CS+ (linear 
decrease: F(1, 76) = 458.51, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .86; quadratic decrease: F(1, 
76) = 260.66, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .77). Thus, threat was perceived as more 
improbable as stimuli became more dissimilar from the danger cue. 
Consistent with previous investigations, pairwise comparisons revealed 
that all stimuli from the improbable threat cluster (∆CS- , CS-, GS1) were 
a) appraised as significantly less likely to result in shock compared to 
stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (GS2, GS3, CS+; all ps < 
.001) and b) not appraised as more or less likely to result in shock 




planned dichotomization of stimuli into improbable and more probable 
threat clusters. 
Threat aversion. A significant effect of shock condition was also 
found for shock aversion ratings, F(3, 74) = 46.52, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .38., 
wherein participants reported greater aversion to threat as the number of 
shocks increased (see Figure 3.1.B below). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that aversion was greater during the 3-shock condition relative 
to the 2- shock and 1-shock conditions (ps < .001);, while threat aversion 
during the 2-shock condition was greater relative to the 1-shock condition 
(p = .001). As such, the threat intensity manipulation produced the 
within-subject variability in perceived threat aversion necessary to 










Figure 3.1. Differences between stimuli in terms of threat expectancy 
ratings (A) and shock intensity levels in terms of shock aversion ratings (B). 
The three stimuli least resembling CS+ (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) were all rated as 
significantly less likely to result in shock compared to the three stimuli most 
resembling CS+ (GS2, GS3, CS+) and were also not rated significantly 
differently from each other (ps > .26). ∆CS- = triangular safety cue; CS- = 
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circular safety cue’ GS1-3= generalization stimuli. CS+ = conditioned danger 
cue. ***p < .001. N = 78. 
 
Interactive effects of threat aversion, stimulus type, and OCI-R. 
Model statistics for each threat response variable can be found below in Table 
3.1 below. Throughout all tests, adding the main effects of OCI-R, stimulus 
type, and threat aversion increased model fit relative to models with just 
random effects (ps < .001), which was clarified by a significant positive effect 
for stimulus type for all outcomes (ps < .001). There was also a significant 
effect of threat aversion for all outcomes (ps < .001) besides EMG (threat 
aversion: p = .34). In contrast, the main effect of OCI-R was not a significant 
predictor for any threat-response outcome (ps > .20). Table 3.1. Linear mixed 
model statistics for each threat response outcome. 






























OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised. N = 78. 
Threat expectancy ratings. Adding the constituent two-way interactions 
between OCI-R, threat aversion, and stimulus type led to an incremental 
increase in model fit for threat expectancy ratings, which was further clarified 
by a significant, OCI-R x Stimulus type interaction, t(1324) = -3.20, p = .0014, 
d = 0.51. Simple slopes of the effect of OCI-R on threat expectancy ratings for 
each level of stimulus type revealed that higher OCI-R scores were associated 
with increasingly heightened ratings of threat probability as threat became less 
probable, with effects becoming less negative from CS+ (β = -.072, 95% CI [-
.16, 0.018], t(76) = -1.62, p = .11) to GS3 (β = -.041, 95% CI [-.12, 0.041], t(76) 
= -1.62, p = .32) to GS2 (β = -0.009, 95% CI [-.0.085, 0.065], t(76) = -0.23, p = 
.82) and increasing in positive strength from GS1 (β = 0.023, 95% CI [-.052, 
0.098], t(76) = 0.63, p = .53) to CS- (β = 0.055, 95% CI [-.025, 0.14], 
t(76) = -1.62, p = .17) to ∆CS- (β = 0.087, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.18], t(76) = 1.95, p 
= .055). Fitted threat expectancy values for high (+1 SD above the mean) and 
low (- 1 SD below the mean) OCI-R at each level of stimulus type can be found 
in Figure 3.2.A. In contrast, inclusion of the three-way Threat aversion x OCI-R 
x Stimulus type failed to produce a further incremental increase in model fit, 
 c2 (1) = 0.091, p = .76. 
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Anxiety Ratings. For subjective ratings of anxiety, including the 
two-way interactions  between OCI-R, threat aversion ratings, and stimulus 
type led to an incremental increase in model fit, c2 (3) = 94.18 , p < .001. 
However, the OCI-R x Stimulus type interaction failed to reach significance 
(p = .65), and inclusion of the three-way Threat aversion x OCI-R x 
Stimulus type interaction failed to produce a further incremental increase in 
model fit, c2 (1) = 1.55 , p = .21. 
 
Startle EMG. For startle, including the two-way interactions between 
OCI-R, Threat Aversion, and Stimulus Type led to an incremental increase in 
model fit at the level of a trend,  c2 (3) = 7.72 , p = .066. Within the two-way 
interaction model, there was once again a significant, negative OCI-R x 
stimulus type interaction, t(1324) = -2.20, p = .028, d = 0.36, which simple 
slopes revealed was again driven by OCI-R scores becoming increasingly 
predictive of startle as threats became less probable, with the effects becoming 
less negative from CS+ (β = -.053, 95% CI [-.15, 0.053], t(76) = -1.02, p = .32) 
to GS3 (β = -0.021, 95% CI [-.11, 0.065], t(76) = -0.49, p = .63), and increasing 
in positive strength from GS2 (β = 0.01, 95% CI [-.0.075, 0.077], t(76) = 0.27, p 
= .79) to GS1 (β = 0.042, 95% CI [-.034, 0.12], t(76) = 1.10, p = .28) to CS- (β 
= 0.074, 95% CI [-.012, 0.16], t(76) = 1.70, p = .093) to ∆CS- (β = 0.11, 95% 
CI [0.01, 0.21], t(76) = 2.02, p = .046). The fitted startle value for high (+1 SD 
above the mean) and low (- 1 SD below the mean) OCI-R at each level of 
stimulus type can be found in Figure 3.2.B. In contrast, inclusion of the three-
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way threat aversion x OCI-R x Stimulus type interaction again failed to 
produce a further incremental increase in model fit for startle data,  2 (1) = 
0.032, p = .86. 
Avoidance choices. Including the two-way interactions between OCI-R, 
Threat aversion, and Stimulus type also led to an incremental increase for 
avoidance,  2 (3) = 339.19 , p = .0012, which was clarified by a significant OCI-
R x Stimulus type interaction, t(1324) = -2.89, p = .004, d = 0.42. Simple slopes 
for this effect again revealed that higher OCI-R scores again predicted 
increasingly heightened avoidance as threats became less probable, with effects 
increasing from CS+ (β = -.0045, 95% CI [-.10, 0.95], t(76) = -0.89, p = .93) to 
GS3 (β = 0.021, 95% CI [-0.071, 0.11], t(76) = 0.45, p = .65) to GS2 (β = 0.046, 
95% CI [-.0.042, 0.13], t(76) = 1.045, p = .30) to GS1 (β = 0.072, 95% CI [-
0.016, 0.16], t(76) = 1.62, p = .11) to CS- (β = 0.097, 95% CI [0.05, 0.19], t(76) 
= 2.09, p = .04) to ∆CS- (β = 0.13, 95% CI [0.03, 0.23], t(76) = 2.44, p = .017). 
The fitted avoidance value for high (+1 SD above the mean) and low (- 1 SD 





Figure 3.2. Differences in (A) threat expectancy ratings, (B) startle, and (C) 
avoidance choices across low (- 1SD below the mean; blue line) and high 
(+1SD above the mean; green line) levels  of OCI-R as a function of stimulus 
type. Levels of each response are expressed as fitted values estimated from 
simple slopes of the effect of OCI-R at each level of stimulus type. OCI-R = 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised; ∆CS- = triangular safety cue; CS = 
circular safety cue; GS = Generalization Stimulus CS+ = conditioned danger 
cue. *p < .05. ^p < .056. N = 78. 
 
 
Additionally, including the three-way Threat-aversion x OCI-R x 
Stimulus type interaction led to a further incremental increase in model fit 
for avoidance,  2 (1) = 21.88, p < .001, which was in the negative direction as 
predicted, t(1324) = -4.70, p < .001, d = 0.75. Further, examining the 
Threat-aversion x OCI-R effect separately within clusters of improbable 
threat (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and more probable threat (GS2, GS3, CS+) revealed 
that this interaction significantly predicted avoidance of stimuli from the 
improbable threat cluster, t(622) = 2.78, p = .006, d = 0.44, but not the more 
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probable threat cluster, t(622) = -0.36, p = .72. Simple slope analyses (see 
Figure 3.3 below) revealed positive relations between levels of threat 
aversion and avoidance during improbable threat stimuli at high (β = 0.19, 
95% CI [0.12, 0.26], t(622) = 5.35, p < .001) but not low levels of OCI-R, β 
= 0.03, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.08], t(622) = 0.75, p = .45, and positive relations 
between threat aversion and avoidance during more probable threat at both 
high levels of OCI-R (β = 0.67, 95% CI [0.54, 0.80], t(622) = 10.16, p < 
.001) and low levels OCI-R (β = 0.70, 95% CI [0.57, 0.83], t(622) = 10.94, 
p < .001). Thus, OCD symptoms predicted the greatest avoidance on trials 
where threats were both highly improbable and perceived as maximally 
aversive. 
 
Figure 3.3. Relations between self-reported threat aversion (x-axis) and the 
percentage of avoidance choices committed (y-axis) in the presence of 
improbable (left) and more probable (right) threat cues. Different color lines 
represent the relationship between these variables at - 1SD below mean for 
OCI-R (blue lines) and +1SD above the mean for OCI-R (green lines). Cues that 
compose improbable and more probable stimulus clusters are shown below 
graphs (danger cue on far right). OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
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Revised; ∆CS- = triangular safety cue; CS- = circular safety cue’ GS1-3 = 
generalization stimuli. CS+ = conditioned danger cue. N = 78. 
 
Specificity of effects to OCD symptoms. Re-testing significant 
effects portioning out variance in the OCI-R that was shared with STAI-T 
(trait anxiety) revealed that the OCI-R x Stimulus-type interaction remained a 
significant, negative predictor of threat expectancy ratings, t(1324) = -3.00, p = 
.0027, d =0.48, startle, t(1324) = -2.43, p = .015, d = 0.39, and avoidance 
choices, t(1324) = -2.94, p = .033, d =0.47. Similarly, the negative, 3-way 
OCI-R x Threat- aversion x Stimulus-type interaction also remained 
significant, t(1324) = -5.19, p < .001, d = 0.83. Thus, OCI-R effects appeared 
attributable to OCD symptoms as opposed to general levels of dispositional 
anxiety. 
The contribution of appetitive motivational processes on relations 
between OCI-R  and avoidance. Unlike results with threat aversion ratings, 
the three-way interaction between stimulus type, OCI-R scores, and self-
reported desire to win failed to result in incrementally more likely model of 
avoidance choices,  2 (1) = 0.74, p = .39. Thus, OCD symptoms appeared to 
interact specifically with aversive motivation in facilitating greater avoidance 
of more improbable threats. 
Exploratory analyses with OCI-R subscales. Finally, to explore 
whether significant results were driven by specific OCD symptoms, I re-tested 
the significant OCI-R effects for threat expectancy, startle EMG, and 
avoidance choices replacing overall OCI-R with scores on each OCI-R 
subscale. The strength of two-way interaction (t-values) involving stimulus 
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type for each OCI-R subscale relative to overall OCI-R scores can be found in 
Figures 3.4.A (threat expectancy ratings), 3.4.B (Startle EMG), and 3.4.C 
(Avoidance) below. 
Figure 3.4. Strength of interaction (y-axis) between each OCI-R subscale (x-axis) 
with stimulus type in prediction of A) threat expectancy (top), B) startle (middle), 
and C) avoidance choices (bottom) compared to the same effect with overall OCI-R 
(black dashed line). All y-axes are expressed in reverse order with higher negative 
values expressed on top. Increasingly negative t values indicate a more gradual 
decline in anxiety-related responding as stimuli communicated more unrealistic 
threat. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised. ^p < .07; *p < .05; **p < 
.01; ***p < .001. N = 78. 
 
Threat expectancy ratings. Including the two-way interactions between 
threat aversion, stimulus type, and OCI-R subscale scores led to an incremental 
increase in model fit for models across all subscales (ps < .001). Further, there 
was a negative, two-way interaction with Stimulus type for the Checking, 
t(1324) = -4.43, p < .001, Neutralizing, t(1324)= -3.36, p = .0008, Obsessing 
t(1324) = -2.11, p = .035), and Ordering subscales, t(1324)= -2.63, p = .0088, 
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but not for the Washing, t(1324) = -1.05, p = .28, or Hoarding subscales, 
t(1324) = -.63, p = .53. 
Like overall OCI-R, no 3-way interaction was observed between 
Stimulus type, Threat aversion, and any OCI-R subscale (ps > .05). 
Startle EMG. Including the two-way interactions with Threat aversion 
and Stimulus type led to an incremental increase in model fit for the 
Neutralizing subscale,  2 (3) = 0.74, p = .39, but not any other subscale (ps > 
.08). However, there were negative, two-way interaction with Stimulus Type 
for the Obsessing, t(1324) = -2.11, p = .035, Neutralizing, t(1324) = -2.91, p = 
.0037, and Ordering, t(1324) = -2.27, p = .024 subscales, as well as for the 
Washing subscale at the level of a trend, t(1324) = -1.91, p = .057. 
No 3-way interaction between stimulus type, threat aversion, and any 
OCI-R subscale was predictive of startle (ps > .25). 
Avoidance Choices. Including the two-way interactions with Threat 
aversion and Stimulus type led to an incremental increase in model fit across all 
OCI-R subscales in predicting avoidance (ps < .001). This interaction was 
clarified by significant negative, two-way interaction with Stimulus Type for the 
Checking, t(1324) = -3.64, p = .0003, Washing, t(1324) = -2.00, p = .044, and 
Ordering subscales, t(1324) = -3.61, p = .00031, and the Neutralizing subscale 
at the  level of a trend, t(1324) = -1.80, p = .074. 
Across all subscales, the 3-way interaction with Stimulus type and 
Threat aversion ratings emerged as a significant, negative predictor of 
avoidance choices (ps < .020). However, the Hoarding, Obsessing, 
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Neutralizing, and Ordering subscales all failed to demonstrate a significant 
interaction with threat aversion ratings in predicting avoidance of stimuli within 
either threat cluster (ps > .17). In contrast, avoidance of stimuli within the 
improbable threat cluster was strongly predicted by two-way interactions 
between Threat aversion ratings and the Washing, t(622) = 5.50, p < .001 d = 
0.88, and Checking subscales, t(622) = 4.29, p < .001, d = 0.69, neither of 
which interacted with Threat aversion to predict avoidance of stimuli from the 
more probable threat cluster (ps > .41). 
Simple slopes revealed that higher Threat aversion ratings predicted 
greater avoidance of stimuli in the improbable threat cluster at high levels of 
Washing, β = 0.23, 95% CI [0.16, 0.29], t(622) = 6.80, p < .001, but not low 
levels of Washing, β = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.04], t(622) = - 0.73, p = .47, 
while avoidance in the more probable threat cluster was predicted by higher 
Threat aversion at both high, β = 0.73, 95% CI [0.59, 0.87], t(622) = 10.26, p < 
.001, and low levels of Washing, β = 0.65, 95% CI [0.52, 0.77], t(622) = 10.46, 
p < .001. Similarly, higher Threat aversion ratings predicted greater avoidance 
of stimuli within the improbable threat cluster at high levels of Checking, β = 
0.20, 95% CI [0.26, 0.14], t(622) = 6.19, p < .001, but not low levels of 
checking, β = -.019, 95% CI [-0.099, 0.061], t(622) = 0.27, p = .78, while 
avoidance of more probable threat stimuli was predicted by greater Threat 
aversion ratings at both high, β = 0.65, 95% CI [0.52, 0.78], t(622) = 9.87, p < 
.001, and low levels of Checking, β = 0.73, 95% CI [0.60, 0.86], t(622) = 




The current study offers the first lab-based test of whether OCD 
symptoms are associated with a general sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes—a type of negative consequence commonly feared across a 
diverse array of OCD subtypes. The proposed link between OCD and 
improbable catastrophes was tested by examining whether OCD symptoms 
predicted greater threat responding (threat expectancy, anxiety ratings, startle 
responses, avoidance choices) to cues signaling parametrically varying levels 
of threat probability and threat aversion. Results show that, among those with 
greater OCD symptoms, higher levels of threat aversion were associated with 
greater avoidance of threats judged as very unlikely to result in shock, such that 
the relationship between avoidance and OCD symptoms was strongest when 
threats were both improbable and highly aversive. Additionally, higher OCD 
symptoms predicted greater threat expectancy, startle, and avoidance as 
potential threats became more improbable but not as they became more 
aversive. Thus, those with greater OCD symptoms exhibited a heightened 
sensitivity toward improbable threats, but not more aversive threats, that was 
reflected in their cognitive appraisals, physiology, and behavior. Importantly, 
the use of an OCD-unrelated threat in this experiment (i.e., electric shock) 
suggests that relations between OCD symptoms and threat responding are 
attributable to more generalizable features of threat probability and 
aversiveness rather than any specific source of threat. 




That avoidance of improbable threats increased with levels of perceived 
threat aversion for individuals with higher OCD symptoms offers initial 
experimental validation for the notion that those with OCD are sensitive to 
improbable, catastrophic threats. Specifically, differences in avoidance between 
those high and low on OCD symptoms were greatest during the lab-based 
analogue of this very situation: Trials in which the individual was very averse 
to the consequences of shock but was presented with a stimulus judged as very 
unlikely to result in shock. In contrast, when facing more probable threats, 
levels of perceived threat aversion had an equivalent influence on avoidance 
for those with high and low levels of OCD symptoms. Thus, OCD symptoms 
did not appear to confer a tendency to avoid all types of threat, but rather a 
specific proclivity to avoid threats that were both very unlikely and highly 
aversive. 
Unexpectedly, passive forms of threat reactivity—startle and subjective 
anxiety—were not predicted by the hypothesized three-way interactions 
involving threat probability, threat aversion, and OCD symptoms. Thus, while 
those with higher OCD symptoms were more likely to avoid improbable, 
highly aversive threats, they did not exhibit elevated levels of startle and 
subjective anxiety in their presence. Though perplexing, these null findings 
could be attributed to two possible reasons. First, avoidance of improbable 
catastrophes among those greater in OCD symptoms may have represented a 
better-safe-than-sorry strategy—a precautionary attempt to mitigate the 
potential that a harmful, improbable event would occur rather than a reaction to 
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an anxious state. While potential danger tends to prompt better safe than sorry 
strategies in all people due to its evolutionary advantage (Smeets et al., 2000; 
Stich, 1990), those with OCD are thought to be over-reliant on such strategies 
(De Jong & Vroling, 2014; Gangemi, Mancini & Dar, 2015). For example, an 
individual with checking OCD who has only minimal doubt that their stove is 
turned off after repeatedly checking may continue to check because of an 
overly strong need to be safe rather than sorry. According to this line of 
thinking, those high on OCD symptoms displayed heightened responding to 
low probability, highly aversive threats with active but not passive measures of 
threat reactivity because only the former measure was influenced by biases 
toward a better safe than sorry policy. 
A related explanation for the differential results across active and 
passive measures of threat responding stems from the well-established link 
between OCD and inflated responsibility (Salkovskis et al., 2000; Myers et al., 
2008): The house burned down because the individual forgot to turn off the 
stove, contracted HIV because they failed to wash their hands properly or 
killed some loved one because they failed to lock away dangerous objects 
when they had the chance. Accordingly, it could be that those with OCD are 
particularly sensitive to consequences that are improbable, catastrophic, and 
(theoretically) preventable. This possibility may account for the particular 
pattern of findings in this study because OCD-related abnormalities in active 
but not passive threat responses are subject to inflation by excessive needs to 
avoid carelessness. While better-safe-than-sorry biases and heightened 
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concerns with carelessness are plausible sources of heightened avoidance of 
low probability, high aversion threats in OCD, they remain unverified, and 
future OCD work is needed to explicitly assess the influence of such 
constructs on levels of reactivity to experimental analogues of improbable 
catastrophes 
Independent Effects of Threat probability and Aversion 
 
That OCD symptoms were associated with higher threat responding 
(threat expectancy, startle, avoidance) as threats became more improbable, but 
not more aversive, is consistent with improbable catastrophes arising in OCD 
through a broad tendency to overestimate the likelihood of improbable threats 
as opposed to the costs of more aversive ones. Specifically, those with higher 
OCD symptoms exhibited increased startle, threat expectancy, and avoidance 
relative to those with lower OCD symptoms as threats became more 
improbable, independent of how averse they were to the threat’s consequences. 
This result echoes findings from several past experimental studies showing that 
OCD participants continue to exhibit heightened uncertainty, checking, or 
indecisiveness when confronted with low-probability events bearing low or 
absent costs (Fear & Healy, 1997; Foa et al., 2001; Pélissier et al., 2002; 
Hermans et al., 2008). Moreover, while those with OCD have been shown to 
invariably overestimate the likelihood of experiencing an improbable, OCD-
relevant catastrophe, their perception of such events’ aversiveness is mixed 
(e.g., Niemeyer et al., 2013 vs. Moritz & Jelinek, 2009). Thus, results from this 
study and past studies suggest that OCD involves a heightened sensitivity to 
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improbable events independent of their costs, but not catastrophic events 
independent of their probabilities. 
While OCD predicted increased expectancy to improbable threat, the 
elevation was quite slight: Those with OCD symptoms 1 SD above the mean 
found improbable threats only 5% more likely than those with OCD symptoms 
1 SD below the mean. This finding coheres with results by Moritz and 
colleagues (e.g., Moritz & Jelinek, 2009), where OCD patients typically rated 
their personal vulnerability for improbable catastrophes within 1 point of 
healthy controls on a 7-point scale of likelihood, and never exceeded the 
midpoint of four. Additionally, these marginal increases in perception of 
improbable threat are consistent with the fact that most OCD patients possess 
intact insight into the senselessness of their symptoms (e.g., Marazzti et al., 
2002; Kishore, Samar, Reddy, Chandrasekhar, & Thennarasu, 2004) and do not 
typically appraise their feared consequences as very likely (Foa and Kozak, 
1995; Tolin et al., 2001). 
Interestingly, results with startle were virtually identical to those with 
perceived threat likelihood: OCD symptoms were increasingly predictive of 
startle magnitudes as threat cues became more improbable. Thus, the increased 
proclivity to overestimate improbable threat proposed as central to SIC may 
have also been encoded on a physiological level. Support for this idea comes 
from several studies linking OCD symptoms to increased physiological arousal 
during safety. For instance, Borelli et al. (2015) found that children higher on 
OCD symptoms exhibited increased startle to learned safety cues but not 
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learned threat cues, while Lazarov and colleagues have consistently found that 
individuals with greater OCD symptoms display more spontaneous spikes in 
galvanic skin responses during a relaxation task (Lazarov, Dar, Oded, & 
Liberman, 2010; Lazarov, Dar, Liberman, & Oded, 2012). Consistent with 
these studies, the current findings suggest that those with greater OCD 
symptoms may be less able to taper down their threat-related arousal even 
toward stimuli that are clearly distinguishable from danger. 
Interpreting Effects of Specific OCD Symptom Presentations 
 
Although no specific hypotheses were made about which OCD 
symptoms would influence responding to improbable and aversive threats, two 
intriguing patterns emerged across  analyses with individual OCI-R subscales. 
First, it is noteworthy that Washing and Checking were the only two OCI-R 
subscales that interacted with threat aversion to predict heightened avoidance 
of improbable threats. An interesting feature of these subscales is that their 
items largely pertain to behavioral responses that are often used by OCD 
patients as a form of avoidance (e.g., “I repeatedly check gas and water taps 
and light switches after turning them off”, “I wash my hands more often and 
longer than necessary”). Thus, these subscales may have thus been particularly 
germane predictors for the behavioral avoidance of improbable aversive 
threats assessed in the PIG paradigm, while other subscales like Neutralizing 
that pertain to more mental avoidance responses (e.g., “I feel I have to repeat 
certain numbers”) may not been a particularly good match to the behavioral 
avoidance measured by the PIG paradigm. 
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Second, Hoarding emerged as the only subscale failing to predict 
heightened responding to improbable threat across any index of threat 
responding (i.e., null results with startle, threat expectancy, or avoidance). 
This finding coheres well with the spate of empirical findings showing that 
hoarding symptoms have divergent clinical (e.g., Bloch et al., 2014) and 
neurobiological correlates (e.g., Mataix-Cols et al., 2004) relative to other 
OCD symptoms, as well as with the more recent decision to relegate Hoarding 
to its own independent diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
These findings build upon this past work by suggesting that Hoarding 
symptoms perhaps also diverge from other OCD symptoms by not conferring 
the inflated perception of improbable event likelihood deemed central to the 
development of SIC. 
Conclusions 
 
The current study represents the first lab-based test of whether OCD is 
linked with a heightened sensitivity toward improbable, catastrophic events. 
Results showed that individuals with higher OCD symptoms became more 
likely to avoid improbable threats the more averse they are to their 
consequences, and also exhibit greater levels of threat expectancy and startle 
for more improbable threats. Such results offer initial empirical validation for 
the observation that a variety of common OCD-relevant concerns involve 
improbable, catastrophic consequences, and further implicate a more general 




Chapter 4: Replication and Extension to Disgust-Related Threats (Study 2) 
 
Results from the first study offered preliminary evidence that OCD 
symptom confer increased threat responding to scenarios involving highly 
improbable and aversive consequences. A strength of this study was the use of a 
non-OCD-relevant threat, electric shock, which circumvented the circularity 
introduced by using a threat that is already known to elicit elevations in OCD 
symptoms. Although electric shock is undoubtedly an improvement over the 
use experimental threats directly implicated in OCD, it is still limited by the 
fact that it is circumscribed to physical danger. This limitation is particularly 
important for identifying the psychological contributors of OCD symptoms, 
which are often also characterized by strong feelings of disgust (Sieg and 
Scholz, 2001; Berle & Phillips, 2006; Knowles, Jessup, & Olatunji, 2018) in 
addition to desires to prevent harm. Indeed, both disgust-avoidance (i.e., desire 
to prevent the feeling of disgust) and harm-avoidance (i.e., desire to prevent a 
specific harmful event) have been identified as core motivational components 
in OCD patients with contamination fears (Melli, Chiorri, Carraresi, Stopani, & 
Bulli, 2015). 
The Role of Disgust in OCD 
 
Support for the role of disgust in OCD comes from a number of 
different sources. First, correlational studies have shown that those with 
elevated OCD symptoms are often also higher on disgust-related personality 
traits. For instance, Thorpe, Patel, and Simonds (2003) found that levels of 
disgust propensity significantly predicted OCI-R scores in a clinical sample, 
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with scores from the Washing subscale emerged as the most strongly predicted. 
Similar results have been obtained with non-clinical samples, where links 
between contamination fears and disgust have been found independent of 
anxiety and depression (Mancini, Gragnani, & D’Olimpio, 2001; Mortetz & 
McKay, 2008). Other studies suggest that disgust-related traits may also be 
elevated among individuals with OCD symptoms other than 
contamination/washing. For instance, Tolin, Woods, and Abramowitz (2006) 
found that disgust proneness significantly predicted ordering and checking 
symptoms from the OCI-R in addition to washing symptoms. Similarly, 
disgust- sensitivity significantly predicted levels of religious obsessions in a 
student sample, even after controlling for levels of contamination concerns and 
general fearfulness (Olatunji, Tolin, Huppert, & Lohr, 2005), while Muslim 
individuals with high scrupulosity have reported higher levels of disgust 
proneness after exposure to disgust-inducing images (Inozu, Ulukut, Ergun, & 
Alcolado, 2014). Thus, dispositional tendencies toward experiencing disgust 
may play a role in OCD more broadly, while also being particular relevant to 
the contamination subtype. 
Experimental studies have also implicated a link between OCD and 
heightened disgust- responses. In one study, Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012) found relations between OCI-R scores and implicit associations to 
disgust-relevant stimuli, as indexed by greater latencies (i.e., reaction times) 
when tasked with appraising a disgust-related picture as not disgusting. In this 
study, relations between disgust responses and the Washing and Obsessing 
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subscale of the OCI- R emerged as particularly strong. Similarly, Olatunji, 
Tolin, Huppert, and Lohr (2005) found that participants with high symptoms of 
contamination OCD exhibited less compliance across behavioral avoidance 
tests (BATs) involving contact with disgust-relevant stimuli (e.g., touching 
rotting food, stained underwear, earthworms etc.). as well as greater disgust 
responses when exposed to disgust-inducing images. Finally, OCD patients 
have also been found to exhibit greater self-reported (but not physiologically-
measured) disgust to images of bodily waste relative to anxious and healthy 
controls. (Whitton, Henry, & Grisham, 2015). Thus, experimental studies back 
up the findings of correlational investigations by showing that persons with 
higher OCD symptom also exhibit heightened responses to disgust-related 
manipulations. 
The Relevance of Disgust-related Responses to SIC 
 
Given the prominent role of disgust in OCD, it is clearly important to 
test whether OCD symptoms predict heightened responses to anxiety- and 
disgust-provoking improbable catastrophes alike. This is particularly important 
given that fear—the primary emotion provoked by the potential of harm—is 
associated with a different behavioral and physiological response pattern 
compared to disgust. For instance, heart rate acceleration is thought to 
characterize fear while deceleration is thought to characterize disgust (Woody 
& Teachman, 2000). Similarly, while fear appears to enhance visual detection 
and processing, consistent with needing to attend quickly to threat, disgust 
suppresses visual attention and detection, consistent with it functioning to 
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minimize contact with contagious objects (Krusemark & Li, 2011). 
Additionally, some studies suggest that disgust does not habituate (i.e., 
decrease) with continued exposure to a threatening situation in the same way 
that fear does (Smits, Telch, & Randal, 2002; Olatunji, Wolitzky- Taylor, 
Willems, Lohr, & Armstrong, 2009), as measured by subjective report during 
in-vivo exposure exercises. Finally, even though disgust- and fear-induced 
behaviors are both assessed using similar measures like the BAT, many 
researchers contend that they prime different kinds of avoidance. More 
specifically, while fear may motivate the immediate fight-or-flight response, 
disgust may promote a more gradual back-away-slowly type of response 
(Susskind et al., 2008; van Hoof, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013), 
consistent with disgust-inducing scenarios (e.g., dead animals, feces) involving 
dangerous but stationary objects. 
Despite these differences, there is reason to suspect that OCD 
symptoms may confer increased sensitivity to disgust-related improbable 
catastrophes the same way they do to harm- related ones. Phenomenologically, 
disgust-related threats may involve improbable catastrophes the same way that 
harm-provoking ones do. For instance, many forms of contamination OCD 
involve fears of an improbable catastrophe with a strong disgust component, 
as evidenced fears of coming into contact with contagions capable of 
conferring a serious illness (e.g., HIV) or a morally repugnant person who 
may transfer their untoward characteristics (Coughetry et al., 2013). Indeed, 
in some cases of contamination OCD, the improbable catastrophe is the 
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disgust response itself, which the patient fears will endure interminably 
following contact with a dirty/contaminated object (Abramowitz, 2006). 
There is also evidence that OCD patients exhibit the same heightened 
expectancy for improbable disgust-related threats as was found for electric 
shock in the first study. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Tolin et al. (2004) found that 
OCD patients rated a neutral object (a pencil) as more contaminated compared 
to healthy and anxious controls, but only when it was farther down a chain of 
contagion. More specifically, OCD patients showed similar contamination 
ratings to the other groups for a pencil that had been rubbed directly onto a 
contaminated object, but higher ratings for the pencil that had been rubbed onto 
the first pencil (pencil #2), and for the pencil that had been onto that pencil (i.e., 
pencil #3), etc. These results may be interpreted as those with OCD 
overestimating the probability of improbable disgust-related threats (i.e., 
pencils farther down the chain of contagion), but not more probable disgust-
related threats (i.e., the first pencil in the chain of contagion) relative to healthy 
and anxious controls. As such, individuals with OCD may demonstrate the 
same heightened perception of likelihood for improbable, disgust- inducing 
threats in the same way they do for harmful ones. Given that this probability 
overestimation is proposed to be the driving feature behind SIC, participants 
with elevated expectancy of improbable, disgust-related outcomes may also 
exhibit heightened anxiety and avoidance for these threats when they are 
appraised as subjectively very aversive. 
The Current Study 
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Given these considerations, the purpose of this second study was to a) 
re-test whether OCD symptoms confer increased threat expectancy for 
improbable threats and increased anxious reactivity toward improbable, highly 
aversive ones, and b) test if these relationships are similar across a harm-related 
threat (i.e., electric shock) and a disgust-related threat (i.e., an 8s video of 
someone vomiting). Consistent with the purported sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophe being generalizable across all threats, I hypothesized that OCD 
symptoms would predict increased threat expectancy of both harmful and 
disgust-provoking improbable threats, as well as increased anxious reactivity 
(avoidance, startle EMG) among those with higher aversion to such threats. 
Finally, because disgust appears to play a particularly important role in 
contamination OCD, I predicted that washing symptoms would produce the 
strongest effects in tests involving disgust- related threats. These analyses 
should help further clarify whether OCD symptoms confer increased sensitivity 
to improbable, catastrophic consequences by assessing whether this sensitivity 





Participants were adult undergraduate students aged 18 – 65 who were 
originally recruited for two larger studies on personality traits and fear 
conditioning: One that utilized the original PIG paradigm (n = 422) and one 
that utilized an adapted disgust-version (n = 113). All inclusion criteria were 
identical to the first study (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). Because average threat 
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aversion ratings (i.e., subjective rating of how important it was to not receive 
the experimental threat) were far higher in the shock condition (M = 5.94, SD 
= 3.52) compared to the disgust condition (M = 2.99, SD = 3.34), random 
subsets of participants from each condition were selected so as to match the 
conditions on mean threat aversion ratings. Additionally, no participants were 
selected who met the exclusion criteria listed in the first study, including a 
failure to distinguish CS+ from CS- during the Test phase or triggering a 
validity item embedded  within the online surveys. Finally, no participants 
were selected from the shock condition that had been included in previously 
published data sets (i.e., Hunt et al., 2017; Hunt et al., 2019). 
This selection procedure resulted in a total sample of 203 participants, 
including 134 for the shock condition and 69 for the disgust condition. The 
samples did not differ in terms gender, age, mean OCI-R scores, or perceived 
threat aversion ratings (see Table 4.1 below). 




Note. Shock and disgust conditions were identical except for the nature of the 
experimental threat (electric shock vs. 8s vomit video clip). Threat aversion 
ratings refer to participants’ self- reported desire to not receive the 
experimental threat during the task. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive 







The same questionnaires collected in study one were collected in this 
study (OCI-R, STAI- T). Individuals from the disgust condition were also 
administered the Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale – Revised (Olatunji 
Cisler, Deacon, Connolly, & Lohfr, 2007), which was used to test if effects with 
the OCI-R were the result of more general disgust-related dispositions. 
Physiological Apparatus 
 
Startle-blink EMG was elicited and recorded with an identical 
system and procedure as study one (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). 
Experimental Paradigm 
Shock version. The shock condition of the PIG paradigm was identical 
to the original task developed by van Meurs et al. (2014). Full details can be 
found in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. Notably, this original version is different from 
the adapted version described in chapter 3, in that a) it utilizes only a single, 1-
shock condition (i.e. 1 shock is possible when taking the short path) as 
opposed to additional 2- and 3-shock conditions, and b) assesses risk ratings 
on half of Pavlovian instrumental using a 3-point scale (i.e., 0 = “no risk”, 1 = 
“some risk”, 2 = “high risk”) as opposed to the 10-point scaled anxiety and 
shock expectancy ratings that were collected on every Pavlovian trials. 
Disgust version. The disgust version of the PIG was identical to 
the original shock version except for the graphics, experimental threat, 
and story provided to participants. Specifically, participants in the 
disgust version were told that the short road often passed roadkill, 
which depending on the direction of the wind (i.e., presentation of the 
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CS+) could blow toward the farmer and cause him to become sick. On 
both Pavlovian and Instrumental trials when the CS+ was presented, an 
image of wind is depicted beside the short road coincident with an 
image of the virtual farmer vomiting (see Figure 4.1 below). This image 
was presented coincident with a 6 s video clip of a real person vomiting 
superimposed over the CS+. The video clip has been used in previous 
studies disgust-conditioning (Olatunji, Berg, Cox, & Billingsley, 2017). 
As in the original version, the actual experimental threat (i.e., video) is 
only presented on 50% of Pavlovian trials and 100% of Instrumental 
trials when the participants takes the short path, while the virtual vomit 
image is shown on 100% of both Pavlovian trials and Instrumental trials 
when the short path is taken. Throughout the disgust version, a research 
assistant observed the participants through a camera attached to the 
computer monitor to ensure the video clip was viewed in its entirety. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Example graphic of CS+ trial for the disgust version of the PIG 
paradigm. The disgust version was identical to the shock version except for 
the graphics, story, and experimental threat. Participants were told that on 
some trials, taking the short road would result in the wind blowing the smell of 
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roadkill to the path and causing the farmer to vomit. PIG = Pavlovian and 





The procedure in this study was identical to that of the first study 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.2), except that: a) the shock work-up procedure 
for the shock condition involved only one shock, which was adjusted so 
that it was rated as highly uncomfortable but not painful (rated as a 3 on a 
scale of 0 to 5), and b) only one set of self-report ratings for the Test phase 
were collected, which occurred immediately after the conclusion of the 
experiment. 
Data Analysis  
Processing and manipulation checks. Startle EMG was processed 
in an identical fashion as the first study. Risk ratings and startle EMG 
during Preacquisition and Acquisition were separately averaged for each 
stimulus type and then analyzed with separate 3-level (Stimulus type: 
∆CS-, CS-, CS+) x 2-level (Threat condition: Shock, Disgust) rANOVAs. 
Risk ratings, startle EMG, and avoidance choices during the Test phase 
were separately averaged for each stimulus type and analyzed with 
separate 6-level (∆CS-, CS-, GS1, GS2, GS3, CS+) x 2-level (Threat 
condition: Shock, Disgust) rANOVAs. Significant stimulus x condition 
interactions were followed-up by examining pairwised differences for 
each stimulus type between the two conditions. 
Main analyses. For the main analyses, separate hierarchical linear 
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regression models  were built to test whether each response collected 
during the Test phase (avoidance choices, risk ratings, and startle EMG) 
could be predicted by OCI-R, threat aversion ratings, threat condition, and 
their interactions. OCI-R scores were entered in the first step to assess the 
main effect of OCD symptoms on threat responding. Threat aversion 
ratings and threat condition were entered next, followed by each of the 
constituent two-way interactions between the preceding variables (OCI-R 
x threat aversion; OCI-R x threat condition; threat aversion x threat 
condition). The three-way OCI-R x threat aversion x threat condition 
interaction was entered in the final step. 
To simplify interpretations, within-subject differences in stimulus 
type were not assessed in this study so as to avoid testing 4-way 
interaction (i.e., stimulus type, x threat aversion rating x OCI-R x threat 
condition). Instead, average responding to stimuli in the improbable 
threat cluster (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and the more probable threat cluster (GS2, 
GS3, CS+) were tested separately as outcomes, given that results from 
both Study 1 and past studies (Hunt et al., 2017; Hunt et al., 2019) 
supported this dichotomization on the basis of perceived threat 
probability. All predictors were z-scored prior to analyses. 
Consistent with the notion that OCD symptoms would predict 
heightened expectancy of improbable threat regardless of threat modality, 
it was hypothesized that risk  ratings toward the improbable threat stimuli 
(but not the more probable threat stimuli) would be significantly 
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predicted by higher OCI-R scores, but not the OCI-R x threat condition 
interaction. It was also predicted that startle EMG and avoidance choices 
for improbable threat stimuli (but not more probable threat stimuli) 
would be significantly predicted by the OCI-R x threat aversion 
interaction, but not the three-way OCI-R x threat aversion x threat 
condition interaction, consistent with OCD symptoms predicting 
heightened anxiety and avoidance to improbable, highly aversive threats 
regardless of modality. 
All significant interactions were followed up with simple slopes 
calculated with the PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012), which 
tests the influence of one variable (the predictor) at low (-1 SD) and high 
(+1 SD) levels of the other variable (the moderator). Since threat-
condition contained only two levels, it was utilized as the moderator for 
all its  significant interactions. For interaction interactions involving 
OCI-R and threat aversion, OCI-R was utilized as the moderator. Three-
way interaction were broken down by testing the influence of threat 
aversion ratings at high and low levels of OCI-R separately for the 
disgust and shock conditions. 
To ensure significant effects with OCD symptoms were not driven 
by more anxious- or disgust-related dispositions in general, significant 
effects within each condition were re- tested controlling for levels of 




Subscale analyses. Finally, to examine whether specific OCD 
symptoms were contributing to significant effects, the same analytic plan 
above was rerun replacing OCI-R scores with each symptom subscale: 
Washing, Checking, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding, and Neutralizing. 
For these analyses, it was predicted that washing symptoms would be 
associated with a significant 3-way interaction for startle EMG and 
avoidance, which would be driven by a significantly greater OCI-R 
Washing x threat aversion rating in the disgust condition relative to the 
shock condition. No other explicit hypotheses were made for any other 
OCI-R subscale and their tests are considered exploratory. Alpha was set 





Prior to conditioning, no differences across stimuli (∆CS- , CS-, CS+) 
were detected in terms of or startle EMG (p = .19) or risk ratings (p = .84 ). 
The stimulus x condition interaction was also not significant for startle EMG (p 
= .57) or risk ratings (p = .26), indicating null differences between stimuli prior 
to acquisition did not differ across threat conditions. 
Acquisition 
During Acquisition, main effects of stimulus type were found for both 
startle EMG, F(2, 188) = 11.92 p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.06, and risk ratings, F(2, 198) = 
593.60, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.86. Pairwise comparisons between stimuli revealed 






CS- (M = 50.17, SD = 3.76; p < .001) and ∆CS- (M = 50.53, SD = 4.51; p < 
.001), which did not differ from each other (p = .61). CS+ was also rated as 
more likely to elicit threat (M = 1.54, SD = 0.41) compared to both the CS- (M 
= 0.27, SD = 0.39; p < .001) and the ∆CS- (M = 0.21, SD = 0.43; p < .001); 
CS- was also rated as slightly more likely to elicit threat compared to ∆CS-, t(1, 
202) = 2.30, p = .026. The stimulus x condition interaction did not reach 
significance for startle, F(2, 188) = 2.18 p = .12, 𝜂$ = 0.026, or risk ratings, 
F(2, 198) = 1.29, p = .28, 𝜂$ = 0.013, indicating that conditioning was similarly 
effective across both experimental conditions. 
Test Phase 
Risk Ratings. During the Test phase, risk ratings differed significantly 
as a function of stimulus type, F(5, 197) = 607.49, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.75, which 
was driven by a continuous decline in perceived shock as stimuli became more 
dissimilar from CS+ (linear decrease: F(1, 202) = 1500.34, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .88; 
quadratic decrease: F(1, 202) = 512.15, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.72) Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that all stimuli from the improbable threat cluster (∆CS- , 
CS-, GS1) were a) rated as significantly less likely to result in shock compared 
to stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (GS2, GS3, CS+; ps < .001), 
and b) were not rated significantly differently in terms of shock risk from each 




dichotomization of improbable and more probable threat clusters. The stimulus 
x threat condition interaction was not significant, F(5, 198) = 1.97, p = .11, 𝜂$ = 
0.010, indicating that differences between stimulus type did not differ between 
the shock and disgust conditions of the experiment (see Figure 4.2 below). 
Figure 4.2. Differences between stimuli in terms of risk ratings between the 
disgust condition (green line) and shock condition (red line). The three stimuli 
least resembling CS+ (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) were all rated as significantly less likely 
to result in shock compared to the three stimuli most resembling CS+ (GS2, GS3, 
CS+), which were also not rated significantly differently from each other (ps > 
.15). Differences between stimuli did not vary significantly across conditions as 
indicated by a non-significant stimulus x condition interaction (p = .11). ∆CS- = 
triangular safety cue; CS- = circular safety cue’ GS1-3= generalization stimuli. 
CS+ = conditioned danger cue. N.S. = Not significant. ***p < .001. N = 203. 
 
Startle EMG. Startle EMG also differed significantly as a function of 
stimulus type, F(5, 183) = 35.65, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .16, which was similarly driven 
by a continuous decline in startle as stimuli became more dissimilar from CS+ 
(linear decrease: F(1, 188) = 64.47, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .26; quadratic decrease: F(1, 
188) = 39.70, p < .001, 𝜂$ = .17). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all stimuli 








smaller  startle responses compared to stimuli from the more probable threat 
cluster (GS2, GS3, CS+; ps <.05). Within the improbable threat cluster, ∆CS- 
elicited significantly greater startle than CS-, t(1, 188) = 2.11, p = .036, but not 
at the Bonferroni-corrected p-value of .013. Within the more probable threat 
cluster, CS+ elicited significantly greater startle responses compared to GS3, t(1, 
188) = 4.94, p < .001, which in turn elicited greater startle responses than GS2, 
t(1, 188) = 5.76, p < .001. The stimulus x threat condition interaction was also 
significant for startle, F(5, 183) = 10.72, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.054. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this effect was driven by there being significantly 
greater startle in the shock condition relative to the disgust condition for CS+, 
t(1, 188) = 3.90, p < .001, and GS3, t(1, 188) = 3.93, p < .001. 
Avoidance choices. During the Test phase, risk ratings differed 
significantly as a function of stimulus type, F(5, 197) = 159.75, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 
0.44, which was again driven by a continuous decline in the number of 
avoidance decisions committed as stimuli became more dissimilar from CS+ 
(linear decrease: F(1, 202) = 220.42, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.52; quadratic decrease: 
F(1, 202) = 126.79, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.39). Pairwise comparisons showed that all 
stimuli from the improbable threat cluster (∆CS- , CS-, GS1) a) were avoided 
significantly less than all stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (GS2, GS3, 
CS+; ps < .001), and b) did not differ differently in avoidance levels from each 
other (ps > .44). Like risk ratings, the stimulus x threat condition interaction was 
not significant, F(5, 198) = 0.19 p = .80, 𝜂$ = 0.001, indicating that differences 
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between stimulus types did not differ between the shock and disgust conditions 
of the experiment. 
Main Analyses 
 
Full statistics for models predicting responses (risk ratings, startle, 
avoidance) to improbable threat stimuli and more probable threat stimuli can 
be found below in tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
Table 4.2: Regression Model Statistics for Improbable Threat Responses 
Note. Improbable threats are indexed as the average response (risk ratings, startle 
EMG, avoidance choices) to the three stimulus classes most dissimilar from the 
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conditioned danger cue (i.e, ∆CS-, CS- and GS1). Condition refers to the type of 
experimental threat participants were at risk for – electric shock or disgust. 
Positive beta weights reflect greater responding in the shock vs. the disgust 
condition Aversion ratings refer to participants’ self-reported desire to not 
receive the experimental threat during the task. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory – Revised. N= 203 
 
 
Table 4.3: Regression Model Statistics for More Probable Threat Responses  
Note. More probable threats are indexed as the average response (risk ratings, 
startle, avoidance) to the stimulus classes with greatest similarity to the 
conditioned danger cue (i.e, GS2, GS3, and CS+). Condition refers to the type 
of experimental threat participants were at risk for – electric shock or disgust. 
Positive beta weights reflect greater responding in the shock vs. the disgust 
condition. Aversion ratings refer to participants’ self-reported desire to not 
receive the experimental threat during the task. OCI-R = Obsessive 





Risk ratings. As predicted, OCI-R scores predicted greater expectancy 
of improbable threat (p < .001). Further, this effect did not differ as a function 
of the experimental condition (p = .41), which simple slopes revealed was 
driven by greater OCD symptoms predicting higher expectancy of improbable 
threat in both the disgust condition, β = 0.34 t(202) = 3.04, p = .0027, and the 
shock condition, β = 0.19, t(202) = 2.15, p = .033 (see Figure 4.4 below). 
Moreover, the OCI-R x threat aversion interaction was also not significant (p = 
.23), indicating that those with greater OCD symptoms tended to overestimate 
the chance of improbable threat regardless of how aversive they found it. 
In contrast, OCI-R scores did not significantly predict heightened threat 
expectancy of more probable threat stimuli (p = .40), which did not vary 
significantly across conditions (p = .85) or levels of threat aversion (p = .15). 
Figure 4.3. Effect of OCI-R scores on improbable threat risk ratings across 
experimental conditions. Improbable threat stimuli are the three stimuli that are 
most dissimilar from the conditioned danger cue (i.e., ∆CS-, CS-, GS1). 
Disgust and shock conditions were identical except for the nature of the 
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experimental threat (electric shock vs. vomit video clip). OCI-R = Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory – Revised. *p < .05; **p < .01. N = 203. 
 
 
Startle EMG. Contrary to predictions, startle to improbable threat 
was not significantly predicted by any independent variable, including OCI-
R or the OCI-R x threat aversion interaction (ps > .31). Similarly, no 
independent variable emerged as a significant predictor of startle to more 
probable threat stimuli (ps > .27), with the exception that startle was greater 
for the shock condition relative to the disgust condition (p < .001). 
Avoidance choices. Consistent with predictions, avoidance of 
improbable threat was significantly predicted the OCI-R x threat aversion 
interaction (p = .005), such that perceived aversion was a better predictor of 
improbable threat avoidance by those with higher OCI-R scores. Avoidance of 
improbable threat was also significantly predicted by the three-way OCI-R x 
threat aversion x threat condition interaction (p < .001), which was driven by a 
significant OCI-R x threat aversion interaction for the shock condition, 
F(3,199) = 12.59,   R2 = .074, p = .001, but not the disgust condition, F(3,199) = 
0.005,   R2 = .005, p = .56. Simple slopes further revealed that threat aversion 
predicted avoidance of improbable threat for the shock condition at high (+1 
SD) levels of OCI-R, β = 0.75, t(202) = 5.79, p <.001, but not low (-1 SD) 
levels of OCI-R, β = 0.074, t(202) = 0.56, p = .58. In contrast, threat aversion 
did not significantly predict avoidance of improbable threat in the disgust 
condition at high levels of OCI-R, β = 0.047, t(202) = 0.52, p = .60 or low 
levels of OCI-R, β = 0.12, t(202) = 1.23, p = .22.  
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Avoidance of more probable threat was not significantly predicted by 
OCI-R scores (p = .49), or the OCI-R x threat aversion interaction (p = .26); 
however, the OCI-R x Threat aversion x Threat condition interaction was 
marginally significant (p = .064). More probable threats were also predicted by 
the OCI-R x Threat Condition interaction (p = .01) and the Threat Aversion x 
Threat Condition interaction (p = .006), indicating that OCI-R scores and threat 
aversion ratings were more predictive of probable threat avoidance in the shock 
condition relative to the disgust condition. Simple slopes of relations between 
threat aversion and avoidance for each OCD group  (low vs. high) and threat 
probability cluster are shown in Figure 4.4.   
Figure 4.4. Interactive effects of OCI-R scores and threat aversion ratings across 
stimulus probability clusters and experimental conditions. More probable threat 
stimuli (left) are the three stimuli most similar to the conditioned stimulus (i.e., 
CS+, GS3, GS2) and improbable threat stimuli (right) are the three stimuli most 
dissimilar from the conditioned danger cue (i.e., ∆CS-, CS-, GS1). Shock (top) 
and disgust (bottom) conditions were identical except for the nature of the 
experimental threat (electric shock vs. vomit video clip). Threat aversion ratings 
refer to participants’ self-reported desire to not receive the experimental threat 
during the task. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised. **p < .01; 
***p < .001. N = 203. 
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Testing specificity to OCD Symptoms 
 
Next, to test whether significant effects with OCI-R for risk ratings and 
avoidance were attributable to OCD symptoms as opposed to broader levels of 
anxiety- or disgust-related personality traits, significant models were re-run 
controlling for levels of trait anxiety (STAI-T) and Disgust Propensity (DPSS-
DP). For the shock condition, OCI-R remained a significant predictor of risk 
ratings to improbable threat, β = 0.19, t(133) = 2.11, p = .037, and avoidance 
of improbable threat, β = 0.19, t(132) = 2.12, p = .036, after controlling for 
STAI-T scores. The OCI-R x threat aversion interaction also remained a 
significant predictor of improbable threat avoidance after controlling for STAI-
T, β = 0.27, t(130) = 3.37, p = .001. In contrast, OCI-R scores became only a 
marginally significant predictor of improbable threat risk ratings for the 
disgust condition when controlling for DPSS-DP scores, β = 0.23, t(133) = 
1.91, p = .061. DPSS-DP scores also emerged as a strong and significant 
predictor of improbable threat risk ratings for the disgust condition, β = 0.38, 
t(133) = 3.33, p = .001. 
Testing Effects with OCI-R Subscales 
 
Finally, to examine if significant results with overall OCI-R were 
driven by particular subscales, the a) significant effect of OCI-R on 
improbable threat risk ratings, b) significant effect of OCI-R on avoidance of 
improbable threat, and c) the OCI-R x threat aversion interaction on avoidance 
of improbable threat were re-tested replacing overall OCI-R with each OCI-R 
subscale (Washing, Checking, Neutralizing, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding). 
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The full set  of OCI-R subscale results can be found below in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Regression model statistics for OCI-R subscales. 
 
Note. Improbable threats are the three stimulus classes with least similarity to 
the conditioned danger cue (i.e, ∆CS-, CS-, GS1). Condition refers to the type 
of experimental threat participants were at risk for (electric shock vs. vomit 
video clip). Aversion ratings refer to participants’ self-reported desire to not 
receive the experimental threat during the task. OCI-R = Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory – Revised. N = 203. 
 
For risk ratings to improbable threat stimuli, all OCI-R subscales were 
significant for the disgust condition (ps < .044), while only Checking (p = .009) 
and Obsessing (p = .020) were significant for the shock condition, as well as 
Washing at the level of a trend (p = .072). For avoidance of improbable threat, 
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no subscales were significant for the disgust condition (ps > .13), while Washing 
(p = .043), Obsessing (p = .049), and Hoarding (p = .009) were significant for the 
shock condition. Similarly, none of the OCI-R subscale x Threat aversion 
interactions were significant predictors of avoidance in the disgust condition (ps 
> .18), while all subscales except for Ordering (p = .92) and Neutralizing (p = 
.069) interacted significantly with threat aversion in predicting avoidance of 
improbable threat in the shock condition (ps < .043). Thus, the hypothesis that 
Washing symptoms specifically would predict greater threat responding to the 
disgust condition was not supported. 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether relations between 
OCD symptoms and heightened anxious reactivity to improbable, highly 
aversive threats, as well as heightened expectancy to improbable threat more 
generally, would generalize across consequences involving disgust (i.e., vomit 
video clip) and physical danger (i.e., electric shock). Consistent with 
expectations, OCD symptoms predicted higher expectancy of improbable, but 
not more probable threats across both harm and disgust-related consequences. 
OCI-R scores also interacted with threat aversion to predict greater avoidance 
of improbable, but not more probable threats, indicating those with greater 
OCD symptoms were more likely to avoid specifically when facing 
improbable, highly aversive consequences. Unexpectedly however, this effect 
was specific to electric shock, as the main effect of OCD symptoms and its 
interaction with threat aversion did not predict avoidance of improbable threat 
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in the disgust condition. Moreover, OCD symptoms were not associated with 
higher startle to improbable threat, regardless of levels of threat aversion, 
which was in contrast to both expectations and to results from the first study. 
Interpreting Combined effects of Threat Probability and Aversion on 
Avoidance 
The fact that perceived threat aversion again predicted avoidance of 
improbable threat specifically among those with higher OCI-R scores offers 
further validation that OCD involves a sensitivity to improbable, catastrophic 
threats. Confidence in this effect is further buttressed by the fact that it was 
consistent despite the presence of key methodological differences between the 
experimental paradigms used in the two studies (e.g., number of shocks 
possible, number of total trials). Contrary to expectations however, OCD 
symptoms did not predict increased avoidance of improbable, subjectively 
aversive, disgust-related threats. This was a surprising finding, as many 
common improbable catastrophes associated with OCD have a clear disgust-
component (e.g., those associated with contamination OCD). More broadly, 
this finding goes against the theory that specific type of threat should not 
influence whether or not those with OCD are sensitive to improbable 
catastrophes. Specifically, the diverse array of improbable catastrophes 
associated with OCD implies that the specific modality of the threat makes 
little difference as to whether those with OCD are sensitive to such events—a 
notion that was contradicted in the present study. 
There are two possible reasons for why OCD symptoms did not 
 
161 
predict avoidance of improbable, highly aversive disgust-related threats in 
the present study. First, avoidance in the PIG paradigm may not be a good 
match for the sort of avoidance disgust primes (Cisler et al., 2009). 
Specifically, disgust is believed to prompt more gradual and subtle avoidance 
behaviors like withdrawing distancing, stopping, or dropping of contaminated 
objects to reduce contact with communicable diseases (Curtis, De Barra, & 
Aunger, 2011) whereas fear is known to prompt more sudden flight-like 
behaviors useful for feeling from active threats. The avoidance scenario 
instantiated in the PIG paradigm is arguably a much better fit for the latter, 
fear-related avoidance: The farmer is encountered with a potential threat 
(e.g., a CS+) and has the option to flee (i.e., take the long path). Moreover, in 
the disgust version of the experiment, the farmer (or the participant) is not 
faced with the potential of coming into contact with a disgust-related threat 
(i.e., human vomit) but rather just the smell (for the farmer) and visual (for 
the participant) of an individual vomiting. Thus, disgust-related threat used in 
this experiment may not actually instantiate the very situation—contact with 
a potential contaminate—believed to be the primary driver of disgust-elicited 
avoidance (Davey, 2011). 
The second reason why OCD symptoms might have predicted 
avoidance of improbable, highly aversive harmful consequences, but not 
disgust-related ones, is that only the former outcome is theoretically 
preventable. Specifically, in the shock condition, participant could still prevent 
receiving electric by taking the long path, while the individual depicted in the 
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disgust video had already become sick. This difference between the two 
version is relevant given the heightened perceptions of responsibility for harm 
often associated with OCD (Salkovskis et al., 2000. As such, if the participant 
(mistakenly) perceived a stimulus as safe during the shock condition, they 
would be responsible for shock occurring to themselves, whereas they would 
not be responsible for the individual in the video becoming sick regardless of 
whether they correctly perceived danger. Regardless of whether these 
interpretations are correct, more research is clearly needed to elucidate if 
observed null relations between OCD symptoms and avoidance of disgust-
related threats reflect a methodological artefact of the PIG paradigm or an 
indication that SIC is indeed relatively circumscribed to harmful consequences. 
Interpreting Null Effects for Startle 
 
Unexpectedly, OCD symptoms did not predict startle to improbable 
threats for either condition, even for individuals reporting high threat aversion. 
Though surprising, null startle results for the disgust condition are at least 
consistent with past investigations, as researchers have thus far failed to link 
OCD to disgust-triggered physiological responding across any method or task 
(Cisler et al., 2009). Moreover, across all participants, there was decreased 
differentiation in terms of startle for stimuli in the disgust condition, suggesting 
that startle was not as robustly modulated by threat probability when 
potentiated by disgust. Thus, the lack of relations between OCD symptoms and 
startle to improbable threat in the disgust condition may be a more global issue 




The lack of expected effects for startle in the shock condition was more 
surprising, as OCD symptoms had predicted startle to more improbable threat 
in study one. This difference could be due to the use of different statistical 
methods in these two studies. For instance, the significant effect in study one 
was an OCI-R x stimulus type interaction using the whole stimulus set, which 
may have been a more powerful procedure for finding OCD-related differences 
across stimuli. Another possibility, however, is that startle is simply a less 
reliable measure of anxiety/avoidance compared to behavioral indices. This 
notion is supported by the substantially lower internal consistency of 
standardized startle response in experimental paradigms (e.g., Bradford, Starr, 
Shackman, & Curtin, 2015) compared to overt behaviors in behavioral tasks 
(e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002). 
Interpreting Independent Effects of Threat Probability and Aversion 
As in study one, OCD symptoms were associated with greater 
avoidance and expectancy of more improbable threats. Moreover, effects with 
threat expectancy were consistent across both the shock and disgust conditions, 
such that participants with higher OCD symptoms were more expectant of 
improbable threat regardless of the particular consequence. This finding adds 
further confidence to the notion that the driving force behind the development 
of improbable, catastrophic fears in OCD is a general tendency to overestimate 
improbable threats, which has been found repeatedly across a variety of 
experimental studies (Fear & Healy, 1997; Hermans et al., 2008; Foa et al., 
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2001; Niemeyer et al., 2013 vs. Moritz & Jelinek, 2009). Further, across 
conditions, there was a) no significant OCI-R x threat aversion interaction, and 
b) no relationship between OCD symptoms and expectancy of more probable 
threats. Together, these results strongly indicate that OCD is associated with a 
fairly focal tendency to overestimate the likelihood of improbable threats, 
which is present regardless of the nature or aversiveness of the particular 
outcome. Of note, the effect of OCI-R on risk ratings for improbable disgust-
related threats became only marginally significant when controlling for disgust 
propensity. Thus, unlike risk for improbable shock-related threats, tendencies 
to overestimate improbable disgust-related threats in OCD may be more 
strongly mediated by certain disgust-related personality traits. 
Like results from the first study, the degree of probability 
overestimation across both threat conditions in this investigation was again 
fairly slight. For instance, individuals with OCD symptoms +1SD above the 
mean rated the risk of shock as 0.2/2 on average, whereas those -1SD below 
the mean provided a rating of 0.1/1 on average. If converted to same scale 
used in the first study (i.e., percentages), these values are basically identical 
(i.e., 5% for -1 SD  below the mean ;10% for +1 SD above the mean). As 
such, these results further indicate that OCD symptoms are associated with 
only marginal increases in the perception of improbable threat likelihood, 
which is again consistent with most patients possessing intact insight into the 
irrationality of their fears (e.g., Marazzti et al., 2002; Kishore, Samar, Reddy, 




Interpreting Effects for Specific OCD Symptom Presentations 
 
Contrary to expectations, washing symptoms did not show particularly 
strong or specific relations to disgust-related threats. Specifically, washing 
symptoms did not predict increased startle or avoidance to improbable disgust-
related threats, even when aversion to such threats was higher. This null result is 
surprising given that disgust-related threats figure prominently into the 
phenomenology of OCD patients with primary washing symptoms (e.g., 
Mancini et al. 2001; Mortetz & McKay, 2008). 
One explanation for these findings is that participants with elevated 
washing symptoms in  this sample were more motivated by avoidance of harm 
than by avoidance of disgust. Although both of these motivations are relevant 
explanations for OCD-relevant washing behavior (Melli et al., 2015), harm-
related motivations appear to be more prevalent. For instance, in one OCD 
patient sample (N = 485), concerns with contracting a specific disease from a 
contaminant (i.e., avoidance of harm) were about twice as common as concerns 
pertaining only to how contacting that contaminant would feel (i.e., avoidance 
of disgust; Pinto et al., 2008). Therefore, it is feasible that the current sample 
was characterized by a greater number of participants possessing harm-related 
motivations for washing behavior compared to those possessing disgust-related 
motivations, thereby resulting in findings for the harm-related threat (i.e., 
electric shock) being stronger. Accordingly, it will be important for future 
research aimed at characterizing the null relations between washing symptoms 
 
166 
and disgust-related avoidance in the PIG paradigm to consider the specific 
motivations exhibited by participants with washing-related symptoms. 
Nonetheless, washing symptoms were predictive of greater risk ratings 
to improbable disgust-related threats but not shock-related ones, and also 
evidenced the strongest relationship with expectancy of improbable disgust-
related threats among the OCI-R subscales. Moreover, although no OCI-R 
subscale significantly predicted avoidance of improbable disgust-related 
threats, the effect of washing was again strongest among the subscales. Finally, 
the effect of washing on avoidance of improbable disgust- and shock-related 
threats was virtually identical (b = 0.19 for disgust; b = 0.18 for shock) whereas 
every other subscale had a much stronger effect in favor of the shock. Thus, 
although effects with washing were weaker than anticipated, there was at least 
some evidence that the subscale exhibited associations that are consistent with 
previously found relations between washing/contamination symptoms and 
responses to disgust- related threats (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2007; Nicholson & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2012). 
Disappointingly, the subscale-specific patterns with threat responding 
found in this study were markedly different from those found in the first study. 
For instance, while Washing and Checking symptoms were the only subscales 
to predict avoidance of improbable, highly aversive threats in the first study, 
such responses were also predicted by Obsessing and Hoarding in this study. 
Effects with Obsessing go against the interpretation that avoidance of 
improbable, highly aversive threats in the PIG paradigm may be best predicted 
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by OCD symptoms that similarly tap behavioral (rather than mental) avoidance 
symptoms. Moreover, while Hoarding arguably taps behavioral responses (e.g., 
collecting/saving items), it has also repeatedly exhibited divergent clinical 
correlates with OCD (e.g., Bloch et al., 2014, implying it should only be 
weakly tied to a putatively OCD-specific process like SIC. 
It is possible that specific methodological differences between studies 
one and two may account for differing patterns of subscale effects. However, 
perhaps the most parsimonious explanation for these discrepancies is error 
associated with measurement of OCI-R subscales. Although the reliability and 
validity of the overall OCI-R scale is excellent, psychometric properties of the 
subscale are quite variable, at times dipping below the acceptable range in 
some studies (Foa et al., 2002; Hajack et al., 2004; Abramowitz & Deacon, 
2006). Therefore, extreme caution should be utilized in interpreting results with 
specific subscales, consistent with their findings being considered only 
exploratory in the present dissertation. 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of the current study was to replicate and extend the finding 
that OCD symptoms predicted heightened avoidance of improbable, highly 
aversive threats, and elevated expectancy of improbable threat more generally, 
by testing the invariance of these relations across threats involving both disgust 
and physical danger. Consistent with results from the first investigation, those 
with higher OCD symptoms were likely to avoid improbable threats if they are 
more averse to  their consequences; however, these effects were specific to 
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harmful consequences. Additionally, participants with greater OCD symptoms 
appraised improbable threats as more likely to occur regardless of whether 
they involved disgust or harm, suggesting links between OCD symptoms and 
overestimations of improbable threat likelihood generalize across different 
kinds of aversive  outcomes. Overall, these results further validate the 
observation that OCD involves a heightened  tendency to avoid improbable, 
catastrophic consequences, but suggest that this relationship may also depend 
on the threat’s potential to evoke harm. Moreover, results with threat 
expectancy offer further confidence that OCD involves a general sensitivity 
toward (slightly) overestimating the likelihood of improbable threats, which 
may be the core feature underlying the purported sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes in the illness.
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Chapter 5: Sensitivity to Improbable Catastrophes as a Risk 
Factor for OCD (Study 3) 
Findings from the first two studies demonstrated that OCD symptoms 
are associated with increased avoidance of improbable, highly aversive threats, 
as well as increased expectancy of improbable threats in general. While these 
findings implicate SIC as relevant to OCD, one issue they are unable to address 
is whether this sensitivity act as a risk factor for the disorder or merely a 
correlate. Clarifying this distinction, moreover, could important clinical 
implications for OCD. For instance, if SIC acts as a risk factor of OCD, it could 
be used to predict and ultimately prevent future manifestation of the illness. 
Moreover, since temporal precedence is one of the necessary components of 
causality (Chambliss & Schutt, 2018), establishing SIC as a risk factor could 
shed light on whether treatments designed to address this sensitivity would 
actually lead to reductions in OCD symptoms. 
Disentangling if a variable represents a correlate or risk factor requires 
a longitudinal design. In the simplest longitudinal design, both the candidate 
risk factor (e.g., SIC) and the outcome (e.g., OCD symptoms) are measured at 
one time point while the outcome is measured again at a future time point (e.g., 
Leneart et al., 2014). If relations between the candidate variable and outcome 
are purely concurrent in nature (i.e., the candidate variable is merely a 
correlate), any variance the candidate variable shares with future levels of the 
outcome should be fully eclipsed when controlling for baseline levels of the 
outcome. However, if the candidate variable also functions as a risk factor, it 
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should predict additional unique variance in the outcome at follow-up above 
and beyond levels at baseline, such that changes in the outcome are associated 
with levels of the risk factor (Zvolensky, Schmidt, Bernstein, Keough, 2006). 
Unfortunately, very little longitudinal exists that can speak to whether 
SIC functions as a risk factor or correlate of OCD pathology. The most 
relevant evidence comes from studies assessing prospective relations between 
OCD beliefs on the OBQ-44 and OCD symptoms. In the first of these studies, 
Coles and Horng (2006) found that OBQ scores predicted OCI-R scores six 
weeks later in a large sample of undergraduate students. This same group also 
found that the distress associated with OCD symptoms (i.e., the distress 
subscale of the original OCI) at 6-month follow-up was significantly predicted 
by baseline OBQ scores (Coles, Pietrefesa, Schofield, & Cook, 2008). In a 
slightly different sample, Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, and 
Rygwall (2006) found that OBQ scores significantly predicted symptoms from 
the OCI-R and the Y-BOCS at 3-month follow-up for men and women who 
recently had their first child—a common trigger of OCD symptoms (Zambaldi 
et al., 2014). Together, these findings suggest that maladaptive OCD-relevant 
cognitions may act vulnerabilities markers for OCD symptoms. However, 
while there is some conceptual overlap OBQ-44 subscales and measures of SIC 
(e.g., tendency to overestimate threat), SIC is obviously a much more specific 
type of threat- based distortion, meaning it may have entirely different 
prospective relations with future OCD symptoms compared to more broad-
band threat-related constructs. 
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First-semester college students offer an intriguing population in which 
to test for premorbid markers of OCD pathology. For one, identifying 
vulnerability markers of psychopathology by definition requires the use of a 
non-clinical sample that has not yet developed the illness (Leneart et al., 2014). 
Importantly however, most first-year college students are just prior to age that 
OCD is most likely to develop (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; Delorme et al., 
2003), suggesting the onset of new pathology is this population is relatively 
high relative to other groups. Additionally, first-semester college students 
experience a variety of novel stressors (e.g., increased academic expectations, 
finding a new friend group), which combined with heightened expectation of 
autonomy may stimulate the development of new anxiety symptoms (Dyson & 
Renk, 2006; Gefen, 2010). Indeed, many aspects of collegiate life could be 
considered face-valid triggers for previously unexpressed OCD symptoms. For 
instance, the heightened prevalence of sexually-transmitted diseases (Koumans 
et al., 2005) and crowded or dirty public spaces (e.g., classrooms, dormitories) 
could bring newfound challenges to those with latent contamination OCD. 
Similarly, increased levels of responsible for protecting one’s valuable 
possessions (e.g., laptops) could provoke formerly unprovoked checking 
behavior among those predisposed to such proclivities. Finally, the requirement 
of a shared living space could be highly distressing for someone with marked 
preoccupations for symmetry and order, especially if paired  with a roommate 
with relatively lax standards for organization and tidiness. 
Given these considerations, the purpose of the current study was to test 
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whether responses to improbable, highly aversive threats in the PIG paradigm 
could prospectively predict levels of future OCD symptoms across the first year 
of college. Since the first two studies implicated heightened responding to 
improbable threats as a marker of OCD symptoms across multiple threat 
response types, I predicted that each threat response (threat expectancy, 
anxiety, startle, and avoidance) to improbable threats, but not more probable 
threat, would act as a prospective predictor of OCD symptoms. Furthermore, I 
predicted that startle, anxiety, and avoidance for improbable threat would more 
strongly predict future OCD symptoms among participants with higher threat 
aversion, consistent with anxious reactivity in conditions most closely 
approximating improbable catastrophes being the most sensitive marker of 
future OCD symptoms. Such analyses should afford a strong initial test of 
whether the constellation of threat responses reflective of SIC function as risk 
factors or correlates of OCD symptoms. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-eight first-semester college students were 
recruited from the University of Minnesota. Inclusion criteria were identical to 
the first two studies except that participants needed to be first-semester 
university students between the ages of 18-19. Additionally, participants were 
required to have never lived away from their caregivers for three months or 
longer in an effort to ensure that the beginning of college was a relatively 
novel transition across participants. Of the 138 tested participants, 39 failed to 
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complete the symptom follow-up survey in the Spring semester, nine 
discontinued during the experiment, six had incomplete data resulting from the 
paradigm malfunctioning, and one participant was excluded for failing to 
acquire the CS+/US contingency (as indicated by a greater threat expectancy 




In addition to the OCI-R, participants also completed the Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder Screener (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Lowe, 2006), 
the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Leibowitz, 1987), and the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). These questionnaires were 
used to assess whether task indices were specific prospective predictors of OCD 
symptoms or also predicted symptoms of other anxiety disorders (GAD-7, LSAS) 
and depression (BDI-II). 
Experimental Paradigm 
 
The experimental paradigm used in this study was identical to the 
version used in study 1 (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). The one difference was the 
only the 1-shock and 3-shock conditions were administered, aversion to which 
was rated immediately following the conclusion of the experiment. 
Procedure 
 
Participants first completed a lab visit during the Fall of their first 
semester, during which the PIG paradigm was administered in an identical 
fashion as is study one (see chapter 3, Section 3.2). Within two days of 
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their lab visit, participants were given an online survey in which they 
completed the OCI-R, GAD-7, LSAS, and BDI-II among other measures. 
Participants who completed both the lab visit and this survey were then 
contacted at approximately the same point during the following Spring 
semester and invited to complete a shortened version of the same online 
survey they were given at baseline in exchange for $10. 
Data Analysis 
 
Differences between stimuli during Preacquisition and Acquisition for 
each type of threat response (threat expectancy, anxiety, startle) were assessed 
with separate 3-level (Stimulus type: ∆CS-, CS-, CS+) rANOVAs. Differences 
between stimuli during the Test phase for each type of threat response (threat 
expectancy, anxiety ratings, startle, avoidance choices) were tested using 
separate 6-level (Trial type: ∆CS-, CS-, GS1, GS2, GS3, CS+) by 2-level (US 
intensity: 1 shock vs. 3 shocks) rANOVAs. When appropriate, analyses were 
followed by paired samples t-tests. 
Symptom changes across semesters. Paired-sample t-tests were conducted 
to compare levels of OCI-R, LSAS, GAD-7, and BDI-II scores between the Fall 
and Spring semesters. The mean score within each quartile for these measures is 
also reported for both timepoints to illustrate the range of symptom trajectories 
across participants. 
Main analyses. To test concurrent relations between threat responses 
and OCD symptoms, separate hierarchical regression models for each response 
type (threat expectancy, anxiety, startle, avoidance choices) to improbable 
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threat (∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and more probable threat (GS2, GS3, CS+) were used 
to predict OCI-R scores at baseline (i.e., Fall semester). A specific response 
index (e.g., average threat expectancy improbable threat, average anxiety to 
more probable threat, etc.) was entered in the first step to assess the effect of 
responses to threats  of different probabilities. The mean threat aversion ratings 
across the 1- and 3-shock conditions (i.e., average of participants’ ratings of 
how important it was for them to not receive shock in the 1- and 3-shock 
conditions) was entered next to test the influence of participants’ general 
aversiveness to the experimental threat. Finally, the Threat response x Threat 
aversion interaction was entered in the last step to assess whether responding 
to a particular probability grouping of experimental threat (e.g., improbable 
threat) was more predictive of OCD symptoms among individuals who were 
more averse to the threat’s potential consequences (i.e. higher threat aversion 
ratings). 
Next, these same responses were tested as predictors of future OCD 
symptoms. For these models, baseline OCI-R scores were entered in the first 
step to control for any differences in follow-up OCD symptoms that were 
present at baseline. The same set of predictors as the baseline models were 
entered next in the same order (i.e., threat response index, threat aversion 
ratings, Threat response x Threat aversion interaction). 
For both sets of models (i.e., concurrent and future OCI-R scores), 
significant Threat response x Threat aversion interactions were followed up by 
testing the effect of the threat response variable among participants reporting 
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low aversion to threat (i.e., average threat rating < 7) and those reporting high 
aversion to threat (i.e., average threat rating > 7). The groups were divided on 
this level of threat aversion rating on the basis of a median split. 
Finally, to assess whether threat responses were more broadly 
predictive of anxiety and depression symptoms more generally, this identical 
data analytic plan was employed again for the three other symptom measures: 
GAD-7, LSAS, and BDI-II. 
OCI-R subscale analyses. As in previous studies, significant effects 
with overall OCI-R were re-run replacing total OCI-R scores with scores on each 
of the six OCI-R subscales. Because no definitive pattern of results with 
subscales were gleaned in the previous two studies, no explicit hypotheses were 
made about which subscales would be predicted from indices of improbable 
threat responding. Significance was set at p < .05 for all statistical tests. 
    Results  
Pre-acquisition        
 Prior to acquisition, small, statistically significant differences between 
stimuli (∆CS-, CS-,  CS+) were detected for both threat expectancy ratings F(2, 
80) = 3.93, p = .021, and anxiety ratings, F(2, 80) = 3.41, p = .035. These 
differences appeared driven by greater responding to ∆CS- (chance: M =29.48, 
SD = 21.10; anxiety: M =29.16, SD = 19.86) relative to CS- (chance: M =25.39, 
SD = 20.82; anxiety: M =26.53, SD = 18.90), for both threat expectancy ratings, 
t(82) = 2.98, p = 0.004, and anxiety ratings, t(82) = 2.64, p = 0.016. Responding 







differ from ∆CS- in terms of threat expectancy ratings, t(85) = 1.44, p = 0.15, 
or anxiety ratings, t(82) = 1.49, p = 0.14, or from CS- in terms of threat 
expectancy ratings, t(82) = -1.33, p = 0.19, or anxiety ratings, t(82) = -0.93, p = 
0.36. Therefore, no differences between the danger cue (CS+) and the safety 
cues (∆CS-, oCS-)  were detected prior to acquisition, 
Acquisition 
During acquisition, a main effect of stimulus type was found for threat 
expectancy ratings, F(2, 80) = 222.734, p < .0001, 𝜂$ = 0.72, and reflected 
higher ratings to CS+ (M= 66.61, SD = 19.79) relative to CS- (M = 27.08, SD 
= 19.01), t(82) = 16.59, p < .001, and ∆CS- (M = 25.69, SD = 17.28), t(82) = 
15.10, p < .001, which did not differ from each other, t(82) = -1.11, p = .27. A 
main effect of stimulus type was also found for anxiety ratings, F(2, 80) = 89.37, 
p <..0001, 𝜂$ = 0.51, and reflected higher ratings to CS+ (M= 47.76, SD = 22.51) 
relative to CS- (M= 31.37, SD = 19.41), t(82) = 10.41, p < .001, and ∆CS- (M = 
30.58, SD = 18.61), t(82) = 9.80 p < .001, which did not differ from each other, 
t(82) = -1.10, p = .31. 
Test Phase 
Threat expectancy. For threat expectancy, there was a main effect of 
stimulus type during the Test phase, F(5, 77) = 390.16, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.82, which 
was driven by progressively lower threat expectancy ratings as stimuli became 
more dissimilar from CS+ (linear decrease: F(1, 81) = 596.33, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 





comparisons revealed that all stimuli from the improbable threat cluster (∆CS- 
, CS-, GS1) were a) rated as significantly less likely to result in shock compared 
to stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (GS2, GS3, CS+; ps < .001). In 
contrast to previous to investigations, threat expectancy to GS1 was greater than 
CS-, t(82) = 3.51, p = .001, and ∆CS-, t(82) = 2.35, p = .021; threat expectancy 
did not differ between ∆CS- and CS-, t(82) = 0.43, p = .67. significantly 
differently in terms of shock risk from each other (ps > .15). However, the 
difference between GS1 and GS2 was markedly larger than the difference 
between GS1 and oCS-/∆CS-, indicating the improbable and more probable 
threat cluster groups utilized in the previous studies were appropriate for this 
study as well. 
There was also a main effect of intensity level reflecting greater threat 
expectancy ratings during the 3-shock condition relative to the 1-shock 
condition, F(1, 81) = 4.59, p = .035, 𝜂$ = 0.051, as well as a significant Intensity 
level x Stimulus type interaction, F(5, 77) = 3.20, p = 008, 𝜂$ = 0.036. Follow-
up analyses comparing threat expectancy ratings between shock conditions 
separately for each stimulus type revealed heightened expectancy of threat in 
the 3- shock relative to the 1-shock condition for GS2, t(82) = 3.27, p = .002, 
and CS- at the level of a trend, t(82) = 1.91, p = .059, but not for any other 
stimulus type (ps > .22). 
Anxiety ratings. For anxiety ratings, there was a main effect of stimulus 
type F(5, 77) = 163.72, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.66, which was again driven by 







CS+ (linear decrease: F(1, 81) = 213.62, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.72; quadratic decrease: 
F(1, 81) = 117.72 p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.59). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all 
stimuli from the improbable threat cluster evoked significantly less anxiety 
compared to stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (ps < .001), but did 
not differ from each other (ps > .21). There was also a main effect of intensity 
level reflecting greater anxiety ratings during the 3-shock condition relative to 
the 1-shock condition, F(1, 81) = 8.62, p = .004, 𝜂$ = 0.091, as well as a 
significant intensity level x stimulus type interaction, F(5, 77) = 2.41, p = .036, 
𝜂$ = 0.027. Follow-up analyses comparing anxiety ratings between shock 
conditions for each stimulus type separately revealed that greater anxiety in the 
3-shock condition relative to the 1-shock condition for GS2, t(82) = 3.26, p = 
.002, CS+, t(82) = 2.58, p = .011, and CS- at the level of a trend, t(82) = 1.91, p 
= .059, but not for any other stimulus type (ps > .14). 
Startle EMG. For startle, there was a main effect of stimulus type F(5, 77) 
= 22.89, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.24, which was again driven by progressively lower 
startle as stimuli became more dissimilar from CS+ (linear decrease: F(1, 81) = 
47.08, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.39; quadratic decrease: F(1, 82) = 10.81, p = .002, 𝜂$ = 
0.13). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all stimuli from the improbable threat 
cluster evoked significantly less startle compared to stimuli from the more 
probable threat cluster (ps < .012), but did not differ from each other (ps > .83). 
There was also a main effect of intensity level reflecting greater startle during 









.012, 𝜂$ = 0.081, but not a significant Intensity level x Stimulus type interaction, 
F(5, 77) = 0.82, p = .47, 𝜂$ = 0.012. 
Avoidance choices. For avoidance, there was a main effect of stimulus 
type F(5, 77) = 90.78, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.53, which was again driven by 
progressively lower avoidance as stimuli became more dissimilar from CS+ 
(linear decrease: F(1, 81) = 123.74, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.60; quadratic decrease: 
F(1, 81) = 55.42, p < .001, 𝜂$ = 0.40). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all 
stimuli from the improbable threat cluster (∆CS- , CS-, GS1) were avoided less 
than all stimuli from the more probable threat cluster (ps < .001). Within the 
improbable threat cluster, GS1 was avoided slightly more than CS-, t(82) = 2.50, 
p = .014, but no other pairwise differences were significant (ps > .08). There 
was also a main effect of intensity level, such that more avoidance choices 
occurred during the 3-shock condition compared to the 1-shock condition, 
F(82, 1) = 10.35, p = .002, 𝜂$ = .11, as well as a significant intensity level x 
stimulus type interaction, F(80, 5) = 2.40, p = .037, 𝜂$ = .027. Follow-up 
analyses comparing the percent of avoidance choices made between shock 
conditions for each stimulus type revealed a greater percentage of avoidance 
choices in in the 3-shock condition versus the 1-shock condition for GS2, t(82) 
= 2.08, p = .041, GS3, t(82) = 3.17, p = .002, and CS+, t(85) = 2.31, p = .028, 
but not any other stimulus type (ps > .30). 
Symptom Changes across Semesters 
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Differences in symptoms measures (OCI-R, GAD-7, LSAS, BDI-II) 
from baseline to follow-up can be found below in Table 5.1. Although OCD 
symptoms decreased significantly from baseline to follow-up (p < .01), there 
was marked variability in change scores across quartiles, as demonstrate by 
large decreases from the first to second semester for quartiles one and two, no 
change in quartile three, and a large increase for quartile four. A marginally 
significant decrease in social anxiety symptoms was also observed from 
baseline to follow-up (p = .072), while symptoms of GAD did not differ from 
baseline to follow-up, and depression symptoms significantly increased (p < 
.05). 
 
Table 5.1: Differences in symptom measures from baseline to follow-up. 
 
Note. Symptom changes are defined as the symptom score at follow-up minus 
the symptom score at baseline. Q1 – Q4 change refers to the mean symptom 
change score in each quartile of the sample based on change score. OCI-R = 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised. GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder 7; LSAS = Leibowitz Social Anxiety Scale; BDI-II = Beck  
Depression Inventory – II; ^p < .072. * p < .05. **p < .01. N = 83. 
 
Associations between threat responses and baseline OCD symptoms 
 
OCI-R scores at baseline were not significantly associated with any 
index of threat responding to improbable or more probable threat (ps > .12), or 
by any Threat response x Threat aversion interactions (p > .29). Of note, 
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avoidance of improbable threat was associated with baseline OCI-R scores at 
the level of a trend, β = 0.21, t(81) = 1.96, p = .054. 
Predicting Future OCD Symptoms from Threat Responses 
 
Baseline OCI-R was entered in the first step in all models and 
emerged as a highly significant predictor, β = 0.41, t(81) = 4.26, p < .001, 
explaining 16.9% of the variance in future OCI-R scores, F (1, 81) = 16.56, p 
< .001. 
Table 5.2 shows the effects of each threat response, threat aversion 
ratings, and each Threat response x Threat aversion interaction on future OCI-
R scores. For improbable threat, future OCI-R scores were significantly 
predicted by higher threat expectancy, anxiety ratings, and avoidance choices. 
The effect of threat aversion was not significant across models, but the 
improbable threat response x threat aversion interaction was significant for 
anxiety, as well as for startle at the level of a trend. In contrast, improbable 
threat avoidance x threat aversion interaction was not significant; however, the 
interaction term had a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 13.61, which is well-
above the recommended threshold of four and was thus indicative of 
problematic levels of multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Blac, 2010). 
Therefore, the Avoidance x Threat aversion interaction could not be readily 
interpreted. For more probable threat, no threat response or threat response x 
threat aversion interaction term was predictive of future OCI-R scores, 





Table 5.2: Effects of Reactivity to improbable and more probable threat on future  
OCI-R scores 
 
Note. Beta weight reflect the effect of each threat response type on follow-up 
OCI-R scores controlling for baseline OCI-R scores. Improbable threat is 
defined as the average response to the three stimulus classes least similar to the 
conditioned danger cue (i.e., ∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and more probable threat is 
defined as the average response to the three stimulus classes most similar to the 
conditioned danger cue (GS2, GS3, and CS+). Threat aversion is the average 
reported importance of not receiving shock during the 1- and 3-shock 
conditions. FPS = Fear-potentiated startle. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory – Revised. CS+ = Conditioned danger cue. GS1-3 = Generalization 
Stimulus 1 – 3; CS- = Circular safety cue. ∆CS- = triangular safety cue. N 
= 83. ^Predictor had a variance inflation factor of greater than 4 (13.61) so its 
effect should not be interpreted. 
 
Because the improbable threat response x threat aversion interaction was 
significant for anxiety ratings, marginally significant for startle, and not 
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interpretable for avoidance, the effect of each of these threat responses on future 
OCI-R scores was tested for those reporting low aversion to the threat (i.e., 
average threat aversion rating < 7) vs. those reporting high aversion to threat (i.e., 
average threat aversion rating > 7) to better understand the influence of threat 
aversion. For comparative purposes, the effect of improbable threat expectancy 
within these groups was also tested, as was the effect of more probable threat 
responses. 
As shown in Table 5.3, each type of response to improbable threat was a 
significant predictor of future OCD symptoms in the high threat aversion group 
except for startle (p = .13). In contrast, no improbable threat response was a 
significant predictor of future OCD symptoms in the low threat aversion group 
(ps > .24). For responses to more probable threat, only avoidance in the high 
threat aversion group emerged as a significant predictor, while startle in the low 
threat aversion group was significant at the level of a trend (p = .06) 
 
Table 5.3: Effects of threat responses to improbable and more probable threat 






Note. Threat aversion is the average reported importance of not receiving 
shock during the 1- and 3-shock conditions. The low aversion group (n = 43) 
and high aversion group (n = 40) had an average threat aversion rating of < 7 
and > 7, respectively. Beta weight reflect the effect of each threat response type 
on follow-up OCI-R scores controlling for baseline OCI-R scores. Low 
Improbable threat is defined as the average response to the three stimulus 
classes least similar to the conditioned danger cue (i.e., ∆CS-, CS-, GS1) and 
more probable threat is defined as the average response to the three stimulus 
classes most similar to the conditioned danger cue (GS2, GS3, and CS+). OCI-R 
= Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised. CS+ = Conditioned danger cue. 
GS1-3 = Generalization Stimulus 1 – 3; CS- = Circular safety cue. ∆CS- = 
triangular safety cue. N = 83. 
 
Finally, to illustrate how OCD symptom trajectories differed as a function 
of both threat aversion and threat probability, the average OCI-R score at both 
time points was plotted for participants scoring in the upper and lower halves of 
each response variable for improbable threat separately for low and high threat 
aversion groups. Since over half the low threat aversion group never avoided 
any stimuli within the improbable threat group, improbable threat avoidance 
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within this group is instead split into those who avoided (n = 33) vs. those who 
never avoided (n = 9). These graphs can be found below in Figure 5.4 below. 
Figure 5.1. OCD symptom trajectories across participants group based on 
threat aversion ratings (top and bottom) and response sot improbable threat 
cues (green and blue lines). Baseline OCI-R and task data were collected in 
participants’ first semester of college and follow-up OCI-R were collected at 
the same point in participants’ second semester. Improbable threat is the 
average response to the three stimulus classes least similar to the conditioned 
danger cue (i.e., ∆CS-, CS-, GS1). Threat aversion is the average reported 
importance of not receiving shock during the 1- and 3-shock conditions. The 
low aversion group (n = 40) and high aversion group (n = 43) had an average 
threat aversion rating of < 7 and > 7, respectively. Low and high response 
groups were based on median splits conducted within the threat aversion 
groups, except for improbable avoidance within the threat aversion group, 
which was split between those who avoided (n = 9) vs. those who never 
avoided (n = 33). FPS = Fear-potentiated startle. OCI-R = Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory Revised. CS+ = Conditioned danger cue. GS1 = 
Generalization Stimulus 1; CS- = Circular safety cue. ∆CS- = triangular safety 
cue. N = 83. 
 
Predicting Future GAD, SAD, and Depression Symptoms from Threat Responses 
 
Next, to assess whether the same types of threat responses emerged as 
predictors of symptoms for other anxiety disorders and depression, the identical 
data analytic plan was rerun substituting OCI-R scores for scores on the GAD-7 
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(GAD symptoms), LSAS (SAD symptoms), and BDI-II (depression symptoms). 
For SAD symptoms, trend-level effects were found for avoidance of improbable 
threat predicting higher LSAS scores at follow-up, β = 0.20, t(81) = 1.96, p = 
.054, but not for any other response type to improbable, more probable threat or 
their constituent interactions with threat aversion (ps > .11). For GAD 
symptoms, higher GAD-7 scores at follow-up were predicted at trend levels by 
both higher expectancy of improbable threats, β = 0.20, t(81) = 1.83, p = .071, 
and more probable threat, β = 0.20, t(81) = 1.90, p = .061, and greater anxiety of 
more probable threat, β = 0.19, t(81) = 1.77, p = .083, but no other response type 
to improbable threat, more probable threat, or their constituent interactions with 
threat aversion (ps > .12). Finally, for depression symptoms, the threat 
expectancy x threat aversion interaction for more probable threat emerged as a 
significant predictor, β = -0.19, t(81) = -2.07, p = .042, which explained 2.6% 
additional variance in future BDI-II scores, F(77, 5) = 4.23, p = .042. No other 
response type to improbable or more probable threat or their interactions with 
threat aversion emerged as significant predictors of future depression symptoms 
(ps > .10). Thus, the same responses to improbable and/or aversive threats that 
were predictive of OCD symptoms did not appear to be predictive of symptoms 
of other anxiety disorders or depression. 
Predicting Future OCI-R Subscale Scores from Threat Responses 
Finally, to understand whether threat responses and their interactions 
with threat aversion were more strongly predictive of specific future OCD 
symptoms, the identical data analytic plan was re-run replacing overall OCI-R 
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with each OCI-R subscale. Results for these tests are shown below in Table 5.5. 
Expectancy for improbable threat was a significant predictor of future washing, 
checking, and ordering symptoms, as well as hoarding at the level of a trend (p = 
.085). Anxiety to improbable threat was a significant predictor of future washing 
and ordering symptoms, as well as hoarding symptoms at the level of a trend (p 
= .053) and checking at the level of a trend (p = .073). The Improbable threat 
anxiety x Threat aversion interaction was also a significant predictor of future 
washing symptoms, and a trend-level predictor for checking (p = .098) and 
obsessing symptoms (p = .08). Startle to improbable threat was a significant 
predictor of future washing symptoms, and the startle to Improbable threat x 
Threat aversion interaction was a significant predictor of future obsessing 
symptoms. Avoidance of improbable threat was a significant predictor of future 
checking, washing, and ordering, and obsessing symptoms, as well as hoarding 
symptoms at the level of a trend (p = .053). The Improbable threat avoidance x 
Threat aversion was a significant predictor of future obsessing symptoms, but it 
was in the negative direction, contrary to the expectations. 












Note. Beta values are the effect of each threat response on follow-up OCI-R 
subscales scores controlling for baseline levels of the same OCI-R subscale. 
Improbable threat is defined as the average response to the three stimulus 
classes least similar to the conditioned danger cue (i.e.,∆CS-, CS-, GS1). 
Aversion is the average reported importance of not receiving shock during the 
1- and 3-shock conditions. Interactions between avoidance and threat aversion 
across all models had variance inflation factors > 4 and should therefore not be 
interpreted. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised. FPS = Fear-
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potentiated startle. CS+ = Conditioned danger cue. GS1-3 = Generalization 





The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether heightened 
responsivity to improbable catastrophes acts as a correlate or risk factor of 
OCD symptoms. Results show that college students with higher expectancy, 
anxiety, and avoidance to improbable threats in their first semester exhibited 
greater OCD symptoms their second semester, consistent with heightened 
responsivity to improbable conferring increased risk for future OCD symptoms. 
Moreover, anxiety to improbable threat better predicted future OCD symptoms 
among individuals who were more averse to threat, which was also true for 
startle at a trend-level, and evident for avoidance in follow-up tests involving 
threat aversion subgroups. This implies that threat responses to situations better 
approximating improbable catastrophes better discriminate those at elevated 
risk for OCD. In contrast, no index of responding to more probable threat 
emerged as a significant predictor of future OCD symptoms, though avoidance 
emerge as a trend-level predictor. Accordingly, elevated risk for OCD 
symptoms appeared driven by a focal tendency to over- appraise and become 
distressed by improbable threats, especially when perceived as highly aversive, 
rather than a more general tendency to over-respond to all types of threats. 
Moreover,  the same constellation of threat responses that predicted future OCD 
symptoms were not predictive of future symptoms of GAD, SAD, or 
depression, suggesting that heightened reactivity to improbable and highly 
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aversive threat acts as a relatively specific marker of susceptibility for OCD. 
Interpreting Prospective Effects of Improbable Threat Responses 
 
Results from the current investigation support the hypothesis that 
heightened responsivity to improbable threat acts a prospective marker of risk 
for OCD. Specifically, greater threat expectancy, anxiety, and avoidance of 
improbable threats, but not more probable threats, predicted a significant 
portion of the variance in second-semester OCD symptoms, even while 
concurrent (first semester) symptoms were controlled for. Accordingly, 
participants who experienced greater OCD symptoms at follow-up not only 
tended to overestimate improbable threats at baseline but were also more 
distressed and avoidant of them as well. These results add to the few 
prospective studies demonstrating the pathogenic role of dysfunctional beliefs 
in OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008) by implicating a more 
specific tendency to maladaptively respond to improbable threat as a more 
focal vulnerability marker in the illness. Additionally, the fact that predictive 
effects were relatively specific to improbable threat, rather than more probable 
threat, adds further confidence to the notion that OCD is not marked by a more 
general tendency to overestimate threat (OCCWG, 2003). 
While the centrality of improbable threat responding to OCD symptoms 
is consistent with findings of the past two studies, there were some noteworthy 
inconsistencies when it came to results with specific threat indices. Most 
notably, OCD symptoms in the current study were significantly predicted by 
improbable threat anxiety, but not startle, while OCD symptoms in the first 
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study showed the opposite set of relations (i.e., OCD symptoms associated with 
startle but not anxiety to improbable threat). Regarding the null results 
involving startle, effects were in the predicted direction, making them at least 
partially consistent with earlier findings. Thus, as alluded to in the chapter 4, it 
is possible that failure to find consistent relations with startle may be 
attributable to startle simply not being as reliable as behavioral indices of threat 
responding (Bradford et al., 2015). 
The discrepancy for anxiety ratings is more difficult to interpret. On 
one hand, it is a positive sign that OCD symptoms were predicted by 
improbable threat anxiety ratings in this study, as this response is arguably the 
most straightforward measure of threat reactivity in the paradigm. However, 
this finding is also inconsistent with the proposal in chapter 3 that the failure to 
find higher anxious reactivity to improbable threat among those higher on 
OCD symptoms reflects either a) that those higher on OCD respond to 
improbable catastrophes with a better-safe-than-sorry strategy, which occurs in 
the absence of anxiety, or b) that OCD-relevant anxiety is triggered only on 
choice trials that include an element of responsibility, and not on passive non-
choice trials where anxiety ratings are collected. Because the experimental 
paradigm was essentially identical in this study and the first study, it appears 
unlikely that null results involving anxiety in the first study were merely 
artefacts of task design, making both these explanations insufficient. 
In lieu of these reasons, perhaps the most likely explanation for the 
relative inconsistency of anxiety results is that this SIC is less likely to manifest 
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as conscious anxiety compared to other  indicators of threat reactivity. Indeed, 
while 96% of OCD patients exhibit compulsions (i.e., avoidance), only 75% 
report reduction of anxiety or distress as a motivation behind their compulsive 
behavior (Starcevic et al., 2011). The DSM criteria for OCD also reflects the 
relative inconstancy of subjective anxiety, stating only that obsessions may 
involve anxiety (APA, 2013). Thus, it could be the case that the PIG paradigm 
does a decent job of eliciting anxiety to improbable threats, but such responses 
are simply less common compared to threat-based manifestations like 
avoidance among those with elevated OCD symptoms. 
Interpreting Interactions between Improbable Threat Responses and 
Threat Aversion in Predicting Future OCD Symptoms 
Results partially supported the hypothesis that anxious reactivity to 
improbable threat would more robustly predict future OCD symptoms 
among those experiencing higher threat aversion. Specifically, anxiety 
ratings to improbable threat better predicted future OCD symptoms among 
those reporting greater levels of threat aversion, which was also the case for 
startle at a trend-level (p = .063). Moreover, even though the Improbable 
avoidance x Threat aversion interaction could not be interpreted due to an 
unacceptably high level of multicollinearity, avoidance of improbable threat 
was still a much stronger predictor of future OCD symptoms in the high 
threat aversion group compared to the low threat aversion group (which was 
also the case for anxiety and startle). Together, these findings suggest that 
anxious reactivity to improbable threat is more useful for identifying those at 
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elevated risk for future OCD symptoms when collected under conditions 
involving greater threat aversion. In other words, risk for OCD may be best 
elucidated within the PIG paradigm when fear-related responses are 
assessed in conditions most closely resembling an improbable catastrophe. 
Interestingly, similar effect patterns were not observed for threat 
expectancy, as the improbable threat expectancy x threat aversion interaction 
was interpretable (i.e., non- problematic multicollinearity) but did not 
approach significance (p = .78). This null result is consistent with the idea that 
the tendency to overestimate improbable threat is a more general bias that 
exists independent of the threat’s aversiveness, which is supported by results in 
the first two studies as well as in past experiments assessing threat estimates 
among OCD participants under conditions with low potential costs (Fear & 
Healy, 1997; Pélissier et al., 2002; Hermans et al., 2008). As such, the 
tendency to overestimate improbable threat likelihoods may serve as a marker 
of risk for OCD independent of subjective aversion to the particular outcome. 
Interpreting Null Associations between Threat Responses and Baseline OCD 
Symptoms 
The fact that OCD symptoms at baseline were not associated with 
improbable threat responses, including under conditions of higher threat 
aversion, is somewhat surprising since concurrent relations between these 
variables were found in both of the first two studies. One explanation for these 
null results is that the novel stress of the college environment elevated OCD 
symptoms among all participants regardless of whether they were sensitive to 
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improbable, threats or not, thereby thwarting associations between these threat 
responses and OCD symptoms. In other words, positive associations between 
baseline OCD symptoms and improbable threat responses may have been 
diluted by the fact that many participants had elevated OCD symptoms as a 
result of the transitionary stress of their first semester, and not because they 
possessed the underlying tendency to overrespond to these outcomes. 
In support of this explanation, OCI-R scores in the full sample 
decreased significantly from semester one to semester two, which is 
suggestive of decreasing environmental stress and/or greater adjustment. 
Importantly, this decrease mirrors results from a larger longitudinal 
investigation of first year college students, in which psychological distress and 
anxiety spiked during participants’ 1st semester, but increased much more 
mildly, decreased, or did not change during from their 1st to the 2nd semester 
(Conley, Kirsch, Dickson, & Bryant, 2014). Additionally, the experience of 
daily stressors among college students has been found to be a strong, 
concurrent predictor of OCI-R scores (Macatee, Capron, Schmidt, & Cougle, 
2013) independent of other psychological variables (e.g., distress tolerance). 
Together, these findings suggest students likely experienced more stress in 
their first relative to second semester, that such stress could have increased 
OCD symptom, and that this non-specific stress-induced increase could have 
reduced the strength of the relationship between OCD symptoms and 
improbable threat responses at baseline. This account would also explain why 
concurrent relations were found between OCD symptoms and improbable 
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threat responses in the first two studies but not this study, as samples in these 
former investigations consisted largely of participants who were past their first 
semester of college. However, because associations between stressful 
experiences and threat responses were not explicitly tested in the current study, 
this explanation remains speculative at the current time. 
Integrative Account of Prospective Relations between Threat 
Responses and OCD Symptoms 
Taken together, the particular constellation of effects involving future 
OCD symptoms in this study suggests that those at heightened risk for OCD 
may be identified on the basis of two threat-response characteristics. First, 
those susceptible to OCD may express a specific tendency to overestimate the 
likelihood of improbable threats. This tendency appears to exist regardless of 
how aversive the individual perceives the threat to be, consistent with future 
OCD symptoms being predicted by higher expectancy of improbable threat, 
but not the Improbable threat expectancy x Threat aversion interaction. 
Additionally, there are a variety of OCD-relevant traits and biases that may 
result in the likelihood of improbable threats being overestimated (see Chapter 
1, Section 1.5), which is suggestive of this overestimation being a stable 
characteristic in the disorder. 
Second, those at elevated risk for OCD may also demonstrate greater 
anxious reactivity toward improbable threats, but only when they are 
sufficiently averse to their potential consequences. For some, this heightened 
anxious reactivity to improbable threat may be elicited even if aversion to the 
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potential threat is quite low, perhaps as the result of being elevated on other, 
peripheral psychological factors that are both capable of exacerbating the 
experience of distress and have been linked to OCD (e.g., distress tolerance: 
Cougle, Timpano, Fitch, & Hawkins, 2011; intolerance of uncertainty: Tolin et 
al., 2003). Because of this, anxious responsivity to improbable threats may, on 
its own, distinguish individuals at increased risk for OCD—consistent with 
there being main effects of improbable threat anxiety and avoidance on future 
OCD symptoms. 
For some individuals however, anxious reactivity to improbable threat 
is not apparent unless aversion to the threat is sufficiently high. In other 
words, some individuals that are at elevated risk for OCD symptoms may look 
indistinguishable from others if their fear responses to improbable threat are 
collected when aversion to threat is low, and thus require conditions involving 
more aversive outcomes for their latent proclivity to react anxiously toward 
improbable threat to become observable. This explains why anxiety, startle, 
and avoidance of improbable threat seemed to be better detectors of future 
OCD symptoms among individuals for whom aversion to threat was high, as 
this subgroup included a greater proportion of participants whose latent 
proclivity to respond maladaptively to improbable threat had been revealed. 
Implications of Prospective Relations between Improbable Threat 
Responses and OCD Symptoms 
Although the presence of prospective, but not concurrent relations 
between improbable threat responses and OCD symptoms strongly suggests 
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that SIC is not merely a symptom of OCD, these results also cannot definitively 
implicate SIC as a causal vulnerability marker of the disorder. One major 
reason why this equivocation persists is that heightened reactivity to 
improbable, highly aversive threats mainly predicted the maintenance and/or 
decreased reduction of OCD symptoms, and not their development per se. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether SIC existed prior to the onset of the acutely 
stressful first semester period, thereby acting as a risk factor for future OCD 
symptoms, or was itself triggered by this transition, thereby functioning as a 
maintenance factor that predicts chronicity of previously developed OCD 
symptoms (Zvolensky et al., 2006). Moreover, even if SIC had temporally 
preceded and predicted the development of OCD symptoms, this would still not 
be enough to definitively implicate the sensitivity as a causal risk factor of 
OCD. Specifically, SIC could instead act as a proxy risk factor that predicts 
increased risk of OCD symptoms because it correlates with a third variable that 
itself is causally implicated in this disorder (Kraemer et al., 1997). 
Although establishing SIC as a bonified vulnerability marker is an 
important endeavor, this sensitivity could still be clinically useful as a 
maintenance factor. In particular, results from this study highlight the utility of 
SIC for helping distinguish between individuals with transiently elevated OCD 
symptoms versus those who may have developed a more chronic problem. 
Moreover, although the sample size and time course of this study are relatively 
small, the observed effect sizes are encouraging when it comes to the 
possibility of employing SIC-related measures in a clinical context. For 
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instance, among participants who were highly averse to shock, the proportion 
of variance in future OCD symptoms explained by anxiety and by avoidance 
of improbable threat was greater than what was explained by OCD symptoms 
at baseline. In other words, improbable threat responses among individuals 
with high threat aversion were even more useful in detecting future levels of 
OCD symptoms than the person’s current level of OCD symptomology. 
Additionally, it is encouraging that this degree of prediction was achieved with 
measures of behavioral (anxiety, avoidance), rather than psychophysiological 
(startle EMG) indices of threat responding, as the former’s more practical 
implementation provide a relatively more feasible pathway to clinical 
translation (Leneart et al., 2014). 
Predicting Future Specific OCD Symptoms from Threat Responses 
 
Overall, prospective relations between threat responses and future OCD 
symptoms were fairly consistent with what had been observed in the first 
study. Specifically, the most consistent effects were observed for washing, 
which was predicted by improbable threat reactivity for all four response types, 
and checking and ordering symptoms, which were predicted by all threat 
responses variables except for startle. Moreover, the interaction between 
improbable threat anxiety and threat aversion was strongest for washing and 
checking, which is reminiscent of these symptoms alone predicting heightened 
threat responding to improbable, highly aversive threats in study one. The 
relative consistency of effects involving washing, checking, and ordering 
symptoms might imply these OCD manifestations are simply more robustly 
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tied to SIC; however, the strength of their effects in the current study might 
also derive from them being particularly relevant to stressors associated with 
the collegiate environment. For instance, being exposed to a wider array of 
communicable diseases may be a particularly relevant trigger for washing 
symptoms, having to keep valuable possessions in shared spaces may be a 
particularly relevant trigger for checking symptoms, and having to live with a 
messy or unorganized roommate may be a particularly relevant trigger for 
ordering symptoms. Additionally, it bears noting that Washing, Checking, and 
Ordering tend to have some of the best psychometric properties among the 
OCI-R subscales, suggesting that found effects for these symptoms could 
partially reflect the fact that they are measured more reliably (Foa et al., 2002; 
Hajcak et al., 2004) 
Conclusions 
The current study examined whether a sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes represents a correlate or risk marker of OCD symptoms by testing 
concurrent and prospective relations between these variables across the first 
year of college. Results showed that individuals with higher threat expectancy, 
anxiety, and avoidance to improbable threats at baseline exhibited greater OCD 
symptoms at follow-up, while predictive effects involving anxious reactivity to 
improbable threats (subjective anxiety, startle, and avoidance) were stronger 
among participants who found threats more aversive. These findings are 
consistent with improbable threat reactivity acting as a vulnerability marker of 
OCD and suggest that susceptibility for OCD is most fully revealed when 
threat responses are collected in conditions approximating improbable 
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catastrophes. These results offer preliminary evidence that SIC could serve as a 
useful marker of risk for OCD and may be particularly helpful in discriminating 
between individuals with transient versus chronic symptoms of the illness.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Future Directions 
 
The overarching purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate three 
claims related to the relationship of improbable catastrophes to OCD: 1) That 
OCD involves a heightened sensitivity to improbable catastrophes (SIC), 2) 
that SIC is driven by a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of improbable 
threats, and 3) that SIC and its associated processes are specific to OCD rather 
than general to anxiety pathology. In this final chapter, I will revisit each of 
these claims in light of the results of the three preceding studies, reviewing how 
well they were supported and highlighting their remaining limitations. I will 
also present a preliminary model for how SIC could lead to the development of 
OCD symptoms and attempt to integrate the claims of this model with those 
outlined in OCD’s major etiological theories. Finally, I will conclude the 
chapter by offering some preliminary suggestions for how a sensitivity to 
improbable catastrophes could ultimately be used to improve the assessment 
and treatment of OCD.  
Question 1: Does OCD Involve a Heightened Sensitivity to Improbable 
Catastrophes? 
In the current studies, the claim that OCD involves a heightened 
sensitivity to improbable catastrophes was evaluated by examining whether 
participants reporting greater OCD symptoms exhibited higher anxious 
reactivity (anxiety ratings, startle, avoidance) to improbable threats that were 
also appraised as highly aversive. Because the experimental threat—electric 
shock—does not any direct relevance to OCD, any elevations in reactivity to 
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improbable, highly aversive threats among those with increased OCD 
symptoms likely reflect a more general sensitivity to improbable, highly 
aversive outcomes rather than a circumscribed aversion to electric shock. 
Similarly, the OCD assessment tool (i.e., the OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), does not 
pertain to consequences or even subtypes with particularly strong theoretical 
relevance to improbable, catastrophic threats, but rather assesses more general 
kinds of OCD symptoms (e.g., “I frequently get nasty thoughts and have 
difficulty in getting rid of them). As such, links between and improbable, highly 
averse threat responses found in the current studies may be more readily 
attributable to general OCD pathology as opposed to clinical subgroups who 
are particularly sensitive to improbable catastrophes. 
Overall, evidence that OCD is marked by a heightened sensitivity to 
improbable catastrophes was mixed. On one hand, results involving avoidance 
were quite robust: In each study, participants with higher OCD symptoms 
(whether measured concurrently or at a follow- up timepoint) were more likely 
to avoid the possibility of electric shock when it was both very unlikely (i.e., 
the stimulus was highly discrepant from the cue linked to electric shock) and 
very costly (i.e., the participant reported greater aversion to receiving electric 
shock). The consistency of this result is particularly noteworthy given that it 
was found in three different version of the experiment. These so-called 
“conceptual replications”—tests of the same question with different 
experimental parameters—often fail to replicate (Simons, 2014), suggesting 
that the strength of the relationship between OCD symptoms and avoidance of 
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improbable highly aversive threats was strong enough to overcome these 
methodological discrepancies. 
In contrast, findings with indices of passive anxious reactivity (startle, 
anxiety) were less consistent. On one hand, heightened anxiety to improbable 
threat in the third study predicted greater OCD symptoms at follow-up among 
those who reported greater threat aversion—a result that was also marginally 
significant for startle. However, greater threat aversion did not facilitate a 
stronger relationship between OCI-R scores and increased anxiety or startle to 
improbable threats in either of the first two studies. This finding was both 
inconsistent with avoidance results and with the hypothesis that OCD symptoms 
confers increased anxious reactivity to improbable catastrophes across threat 
responses. 
As discussed in chapter five, the discrepancy between passive and 
active responses is unlikely to be an artefact of the task. Specifically, any task-
related reasons that might have contributed to null results for passive responses 
in one study should have applied in all of them. This leaves the possibility that 
SIC is actually more likely to manifest as avoidance as opposed to anxiety in 
OCD, which is supported by the relative frequency of these two symptoms in 
the disorder: While virtually all OCD patients engage in some sort of 
compulsive avoidance behavior (Foa & Kozak, 1995), only some are motivated 
by anxiety as opposed to other reasons (e.g., disgust reduction, achieving ‘just-
not-rightness’, undoing the effect of obsessions; Starcevic et al., 2011). Thus, 
while behavioral (or perhaps mental) efforts to avoid improbable catastrophes 
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may be relatively constant across OCD patients, anxious apprehension of such 
events may be comparatively inconstant. 
Of note, the relative strength of results involving active versus passive 
threat responses is also consistent with more recent conceptualizations of OCD. 
Specifically, while etiological models of OCD have traditionally ascribed a 
more important role for obsessions in the pathogenesis of the illness, Gillan 
and colleagues have suggested that compulsive avoidance habits may actually 
develop prior to obsessional fears (Gillan et al., 2011; Gillan et al., 2014), 
which are merely post-hoc justifications for compulsive behavior (Gillan & 
Shakian, 2015). In the current studies, excessive habit formation may have 
contributed to avoidance arising earlier in the experiment relative to anxiety, 
which in turn would have made the former elevated to a greater degree among 
those with higher OCD symptoms when all trials across the experiment were 
averaged. Examining how OCD symptoms predicted changes in anxiety and 
avoidance throughout the PIG paradigm could be useful for validating this 
account and garnering further support for Gillan’s habit hypothesis more 
broadly. 
Differences between OCI-R subscales 
 
In addition to examining effects with overall OCI-R, exploratory tests 
with individual OCI-R subscales were conducted to assess whether certain 
OCD symptoms predicted heightened reactivity to improbable, highly aversive 
threats. Overall, results at the subscale level were less consistent compared to 
results with the overall OCI-R, making it difficult to identify a clear and 
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interpretable pattern. Indeed, the only subscales that showed any consistency 
were Washing and Checking. In the first study, Washing and Checking were 
the only OCI-R subscales that interacted positively with threat aversion in 
predicting avoidance of improbable threats. In study two, Washing and 
Checking again interacted with threat aversion in predicting avoidance of 
improbable threat, which was also true for Obsessing and Hoarding. Finally, in 
study three, Washing interacted positively with threat aversion in predicting 
anxiety ratings, as did Checking at the level of a trend; Obsessing was the only 
other subscale approached significance. 
There are at least two reasons for why results with Washing and 
Checking yielded the most consistent results. First, among the OCI-R 
subscales, Washing and Checking have the clearest theoretical links to OCD 
subtypes involving improbable catastrophes. Specifically, washing compulsions 
are often prompted by fears of contracting deadly diseases through improbable 
or even magical means (e.g., contracting HIV from a doorknob), while the 
checking- related items of the OCI-R relate to household security measures 
often enacted to prevent unlikely household disasters (e.g., checking locks to 
prevent burglaries, stoves to prevent fires, water taps to prevent floods). In 
contrast, other OCI-R subscales involve more general OCD symptoms (e.g., “I 
frequently get nasty thoughts and have trouble getting rid of them”) that could 
theoretically be elevated regardless of an underlying concern with improbable 
catastrophes. Thus, even though the Washing and Checking subscales do not 
explicitly mention improbable catastrophes, participants who were afraid of 
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improbable catastrophes might have been more likely to endorse items on these 
subscales. 
The second reason for the strength of results with the Washing and 
Checking subscales is that these symptoms offered the best ecological match to 
the behavioral avoidance assessed in the task (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4). 
Specifically, these subscales both involve taking discrete physical actions to 
avoid potential threats, while other OCI-R subscales like Neutralizing involve 
responses that more closely mirror mental or covert acts that OCD patients 
utilize for neutralization purposes (e.g., “I feel I have to repeat certain 
numbers”). Further evidence supporting the importance of an ecological match 
for subscale effects comes from the Hoarding and Obsessing subscales. For 
instance, even though the Hoarding is considered a separate diagnostic entity 
from OCD, its subscale also involves behavioral responses (e.g., “I avoid 
throwing things away because I’m afraid I might need them later”), perhaps 
explaining why it was among the only subscales to interact positively with 
threat aversion in predicting improbable threat avoidance for study two. 
Similarly, the Obsessing subscale, which arguably best approximate the 
tendency to become distressed or anxious (e.g., “I am upset by unpleasant 
thoughts that came into my mind against my will”), was among the only 
subscales to be predicted by a marginally significant interaction between 
improbable threat anxiety and threat aversion in study three. However, results 
with these two subscales were less consistent, making it difficult to confidently 
interpret the presence versus absence of their effects in specific studies. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Although findings from this dissertation offer strong preliminary 
evidence of links between OCD and heightened sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophe, there are at least two major limitations in the current work that 
should be addressed in future research. 
First, results from all studies were generated using non-clinical 
samples. More specifically, even though a fairly significant proportion of each 
study’s sample scored at or above the recommended clinical cut-off at which 
OCD is likely, the percent of each sample meeting diagnostic criteria for OCD 
is unclear. Because empirical models of OCD symptoms— including those 
using data from the OCI-R—suggest that OCD pathology is dimensional 
rather than categorical in nature (Olatunji et al., 2008), I do not believe this 
limitation necessarily affects the ability to infer that SIC is linked to the 
broader continuum of OCD pathology. 
Nonetheless, replicating the current study with clinical OCD participants 
would be useful for understanding how this sensitivity extends to more severe 
levels of OCD pathology. For instance, even though OCD symptoms did not 
consistently predict passive levels of reactivity to improbable, highly aversive 
threats, this relationship might still be present among individuals with more 
severe OCD. Moreover, because OCD patients are by definition experiencing 
clinical significant distress or impairment, studying their reactions to threat 
within the PIG paradigm would be instrumental for linking SIC to OCD-
related disruptions in daily living. 
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A second limitation when it comes to establishing links between OCD 
and SIC is that effects with specific OCD subtypes were not tested. A major 
tenet of the improbable catastrophe theory is that SIC is a generalized feature of 
OCD that applies across the disorder’s major subtypes. Thus, it will be 
necessary to test how patients with different primary obsessions respond to the 
same non-OCD-relevant improbable catastrophe, as this will allow SIC to be 
more confidently implicated as a unifying sensitivity that unites these disparate 
forms OCD together. 
In addition, replicating the current studies in a heterogeneous sample of 
OCD presentations could also help clarify the etiological role of SIC in OCD. 
For instance, it would be intriguing to examine whether levels of responding to 
improbable catastrophes in the task correlate with the number or severity of 
improbable, catastrophic fears reported by the OCD patient. Such work would 
be useful for understanding whether phenomenological differences in 
obsessions pertaining to improbable, catastrophes are indeed reflective of a 
greater sensitivity to these types of consequences. 
Question 2: Is the Sensitivity to Improbable Catastrophes Driven by an 
Overestimation of Improbable Event Likelihood? 
The second claim in this dissertation was evaluated by examining 
whether purported links between OCD and SIC were coincident with a 
tendency to overestimate improbable threat likelihood. Overall, support for this 
claim was quite strong, as OCD symptoms predicted heightened expectancy of 
improbable threat (but not more probable threat) in each of the three studies. 
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Moreover, the same point about conceptual replicability used to illustrate the 
strength of the avoidance findings arguably applies even more aptly to threat 
expectancy. Specifically, significant findings with threat expectancy were not 
only obtained using different versions of the experiment, but the changes that 
were made to the experiments are those that should theoretically have 
influenced results this threat outcome the most. This point is particularly 
applicable when considering the consistency of the threat expectancy results in 
studies one and two: These investigations assessed threat expectancy using 
different prompts (i.e., “Chance of shock?” vs. “Level of risk?”) and different 
scales (i.e., 10-point scale using percentage markers vs. 3-point Likert with 
‘none’ ‘some’, and ‘a lot’ as markers), but yielded virtually identical findings 
when it came to the effect size of OCI-R scores on these outcomes. 
Furthermore, OCD symptoms also predicted heightened threat expectancy to 
improbable harm- and disgust-related threats, further underscoring the 
robustness of the relationship between OCD and improbable threat 
overestimation. 
Improbable threat overestimation as a manifestation of doubt 
 
Although I did not test processes mediating relations between OCD 
and improbable threat expectancy, there are three features of the present 
findings that implicate excessive doubt as the underlying psychological 
process contributing to such effects. 
First, heightened estimates of improbable threat for those with elevated 
OCD symptoms did not extend to more probable threats in any of the three 
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studies. This suggests that OCD is characterized by a specific tendency to 
overestimate improbable events, rather than a more global proclivity to 
overestimates all types of aversive outcomes (OCCWG, 2003). Second, 
elevations that did occur for improbable threat were relatively slight: In both 
study one and study two, a +1 SD increase in OCD symptoms was only 
associated with a 5-10% increase in rated likelihood for improbable threat 
above the average 5% rating of the sample. These slight overestimations of 
improbable threat likelihood are arguably consistent with an increased 
proclivity to doubt, which should putatively surface as an inability to rule out 
an improbable event, resulting in an estimated likelihood just above zero. 
Finally, these slight and specific overestimations of improbable threat 
likelihood among those with elevated OCD symptoms occurred independent of 
threat aversion, suggesting they occurred regardless of how averse the 
individual was to the potential threat. This finding is consistent with past 
studies showing that OCD patients manifest doubt even in situation with mildly 
aversive consequences (Hermans et al., 2008) or no consequences at all (Fear 
& Healy, 1997; Pélissier et al., 2002). 
Interestingly, OCD symptoms often also predicted heightened anxious 
reactivity (startle, anxiety, avoidance) to improbable threats independent of 
threat aversion. Specifically, associations between OCD symptoms and 
improbable threat avoidance were found in all three studies, as were 
associations with startle in study one and anxiety in study three. Furthermore, 
in all cases except for those involving startle in study one, these associations 
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were clarified by an interaction involving threat aversion, such that 
associations between OCD symptoms and the index of improbable threat 
responding were stronger among participants who were more averse to threat. 
Thus, in contrast to results with threat expectancy, links between anxious 
reactivity to improbable threat and OCD symptoms were not fully independent 
of threat aversion. 
One explanation for these findings is that individuals with elevated 
OCD symptoms have different thresholds for whether they become anxious or 
avoidant to improbable threats. In other words, while those with elevated OCD 
symptoms might share a latent proclivity to doubt the non-occurrence of 
improbable threats, they may differ in how bothered they are by the possibility 
that such threat could occur. This would mean that at least some individuals 
with low thresholds for threat-related distress display anxiety and avoidance at 
low levels of threat aversion, thereby allowing simple two-way interactions 
between improbable threat anxiety/avoidance and OCD symptoms to surface. 
However, as threat aversion increases, individuals with elevated OCD 
symptoms and higher threat-distress thresholds may also begin to display 
anxious reactivity toward improbable threats, consistent with the relationship 
between improbable threat reactivity and OCD symptoms strengthening at 
higher levels of threat aversion. Though speculative, the notion of different 
threat-distress thresholds could explain why some debilitating OCD-relevant 
fears involve less objectively severe consequences (e.g., yelling profanities in 
church: Abramowitz, 2006; believing one is ugly: Phillips, 2006), which could 
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arise from individuals possessing lower threat-distress thresholds for particular, 
less severe outcomes. 
Overestimation of threat severity 
An additional possibility for why improbable catastrophe arise 
commonly in OCD is that those with the disorder overestimate the severity of 
catastrophic consequences. Studies one and two evaluated this hypothesis by 
testing whether OCD symptoms and threat aversion interacted to predict greater 
anxious reactivity, consistent with those elevated on OCD symptoms exhibiting 
greater anxiety and avoidance of events that are more subjectively aversive. 
However, neither of these interactions approached significance, indicating that 
OCD symptoms did not confer any additional anxious reactivity to highly 
aversive threats relative to the increase in reactivity associated with higher 
threat aversion across all participants. 
That OCD symptoms were associated with overestimating the 
likelihood of improbable threats, but not with anxious reactivity to highly 
aversive ones, is consistent with both past empirical evidence and with the 
theoretical properties of improbable catastrophes (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5). 
Empirically, evidence that OCD involves an overestimation of threat severity is 
much less robust than evidence for overestimated threat probability, as this 
association has been identified in some studies (Jones & Menzies, 1997; 
Woods et al. 2003; Moritz & Jelinek, 2009) but not others (Hinds, Woody, Van 
Ameringen, Schmidt, & Szechtman, 2012; Niemeyer et al., 2013; Zetsche et 
al., 2015). From a theoretical perspective, the objectively disastrous nature of 
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improbable catastrophes may render it difficult for any degree of inflated cost 
perception to sway one’s appraisal of these events’ overall aversive value 
(Salkovsks, 1996). For instance, if one (incorrectly) appraises contracting HIV 
from a doorknob as possible, it is hard to imagine that individual differences in 
the perceived cost contracting HIV would hold much sway over the decision to 
avoid the doorknob, as contracting HIV is an objectively awful consequence 
for all individuals. Thus, findings from the current studies are fairly consistent 
with past research and theory in demonstrating that the purported sensitivity to 
improbable catastrophes in OCD arises through a slight, perhaps doubt-
mediated overestimation of improbable threat likelihoods, as opposed to an 
overestimation of costs associated with catastrophic outcomes. 
Differences between OCI-R subscales 
 
In contrast to findings with other outcomes, positive associations 
between specific OCI-R subscales and elevated ratings of improbable threat 
expectancy were more widely distributed. To help compare the consistency of 
these effects, I assigned each OCI-R subscale a point value based on the 
significance of its association with improbable threat likelihood ratings in each 
of the four tests that evaluated this relationship: The OCI-R subscale x stimulus 
interaction in predicting threat likelihood in study one, the main effect of each 
OCI-R subscale in predicting risk ratings to improbable shock in study two, the 
main effect of each OCI-R subscale in predicting risk ratings to the improbable 
disgust-related threat in study two, and the main effect of improbable threat 
expectancy ratings on predicting future levels of each OCI-R subscale in study 
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three. Totals consistency ratings for each OCI-R subscale can be found below 
in Table 6.1. 




Note. OCI-R subscales were assigned a numeric value for each test based on 
the significance value: 0 (no significance; p > .10), 1 (marginal significance; p 
< .10), 2 (p < .05; significance), 3 (high significance; p < .01), or 4 (very high 
significance; p < .001). The tests were the (negative) OCI-R subscale x 
stimulus interaction in predicting threat expectancy ratings in study one; the 
OCI-R subscale main effect on improbable threat risk ratings for shock in 
study two; the OCI-R subscale main effect on improbable threat risk ratings for 
disgust in study two; and the effect of improbable threat expectancy ratings on 
future OCI-R subscales scores in study three. OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory Revised. 
 
According to this point system, most OCI-R subscales showed fairly 
consistency threat expectancy effects relative to each other, with two notable 
exceptions. First, effects involving the Hoarding subscale appeared to be the 
least consistent across the three studies. Hoarding is believed to possess a 
partially distinct etiology compared to OCD (Maier et al., 2004; Bloch et al., 
2014), and as of DSM-5 is considered a separate diagnosis (APA, 2013). This 
etiological distinction is fully consistent with hoarding being the OCI-R 
subscale least consistently associated with overestimating improbable threat 
likelihoods, as this tendency is proposed as the key abnormality behind the 
sensitivity (i.e., SIC) that putatively distinguishes OCD from other related 
conditions. Of course, hoarding-related behaviors are often made on the basis 
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of avoiding very low probability consequences (e.g., keeping a seemingly 
useless object on the belief that it may have utility in the future), making it 
sensible that links between hoarding symptoms and heightened improbable 
threat appraisals were at least partially supported. 
On the other hand, checking-related symptoms showed by far the most 
consistent relations with elevations in improbable threat likelihood. This 
pattern is intriguing given that checking is arguably the OCD symptom that has 
been most robustly linked to the proclivity to doubt in past studies. For 
instance, Samuels et al. (2017) found that while levels of self-reported doubt 
were associated with most OCD symptoms, its relationship to checking was by 
far the strongest. In further support, checking has also exhibited the most 
consistent associations with doubt-related measures in experimental studies 
(e.g., Macdonald et al., 1997; Hermans et al., 2003; Hermans et al., 2008). 
Thus, it could be that the proclivity to doubt which underlies OCD most 
potently triggers checking-related symptoms, which is consistent with this 
symptom being among the most common manifestations of the disorder 
(Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; Foa & Kozak, 1995). 
Alternatively, links between checking and doubt could be partly an 
artefact of how doubt has been defined or manipulated in both the current 
studies and previous ones. Past studies that have found links between doubt 
and checking have involved procedures or questions that couch the construct 
around reduced confidence for memory. For instance, experimental studies 
typically assessed doubt via self-report ratings of whether one has performed 
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or remembered some past action or experience accurately (Constans et al., 
1995; Macdonald et al., 1997; Tolin et al., 2001; Hermans et al., 2003; Cougle 
et al., 2007). This is also true of the lone correlational study of doubt by 
Samuels et al. (2017), who assessed the construct with the single question 
“After you have completed a task, do you doubt whether you have performed it 
correctly?”. Similarly, although doubt was not explicitly assessed in the 
current studies, reduced memory confidence is a likely candidate mechanism 
through which doubt could have exerted its influence, in particular uncertainty 
in recalling whether an improbable threat stimulus had previously coincided 
with shock. The relevance of reduced memory confidence to this study and 
past investigations may help explain the robustness of effects involving 
checking, which is arguably the manifestation of doubt that is most relevant to 
this symptom type. For instance, most prototypical examples of checking 
occur following repeated attempts to remember whether one performed some 
important household security-related task (e.g., locking the door, turning of the 
stove, shutting off the water, etc.). Accordingly, it is possible that using an 
experimental manipulation capable of eliciting different manifestations of 
doubt (e.g., doubt about whether one is an evil or immoral person) could allow 
the construct to show stronger relationships with different kinds of OCD 
symptoms (e.g., religious or aggressive obsessions). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
There are two major limitations of the current work when it comes to 
establishing the primacy of probability-based distortions relative to cost-
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based distortions in the genesis of SIC. First, although evidence favors a 
strong relationship between expectancy of improbable threat and OCD, the 
current studies were not designed to mechanistically link this tendency to 
SIC. Specifically, passive indices of threat responding (including threat 
expectancy) and active indices (i.e., avoidance) were assessed on separate, 
alternating trials, so I could not directly test whether overestimating the 
likelihood of improbable threat caused avoidance of such threats when paired 
with higher subjective costs. Indeed, it is possible that the reverse happened: 
Avoidance fostered increased estimations of improbable threat likelihood, 
which is consistent with Gillan and Shakian’s (2015) proposal that threat-
related beliefs (in the form of obsessions) are post-hoc justification for 
compulsive avoidance. As a middle ground, there could also be an interplay 
between avoidance and expectancy of improbable threat, wherein a (perhaps) 
doubt-mediated expectancy increase produces an initial avoidance behavior, 
which in turn insulates such expectancy beliefs from being disconfirmed. 
Future studies utilizing an experimental paradigm in which threat expectancy 
is collected immediately prior to avoidance choices could help clarify the 
temporal relationship between these variables, as could more advanced 
statistical techniques like modeling of avoidance and threat probability 
ratings on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Second, as alluded to earlier in this section, constructs mediating links 
between OCD symptoms and improbable threat expectancy effects were not 
measured. Thus, it cannot be definitively concluded that found associations 
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between improbable threat expectancy and OCD are mediated by doubt as 
opposed to a different process. Clarifying the contribution of doubt to this 
relationship could be done in two ways. First, the PIG paradigm could be 
amended to include more pointed questions about the degree to which doubt 
influenced one’s behavior in the task. For instance, participants could rate the 
degree to which they doubted whether stimuli from the improbable threat 
cluster were predictive of shock, or how confident they were that they 
accurately understood the rules of the task. This method is similar to what has 
been adopted in past studies (Constans et al., 1995; Macdonald et al., 1997; 
Tolin et al., 2001; Hermans et al., 2003; Cougle et al., 2007), and has proven 
useful for clarifying whether behavior within a paradigm is attributable to a 
doubt-related process. 
A second option is to examine whether links between OCD symptoms 
and estimates of improbable threat likelihood are mediated by doubt-related 
proclivities in the real-world. This type of investigation would be an especially 
useful step for verifying that the propose doubt- induced sensitivity to 
improbable catastrophes is relevant to OCD in everyday life. However, the 
only study to my knowledge that has attempted to evaluate real-world doubt-
related tendencies was Samuels et al. (2017), who assessed such proclivities 
with a single item. Thus, the lack of validated measures of doubt is a more 
global hindrance for OCD research that will need to be rectified before this 
particular limitation can be addressed. 




The final claim about SIC in these studies is that the process is a 
specific feature of OCD and not a more general feature of anxiety pathology. 
The specificity of SIC can be inferred from phenomenological differences 
between OCD and similar anxiety-related conditions, whose prototypical 
feared consequences tend to be more probable, less catastrophic, or both (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Moreover, while many threat-related distortions are 
shared across OCD and other anxiety disorders (e.g., Tolin et al., 2003), traits 
thought to produce the elevations in improbable threat likelihood deemed 
central to SIC (e.g., reduced confidence in cognitive abilities: Hermans et al., 
2008; inferential confusion: Aardema et al., 2005; magical ideation: Einstein 
& Menzies, 2006) tend to be more specific to OCD. 
In the current studies, evidence for the specificity of SIC to OCD was 
assessed by testing whether significant effects with OCI-R scores remained 
significant when a) controlling for broader anxiety-related personality factors 
(studies one and two) and b) whether longitudinal associations with 
improbable, highly aversive threat responses generalized to other types of 
anxiety symptoms (study three). Overall, no tests supported the notion that 
SIC, or the elevation in improbable threat likelihood putatively contributing to 
it, is a general feature of anxiety pathology. In study one, all positive effects 
with OCI-R (i.e., higher expectancy, startle, and avoidance to more improbable 
threats; higher avoidance to threat appraised as more aversive) remained 
unchanged when shared variance with trait anxiety was partitioned out. This 
was essentially the same finding in study two, where all found effects with 
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OCI-R (higher risk ratings and avoidance to improbable threat; higher 
avoidance of improbable threat rated as more aversive) remained significant 
despite levels of trait anxiety being controlled for. In study three, all the indices 
of improbable threat responding that significantly predicted changes in OCI-R 
scores (expectancy, anxiety, avoidance) failed to significantly predict changes 
in GAD or SAD symptoms. This specificity for predicting OCD symptoms also 
persisted when improbable threat rresponses were considered in conjunction 
with increased levels of threat aversion. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Although the above tests provide fairly strong evidence that SIC is not a 
general feature of anxiety pathology, they cannot definitively rule out the role 
of this sensitivity in specific anxiety disorders. Specifically, it could be the case 
that SIC, or an increased proclivity to doubt, applies to other types of disorders 
which may also involve fears of improbable, catastrophic situations. Perhaps 
the most critical disorder in which to address this limitation is specific phobia, 
particularly the environmental and situational subtypes. Many of the most 
common phobias within these subtypes involve scenarios whose consequences 
could be considered improbable catastrophes, including drowning, being 
caught in a natural disaster, or falling from a high height (APA, 2013). Of 
course, these fears could perhaps be more parsimoniously explained as 
evolutionary salient threats (Seligman, 1971), a categorization which helps 
explain the selectivity of specific phobia more generally. Nonetheless, SIC 
could be a more specific factor that pertains to both environmental and 
 
222 
situational phobias and OCD, which is line with findings showing that OCD 
co-occurs with these SP subtypes most frequently (Park et al., 2013). 
Etiological Implications 
 
Although data from this dissertation cannot be used to definitely 
identify the mechanism contributing the development of SIC, I believe there is 
sufficient evidence to tentatively conclude that this sensitivity arises through a 
distinct, two-step process. 
First, I propose that OCD confers a specific tendency to overestimate 
the likelihood of improbable outcomes. This difficulty may manifest as an 
inability to achieve complete certainty (i.e., doubt), an over-reliance on 
possibilities relative to sensory information (i.e., inferential confusion) belief in 
power of non-physical forces (i.e. magical thinking, thought-action fusion), or 
reduced confidence in one’s perceptions of reality (i.e., reduced cognitive 
confidence). Regardless of the particular trait mediating it, this distorted 
perception of improbable threat likelihood appears to possess three specific 
features. First, it is pervasive across situations and consequences. This feature 
is consistent with the finding that OCD predicted heightened expectancy of 
improbable threat independent of the outcome’s cost (i.e., threat aversion 
ratings) and threat modality (i.e., shock-related vs. disgust-related), and with 
behavioral and subjective indicators of doubt emerging even in situations 
involving benign or absent consequences (Fear & Healy, 1997; Hermans et al., 
2008). Second, this overestimation of improbable threat likelihood will usually 
be slight. This feature is consistent with OCD symptoms predicting significant 
 
223 
but relatively mild increases in improbable threat expectancy in both the 
current studies (see Figures 3.2 and 4.3) and past studies (e.g., Moritz & 
Jelinek, 2009) and with most OCD patients possessing intact insight into the 
senseless of their symptoms (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1995; Marazziti et al., 2002; 
Kishore et al., 2004). Finally, I contend that this slight, but pervasive 
overestimation of improbable threat likelihood is fairly unique to OCD, 
consistent with improbable threat expectancy effects remaining significant 
when controlling for trait anxiety (studies 1 and 2), not generalizing to other 
anxiety symptoms (study 3), and being uniquely elevated among OCD patients 
relative to those with other anxiety disorders (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5). 
Next, I propose that this slight, specific, and pervasive tendency to 
overestimate improbable event likelihoods may allow remote possibilities with 
higher subjective costs to become increasingly more likely triggers of obsessive 
thinking and compulsive behavior. Said another way, the tendency of OCD 
patients to overestimate improbable possibilities keeps fear of highly unlikely 
outcomes yoked to one’s perceptions of their costs, allowing such events to 
trigger distress and avoidance when paired with a sufficiently severe 
consequence. Support for this step comes from the observed linear relationship 
between perceived threat aversion and avoidance of improbable threats among 
those high but not low in OCD symptoms (see figures 3.4 and 4.4). This data 
suggests that individuals with higher OCD symptoms continued to consider the 
possibility of electric shock even when its chance was remote, allowing 
individual differences in threat aversion to remain relevant in their approach-
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avoidance calculus for improbable threats. 
This second step helps account for the phenomenological observation 
that those with OCD only fear certain improbable threats. Specifically, this 
step predicts that events with high objective costs will be the most likely 
triggers of OCD, as they will most easily elicit the high subjective costs 
necessary for translating the latent overestimation of improbable event 
likelihoods into manifest symptoms. This facet is consistent with most feared 
consequences in OCD being veridical catastrophes (e.g., catching HIV from 
a doorknob, going to hell, stabbing a family member), but still leaves open 
the possibility that outcomes with lower objective costs can elicit OCD 
symptoms if the individual possesses additional cost-related distortions that 
cause these situations to be perceived as subjectively catastrophic. This 
accounts for why some OCD- relevant consequences involve lower objective 
costs (e.g., yelling profanities in church, possessing an abnormality with 
appearance), but suggests that individuals fearing these outcomes must 
possess additional cost-related distortions that result in them being perceived 
as subjectively severe. Interestingly, the presentations associated with these 
consequences (somatic OCD, sexual OCD, hoarding) are often more 
common among patients with lower insight (Storch et al., 2008; Catapano et 
al., 2010; though see Matsunaga et al., 2002), perhaps indicating that these 
outcomes only trigger manifest symptoms among individual whose threat-
related perceptions deviate significantly from reality. 
In addition, step two is consistent with past data linking OCD to 
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certain cost-related distortions. On one hand, a number of traits 
conceptualized as producing inflated perceptions of costs (e.g., intolerance of 
uncertainty, inflated responsibility, perfectionism) have been repeatedly 
implicated in OCD. These traits may increase the subjective aversion to 
improbable events involving veridical catastrophes, or render improbable, less 
severe events subjectively catastrophic, thereby explaining why these factors 
still correlate with levels of OCD pathology. However, because objective 
catastrophes are sufficient to trigger distress on their own, cost- related 
distortions should not be necessary for OCD behaviors, perhaps explaining 
why links between OCD and these factors are more tenuous (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.5). Moreover, because cost-related distortions are incapable of 
eliciting OCD in the absence of the (initial) probability-based distortion, they 
should also not be distinguishing feature of the illness. This supposition is 
consistent with cost-based distortions being more generalized features of 
anxiety pathology rather than specific indicators of OCD. 
Application of mechanism to other threats 
 
To illustrate how the above mechanism could produce a sensitivity to 
improbable catastrophes specifically, I would like to briefly demonstrate how 
this process applies to consequence with different costs and probabilities. 
First, consider the choice to avoid the OCD- relevant improbable 
catastrophe—re-checking the stove to prevent a fire—outlined in chapter 1, 
where checking has an objective cost of -1 and a probability of 1, and losing 
one’s house to a fire (given that one checked) an objective cost of -100,000 
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and an objective probability of .000001. Although not checking is initially the 
favored option (i.e., [Checking: -1 x 1 = -1] < [Not Checking: -100,000 x 
.000001 = 0.1]), a small overestimation of threat probability (i.e., p = 
.00001 rather than p = .00001) would be sufficient to tip the balance in favor 
of checking because the consequence is objectively severe (i.e., [-1 x 1] 1 > - 
10[-100,000 x .0001]). Additional cost-based inflations could also increase the 
outcome’s overall aversive value (e.g., the person could be bothered by the 
idea that they would be responsible for the subsequent fire); however, these 
additional distortions are not necessary and would only become relevant in 
cases where the perceived probability appraisal is elevated significantly above 
zero. 
Next, apply this mechanism to the same scenario but substitute the 
consequence with a less severe (but still improbable) outcome: Ruining a 
new gas stove (e.g., -10). In this case, the same slight overestimation of event 
probability would be insufficient to motivate checking behavior. Indeed, only 
a relatively substantial overestimate of the event’s likelihood (i.e., appraising 
it as .10 or greater), perhaps in tandem with a separate cost-related 
overestimation, could result in checking becoming preferable. This is 
consistent with OCD sometimes involving improbable, less severe 
consequences, but with such outcomes being less typical. 
Next, consider a similar checking-related scenario involving a 
consequence with a higher probability and lower cost: Receiving a higher 
electric bill after forgetting to turn off a light. Because this outcome is at least 
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reasonably likely (e.g., probability = .20), the mechanism would predict that 
the specific tendency to overestimate improbable threats would not be relevant 
and thus no probability-based overestimation would occur. Moreover, while 
the person with OCD could find a slightly higher electric bill more aversive as 
the result of peripheral cost-related distortions (e.g., high perfectionistic 
standards), such a distortion is unlikely to ubiquitous across OCD cases (e.g., 
Martinelli et al., 2014) and is probably also shared with other anxiety disorders 
(e.g., Limburg et al., 2017). This suggests that this situation, at best, would not 
evoke increased checking behavior specifically for those with OCD. 
Finally, while consequences with high probabilities and high costs are 
undoubtedly distressing, such distress would also be clearly adaptive given the 
veridical danger of the outcome. For instance, if one does not remember 
turning off the stove and sees smoke coming from their house, checking is 
clearly the necessary response and would not be considered an OCD 
compulsion. Indeed, OCD patients are just as cautious with their choices as 
healthy and anxious controls when facing theoretical consequences involving 
high probabilities of severe harm (e.g., Foa et al., 2002). This evidence coheres 
with the face-valid assertion those with OCD should respond normatively in 
scenarios involving legitimate threats. 
Integration of SIC with current etiological models of OCD 
To conclude this section, I would like to briefly discuss how this 
proposed two-step mechanism could be integrated with the claims of OCD’s 
major etiological theories (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1 for a review of these 
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theories). Turning first to CAMs, a point of commonality is that OCD 
symptoms arise through an overestimation of threat. Moreover, both my model 
and CAMs contend that these threat-based distortions may look different across 
common OCD subtypes (e.g., involve different traits or belief structures), 
which critical in accounting for the phenomenological heterogeneity of OCD. 
The major point of departure between my model and CAMs is the type 
of threat-based distortion proposed: While my model places greater importance 
on traits that should result in overestimates of threat probability, those traits 
typically implicated in CAMs are more linked to overestimations of cost. 
These include beliefs about inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, 
perfectionism and others (OCCWG, 2003)—all of which generally pertain to 
cost- based rather than probability-based overestimations of threat (see Chapter 
1, Section 1.5). As reviewed earlier, the issue with explaining OCD symptoms 
via cost-based distortions is that these overestimates are a) not specific to OCD 
(e.g., Tolin et al., 2001), and b) not specific to catastrophic consequences. In 
other words, cost-based distortions cannot explain why those with OCD fear 
improbable catastrophes specifically or why fears of such events arise mainly 
in OCD. Nonetheless, my model still maintains that cost-based distortions can 
exacerbate OCD symptoms by augmenting the subjective severity of feared 
consequences, consistent with the empirically- supported role of such beliefs in 
OCD (e.g., Myers et al., 2008). 
Unlike CAMs, The IBA model (O’Connor, 2005) proposes that OCD 
symptoms arise primarily through a probability-based distortion, which is a 
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clear point of convergence with my model. Specifically, the IBA model 
contends that OCD symptoms originate with an initial doubting inference that 
results in a theoretical possibility (e.g., “Maybe my hands are dirty”) being 
treated as an actual probability. Although the IBA model attributes this 
doubting inference to failure in a reasoning process (inferential confusion) 
rather than an overestimation of improbable threat likelihood (as in my model), 
the end result is the same: The individual with OCD assigns a remote 
possibility an actual probability, allowing it to generate obsessive thinking and 
motivate compulsive behavior. 
Where my proposal diverges from the IBA model is in the second 
step: The IBA model does not attempt to explain why this original 
probability-based overestimation (or reasoning error) only leads to certain 
feared consequences, while my model proposes that this distortion only 
become problematic when paired with a sufficiently aversive outcome. 
Accordingly, the IBA model cannot explain why only certain possibilities 
trigger OCD symptoms. Moreover, the IBA model fails to integrate the surfeit 
of empirical evidence linking OCD to cost-based distortions that have nothing 
to do with probability-based reasoning errors (OCCWG, 2003; Myers et al., 
2008), which the second step of my model attempts to integrate. 
The claims of Szechtman and Woody’s (2004) Security-
Motivation-System (SMS) Theory seem to diverge more significantly 
from both model and from IBA and CAMs. Specifically, SMS theory 
conceptualizes OCD as a pathology of stopping rather than starting, 
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proposing that while all humans possess an SMS that responds to subtle 
and often hidden indications of danger, those with OCD lack the ability 
to terminate this threat system. As noted by other authors, the difficulty 
with integrating the SMS proposal with existing OCD theories is that its 
claims are difficult to operationalize and falsify (Taylor, McKay, & 
Abramowitz, 2005). For instance, the claim that the SMS is a universal 
human threat system implies that the starting mechanism of OCD 
symptoms should be similar across affected and unaffected persons; 
however, it is not clear how the existence of the SMS could be shown 
empirically (Taylor et al., 2005). A more specific issue with comparing 
SMS theory with my proposal is that the PIG paradigm is not designed 
to differentiate between abnormalities in starting versus stopping 
mechanisms: Threat responses are collected on a momentary as opposed 
to on-going basis (i.e., single button presses, startle to brief probes), so it 
is unknown whether those with elevated OCD symptoms in the current 
studies would have experienced more distress when disengaging from, 
for instance, a more protracted avoidance choice (see Hinds et al., 2012, 
for an example of such a paradigm). 
Perhaps the only claim of the SMS that my data can speak to is the 
nature of the threat response mediating the mechanisms contributing to OCD 
symptoms. Specifically, Szetchtman and Woody (2004) propose that the SMS 
operates in a largely non-cognitive manner, thereby emphasizing the 
importance of subjective feelings (e.g., anxiety, disgust, not-rightness) and 
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physiological responses relative to cognitively-based beliefs and/or threat 
appraisals. Data from my studies indicate that those with elevated OCD 
symptoms may indeed exhibit heightened subjective feelings (i.e., subjective 
anxiety ratings) and physiological responses (i.e., startle) to the sort of subtle 
indications of danger (i.e., cues that are highly dissimilar from danger) that the 
SMS proposes. However, much more consistent evidence was gleaned for 
beliefs about the risk of improbable threat (i.e. threat expectancy ratings) in my 
studies, which is not the pattern one would be expect if such responses were 
the secondary outlet of symptom manifestations as claimed by the SMS 
theory. 
Finally, regarding Gillian’s habit hypothesis (Gillan, & Sahakian, 
2015), it is clear that there is marked divergence from my proposed model. 
Specifically, Gillan maintains that compulsions—which are excessively 
engrained habits—are the primary driver of OCD symptoms, while 
obsessions are merely post-hoc justification for compulsive behavior. In 
contrast, my model, as well as traditional OCD theories, maintain that it is 
the misappraisal of the feared consequence associated with obsessional 
content that produces discomfort, which in turns motivates the desire for 
compulsive avoidance. While Gillan presents compelling experimental 
(Gillan et al., 2011; Gillan et al., 2014) and neurobiological (Graybiel, 1997) 
evidence for the proposition that OCD involves excessive habit formation, a 
major shortcoming of her proposal is that it cannot explain why this 
abnormality leads to only certain OCD presentations. More specifically, 
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there are many actions that could theoretically become habitual, and there 
are many post-hoc justifications one could make to explain their odd, 
habitual behaviors; therefore, if excessive habit formation is the sole 
contributor to OCD, one would expect a seemingly endless variety of 
compulsions (i.e. habitual actions) and obsessions (i.e. post-hoc 
justifications) to be associated with the disorder. 
Nonetheless, Gillan’s theory does bring attention to some important 
phenomenological features of OCD that are left unaccounted for by both my 
model and others. Chief among these is the fact that a non-trivial proportion of 
those with OCD are unable to identify an explicit feared consequence driving 
their compulsive behavior (Starcevic et al., 2011). This phenomenological 
subtype appears to be especially prevalent in cases of child OCD, as Swedo et 
al. (1989) reports that virtually all young children with OCD in their sample 
were unable to identify a specific reason for their compulsions. Perhaps more 
problematic is the fact that most patients with symmetry/ordering symptoms, 
which are the third-most common OCD presentation (Rasmussen & Eisen, 
1992; Foa & Koza, 1995), report that this preoccupation is driven by an internal 
feeling of ‘not-rightness’ rather than a fear of an explicit consequence 
(Summerfeldt et al., 2015). Thus, theories that base their understanding of OCD 
symptoms on a misappraisal of feared consequences must explain how the 
disorder develops in those reporting no explicit consequence at all. 
Although the data collected for this dissertation is far from capable of 
addressing this issue, one tentative explanation is that SIC preferentially 
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surfaces in an unconscious and behavioral manner early in life. Moreover, this 
early manifestation of SIC may primarily gear children toward maintaining 
order and stability in their environment, which as pointed out Szechtman and 
Woody (2004) could be an adaptive way to prevent subtle and hidden threats to 
survival (i.e., improbable catastrophes). In support, symmetry/ordering is the 
presentation the most OCD patients recall developing first (Pinto et al., 2008), 
and is typically the first sign of dysfunction to parents of OCD children 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 2004); however, this tendency toward order could 
also manifest as rigidly repeating other everyday actions (e.g., handwashing), 
which is necessary for explaining why other OCD presentations also develop 
early on in childhood. Regardless of the particular OCD symptom that arises, 
conscious manifestations of SIC may not appear until later on in development. 
For instance, explicit beliefs surrounding the possibility of improbable 
catastrophes may not come online until more abstract reasoning processes have 
sufficiently developed. Moreover, repetitive actions gear toward environmental 
stability may represent a precautionary strategy for mitigating potential danger 
(i.e., a better- safe-than-sorry strategy; Smeets, de Jong, & Mayer, 2000), 
rather than a response to anxiety, which does not arise until later. In support, 
Zohar et al. (1997) found that repetitive, OCD-like behaviors in children only 
became associated with anxiety in later adolescence, and experimental 
evidence has repeatedly shown that engaging in safety behaviors can 
paradoxically produce increases in anxious feelings (e.g., van den Hout et al., 




Of course, this particular developmental ordering of SIC-mediated 
threat responses would only apply to those with early-onset OCD: The majority 
of those who develop OCD in their early 20s (Delorme et al., 2005) may still 
first experience SIC via cognitive intrusions around a specific possibility (e.g., 
“what if I stab my infant?”), which matches phenomenological rreports in a 
variety of case studies and forms the basis for most etiological theories of OCD 
(OCCWG, 2003). Regardless, this speculative proposition clearly requires a 
great deal more research to validate, in particular when it comes to whether 
SIC manifests differently in children versus adults or early-onset cases versus 
later-onset cases. Similarly, it remains unclear at this point how presentations 
involving symmetry/ordering figure into the broader SIC theory, which is an 





There are two major challenges faced by current OCD assessment tools 
that an experimental measure of SIC could help address. The first challenge is 
that the course of OCD can be quite variable: Although most cases are chronic 
(Perugi et al.,1998), many individuals experience full or partial remission of 
symptoms over time (Angst et al., 2004), while as many as 10% experience 
gradually worsening symptoms (Goodwin et al., 1969). Moreover, although 
those prone to a chronic course sometimes possess certain clinical features 
(e.g., more severe OCD symptoms, earlier age of onset; Perugi et al., 1998), 
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these features are associated with only marginally higher odds of chronicity, 
which therefore remains a difficult phenomenon to predict. The inability to 
adequately discriminate between patients with transient versus chronic OCD is 
also problematic: Clinical resources (e.g., clinician proximity and availability) 
and patient resources (e.g., money) are often scarce (Marques et al., 2010), and 
should thus ideally be  devoted to a problem that is less likely to remit naturally 
over time. 
Results from study three illustrate how measures of SIC could be 
helpful for addressing this particular clinical barrier. Based on the distribution 
of OCI-R scores, a significant number of participants reported high enough 
levels of OCD-related distress or impairment in their first semester of college 
to potentially garner some degree of clinical attention. Treating all individuals 
with these elevations, however, would in reality be a woefully inefficient use of 
resources, as many of them would ultimately experience a natural decrease in 
OCD symptoms by their second semester. Moreover, identification of students 
that would experience this decrease was only partially clarified using the OCD 
assessment tool (i.e., the OCI-R) used in this study, as shown by the fact that 
close to 85% of the variance in future OCI-R scores remained unexplained by 
OCI-R scores at baseline. Accordingly, the additional variance explained by 
improbable threat response in the PIG paradigm could help disambiguate 
individuals with temporary, perhaps stress-induced OCD elevations versus 
those with a more intractable issue. In this way, instruments measuring SIC 
could perhaps help providers with limited clinical resources better decide 
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which patients with similar levels of OCD symptoms are in more need of 
immediate intervention. 
A second, related challenge faced by current OCD assessment methods 
is the inability to identify premorbid risk for OCD. As is the case for all 
mental illnesses, there is currently no objective test capable of accurately 
detecting OCD susceptibility in currently unaffected individuals (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013). As a result, OCD cannot be identified (or technically even 
diagnosed) until the individual has experienced some clinically significant 
degree of distress or impairment in daily living, during which time the initially 
willful decision to avoid a potential consequence could translate into a more 
irresistible and compulsive habit (Hyman & Pedrick, 2009; Denys, 2011). 
Thus, identifying OCD-relevant markers that exist prior to and independent of 
OCD-related distress could be an immensely useful first step in preventing the 
compulsive cycle of OCD from beginning in at-risk individuals. 
Arguably, results from study three are more consistent with SIC being 
a vulnerability marker than a correlate of OCD, as responses to improbable, 
highly aversive threat strongly predicted future, but not concurrent OCI-R 
scores. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, this data alone cannot 
definitively implicate SIC as a premorbid vulnerability marker of OCD. For 
instance, the stress of the first semester of college could have triggered the 
development of SIC among those with higher but not lower levels of OCD, 
thereby allowing the sensitivity to act as a useful predictor of OCD symptom 
maintenance but perhaps not a pre-stressor indicator of future OCD. Moreover, 
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even though SIC was able to strongly predict future OCD symptoms, it is 
unclear whether its predicted variance is redundant with that of other, more 
economical measures of OCD risk. For instance, it could be the case that SIC 
predicts small or even significant variance in future OCD symptoms after 
controlling for relevant demographics factors like gender, age-of-onset, and 
marital status (Fontenelle & Hasler, 2008) or broad psychological factors like 
general negative affect (Grisham et al., 2011). 
Although more research is clearly needed to establish SIC as a useful 
marker of vulnerability or maintenance, there are two aspects of the present 
results that are particularly encouraging in regard to the sensitivity’s potential 
clinical translation. First, the consistent and strongest effects in all three studies 
were with behavioral measures (i.e., avoidance, threat expectancy) as opposed 
to psychophysiological ones (i.e., startle EMG). Although this does not rule out 
the possibility that other types of psychophysiological measures (e.g., skin 
conductance, EEG) could do a better job of identifying those with persistence 
OCD symptoms, the fact that positive effects with fairly non-invasive 
behavioral tools is a promising sign for clinical translation. Second, and 
relatedly, predictive effects with this these behavioral measures were quite 
strong. In the third study, between 7 – 10% of additional variance in future 
OCD symptoms was predicted by behavioral responses to improbable threat. 
When considering only participants who were highly averse to threat, this 
increase in predictive accuracy was even greater: 15.6% of the variance in 
future OCD symptoms was explained by anxiety to improbable threat and 
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19.9% by avoidance of improbable threat. It is unknown whether this degree of 
predictive accuracy will be  replicated in larger and longer study, or whether it 
would outweigh the practical cost of implementing the PIG in a particular OCD 
clinic; however, the strength of this effect is still a highly encouraging albeit 




Regarding treatment implications, perhaps the most useful application 
of SIC is to inform a more unified and simplified type of OCD intervention. 
OCD is known to shift over time from one type of presentation to another 
(Rettew et al., 1992), potentially undoing much of the progress that was 
achieved by addressing a particular set of OCD symptoms. Moreover, over half 
of OCD patients express four or more distinct subtypes (Ruscio et al., 2011), 
which presents as a major challenge for clinicians attempting to establish, 
order, and treat multiple symptom hierarchies in EX/RP. Accordingly, 
interventions aimed at addressing a more fundamental sensitivity like SIC 
could be tremendously beneficial for efficiently treating patients prone to a 
wide variety of OCD manifestations. 
There are two ways that SIC could be implemented to help unify extant 
OCD interventions for treatment of multiple subtypes. First, existing CBT 
protocols could be adapted to incorporate SIC as a secondary and adjunctive 
treatment target. For instance, clinicians could make patients aware of SIC as a 
general bias contributing to their various symptom manifestations, perhaps 
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affording them a more coherent and normalizing account of what are often 
perceived as bizarre or shameful concerns (Weingarden & Renshaw, 2015). 
Knowledge of this underlying predilection to fear improbable catastrophes 
could also help patients more effectively cope with the genesis of new intrusive 
thoughts. For instance, suddenly having a novel, fleeting urge to stab one’s 
child could be highly distressing, unexpected, and demoralizing for a patient 
whose OCD had previously been confined to contamination. However, 
appraising this thought as merely a different manifestation of an existing 
sensitivity to improbable catastrophes could help normalize its presence and 
make it less likely to trigger the sort of aggressive thought suppression that is 
believed to paradoxically increase the frequency and intensity of obsessive 
thoughts (Smàri & Hòlmsteinsson, 2001; Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, & 
Foa, 2002; though see Janeck & Calamari, 1999). 
The second way to incorporate SIC into OCD treatment is to make the 
process a more central component of an existing evidence-based intervention 
like EX/RP. In this option, the overarching goal of treatment would be to 
address the underlying tendency to fear and avoid improbable catastrophes, 
rather than attempting to reduce different types of obsessions and compulsions 
in a piecemeal fashion. For instance, rather than composing separate symptom 
hierarchies categorized by OCD subtype, one general hierarchy could be made 
that is ordered based on the perceived probability and aversiveness of each 
feared consequence. Ideally, proceeding through this hierarchy would allow the 
patient to become gradually more aware of their tendency to overestimate the 
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risk of improbable catastrophes in general, which could subsequently be 
applied to any new or untreated obsession that had gone previously 
unaddressed. 
This unified treatment could also be tailored to address the 
overestimation of improbable threat likelihood that putatively contributing to 
SIC. Indeed, Inference-Based Therapy (IBT; O’Connor et al., 2005) addresses 
a specific probability-based distortion—excessive doubt—by teaching patients 
OCD patient to rely more on sensory information (e.g., “I felt the door is 
locked, therefore it is locked”) as opposed to possibility-based information 
(e.g., “Maybe I am remembering a different time I locked the door”). Results 
from IBT have thus far been highly encouraging, showing equivalent efficacy 
to EX/RP in its two extant clinical trials (O’Connor et al., 2005; Visser et al., 
2015), and even better efficacy among patients with very poor insight (Visser 
et al., 2015). Using IBT as a guide, other complementary modules could also 
be developed to address overestimations of improbable threat likelihood that 
surface through other traits (e.g., magical thinking, sympathetic magic). 
Additionally, extant OCD treatments could also be adapted to address inflated 
perceptions of threat-related costs, which while not conceived as a necessary 
component of SIC, could nonetheless render improbable catastrophes more 
aversive and thus more difficult to face during treatment. Indeed, clinicians 
have long noted that many OCD patients with intact perceptions of threat 
probability may continue to exhibit symptoms if they possess (additional) 
overestimations in their feared consequences’ costs (Carr, 1974; Van Oppen & 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to outline and test the theory that 
OCD is characterized by an underlying sensitivity to improbable catastrophes 
(SIC). The presence of this sensitivity is implied by the ubiquity of feared 
outcomes across diverse forms of OCD that involve both very low likelihoods 
and very high subjective costs. Moreover, other anxiety- related conditions 
typically involve feared consequences involving different cost and probability 
combinations, suggesting SIC uniquely contributes to the development of 
OCD. However, no studies to date had explicitly examined relations between 
OCD symptoms and responses to threats of varying probability and subjective 
aversiveness to confirm that those elevated on such ymptoms actually respond 
most anxiously to improbable, catastrophic outcomes. 
Overall, results offer strong initial support for the theory that OCD 
involves a heightened sensitivity to improbable catastrophes. In the first study, 
those with elevated OCD symptoms showed greatest avoidance when threats 
were improbable and highly aversive, as well as greater startle, avoidance, and 
expectancy of improbable threats more generally. These results were largely 
replicated in study two, where those higher on OCD symptoms demonstrated 
heightened threat expectancy to improbable (but not more probable) threat 
involving both harmful and disgust-related consequences, as well as greater 
avoidance of improbable, highly aversive threats involving harm. Study three 
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further extended these results by showing that first-semester students who were 
expectant, anxious, and avoidant of improbable threat reported higher levels 
OCD symptoms their second semester, with indices of anxious reactivity to 
improbable outcomes (anxiety ratings, avoidance, startle responses) emerging 
as even stronger predictors of future OCD symptoms among those who found 
the experimental threat highly aversive. Thus, OCD symptoms were 
consistently associated with greater avoidance and (to a lesser extent) anxiety 
when threats most approximated improbable catastrophes, as well as greater 
tendencies to overestimate the likelihood of improbable threat independent of 
their perceived aversiveness. 
Together, these results implicate a sensitivity to improbable 
catastrophes as a novel pathogenic marker of OCD, which may be particularly 
evident through avoidance behavior, and perhaps driven by the pairing of a 
more general proclivity to overestimate the likelihood of improbable events in 
a situation bearing a subjectively costly consequence. Future research should 
build upon these findings in clinical samples consisting of patients with both 
different OCD presentations and other anxiety diagnoses, which would be 
instrumental in establishing SIC as a sensitive and specific marker of OCD. 
Moreover, altered version of the experimental paradigm used to assess SIC, as 
well as measurement of other OCD-relevant constructs, could further clarify 
whether the purported sensitivity to improbable catastrophes is the result of 
elevations in traits believed to inflate one’s perception of risk for improbable 
events (e.g., proclivity to doubt). Ultimately, SIC and its associated 
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mechanisms could be useful for distinguishing between persistent and 
transient forms of OCD and for augmenting the ability of existing 
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